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PREFACE

The purpose of this study is to investigate thoroughly the
effect of Agesilaos' career on the Greek world from 404 to 377 B.C.
The usefulness and originality of the study lie partly in its being
the first comprehensive treatment of the king in more than a century.
It is also the first to incorporate fully the writings of the
Oxyrhynchos historian in its presentation of events.

Moreover, it

offers several new interpretations of particular developments and
trends.
Because modern historians have limited their works to one

'
aspect or another of Agesilaos' career or have simply
written lengthy
surveys of the epoch,

such questions as the nature of politics in

Sparta, the extent to which Agesilaos and his friends created the
Spartan hegemony, and the degree to which his designs were opposed
have not been adequately addressed.

This study attempts to bring these

and other matters into clear and coherent focus.
A final note: the abbreviations for journal citations which
appear in the notes throughout this work are those standard in L'ann'e
philologique.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

k~D

EVALUATION OF THE ANCIENT SOURCES

Agesilaos II became king at a critical juncture in Spartan
history.

During his long reign (ca. 399-360 B.C.), he witnessed

both the zenith of Sparta's power and her irreversible decline after
the battle of Leuktra.

The background to his accession,· the unusual

manner in which it occurred, his highly effective campaign in AsiE!
~finer,

the role he played in the conduct and settlement of the

Kor:.i.nthian War and his control of Spartan policy in the decade following th£: settlement are the subjects of later chapters.

First, hm-:-·

ever, a urief discussion is needed of the ancient evidence upon
~nderst~nding

of Agesilaos' influence on Spartan

politic~

whit::~·

must rest.

Epigraphical remains will often clarify aspects of Greek
militar-y, diplomatic and political life while Agesilaos ,,r:J.s king .

1

Yet with a single exception from the ArteEision at Ephesos there ar.e
')

no ancient inscriptions which directly attest to Agesilaos.~
Similarly there is no numismatic material bearing on him since

th·~

1
The most convenient collections of these remains are Heiggs
and Lewis' Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End £f the Fifth
Centu~~-f., Oxford, 1971, and Tad's Greek Historical Inscriptions,
VoL 2, Oxford, 1968. Bengtson's Staatsvertrage des Altertums, Vol. 2,
Munich, 1962, which combines epigraphic and literary material, is also
a very valuable tool for research: see the bibliography.

2 Borker, "Konig Agesilaos von Sparta und der ArtemisTempe! in Ephesos," ZPE 37, 1980, 69-75 and Hesenberg, "Agesilaos
in Artemision," ZPE 41, 1981, 175-180, discuss the nature and
significance of this inscription: see also ch. 5.
1

2

Spartans steadfastly refused to mint their
century after the king's death. 3

o~vn

coinage for nearly a

Thus knowledge of Agesilaos' life

and influence must be derived almost exclusively from literary sources.
Xenophon
The most extensive contemporary source for
is the works of his personal friend Xenophon.

t~e

king's life

Of Xenophon's many

extant works, the Hellenika and his enkomion the Agesilaos are of
primary importance.

Although the

enkor~ion

preserves biographical

details of Agesilaos' career, it is more an uncritical eulogy written
after the king had died, perhaps as a gift to his son Archidamos·.

That

Xenophon used the Hellenika extensively to compose it is clear becaus'=:
often the description of events in the enkcmion parallels almost
verbatim corresponding passages of the Hell~nika. 4

The enkomion omits

3

Jenkins, Ancient Greek Coins, New York, 1972, 11, writes
"In Sparta, in fact, there was a rigid and typically puritanical
prohibition of the use of coined money which persisted until the
third century B.C." Nonetheless. on certain occasions the survival
of coins supplements our knowledge of Spartan policy. Thus, ~vorks
such as Hill's Greek Historical Coins, Chicago, 1976, and Kraay and
Eirmer's Greek Coins, New York, 1966, will aid the understanding of
Sparta-Persian relations from 404-387 and provide evidence of the
decline of Sparta's influence in the Aegean after the battle of
Knidos in 394.
4

Lesky, Geschichte der Griechischen Literatur, Munich,
1971 (3rd ed.), 694, 777, notes that Xenophon used his Hellenika as
a source for composing the enkomion which, along ~dth Isokrates'
~uagoras, served as a model for similar works in the future.
See
also Baloch, Griechische Geschichte, Vol. 3.1 (2nd ed.)~ Berlin,
1927, 401; Ed. Meyer, Geschichte des Altertums, Vol. 4.1 (4th ed.),
Stuttgart, 1958, 260; and Breitenbach, RE 9A.2, 1671.

3

events not reflecting favorably on Agesilaos, 5 yet details not
preserved elsewhere occasionally occur.

The problem of the Hellenika

is more complex because the work purports to be a general history of
the Greek world from 411 to 362 B.C.

In such a work Agesilaos,

though prominent, is merely one individual among many whose deeds are
recorded.

It is therefore necessary to consider briefly Xenophon's

worth as an historian, not as an encomiastic biographer or essayist.
Several distinct problems emerge almost at once.

In the wake

of Athens' defeat and the excesses of the restored democracy (one of
which was the execution of his mentor Sokrates), Xenophon adopted
what became a communis opinio in an age when the Spartans were restoring

'
~aTplOl

deep suspicion.

I
~OAlT€lal.

Many came to look

upv~

democracy with

It seemed to lead eventually to mob rule and

tyrannical imperialism which deprived victims of autonomy and freedom.6

The victorious Spartans sought to remedy such excesses and

secure their own hegemony by imposing "ancestral constitutions" •vhich
were in effect pro-Spartan oligarchies.
Another influence which affected Xenophon (and Plato for
that matter) was a growing admiration for monarchy.

Xenophon's

Swestlake, "Individuals in Xenophon's Hellenica," Essays on
Greek Historians and Greek History, New York, 1969, 222, n.41, observes
for example that the enkomion makes no allusion to the conflict in Asia
Minor between Agesilaos and Lysander.
6Meyer, Vol. 5, 2i3-75; Lesky, 691-93.

4

service tdth Kyros the Younger's Greek mercenaries exposed him to a man
whom he later regarded as a model for the ideal ruler.

Kyros the

Younger apparently embodied many of the virtues which Xenophon would describe in his imaginary biography of Kyros the Great, the founder of
the Persian empire.

Thus it is important to recall that because of his

disenchantment with democracy, Xenophon developed this strong undercurrent of sympathy for monarchic rule. 7
A second tendency in the Hellenika is a distinct philolakonian
bias.

While Xenophon is not blind to certain defects of the Spartan

character and at times takes exception to Spartan conduct, 8 he evinces
~

generally favorable outlook on the _polis \vhich provided him with his

Eleian estAte at Skillous.

As Grote observed long ago, 9 Xenophon cot>ld

obtain copious information on Greek politics from pro-Spartan sources,
while composing his \vork from a Lakedaimonian point of view, because he
lived only 3.7 km. south of Olympia.

7•-:..1,eyer, Vol. 5 , 360•' Le s ky, 694 .
8 For example Xenophon believed that the Spartans had incurred
divine displeasure for their hybristic seizure of the Kadmeia in 382 B.C.
~ell. 5.4.1).
He also records the wide-spread resentment of Agesilaos'
campaign against Phlious in 381 (He 11. 5. 3. 16) .
9

Grote,
Others have also
Meyer, Vol. 4.1,
ians, Lexington,

A History of Greece, London, 1888, Vol. 7, 345.
commented on this pro-Spartan perspective; see
260-61; Lesky, 694; and Bro\vn, The Greek HistorMass., 1973, 95,- for example.

5

Now that the two most salient traits of the Hellenika have
been identified, it remains only to estimate Xenophon's worth as an
historian.

In antiquity Xenophon was usually regarded as more the

philosopher than a historian.

He tends to oversimplify and after the

second book of the Hellenika, his work lacks the coherence of
perspective from

~.;ithin

Sparta itself.

10

In the later books of the

Hellenika he retA;ns only a certain sympathy for the Spartans.
deficiencies most clearly emerge.

Here his

He was unable to discern a pattern

in the great welter of data before him, presenting only certain somewhat
disjointed episodes which lent themselves to compelling literary treatment.

He entirely neglected the career of Epameinondas until the end

of the

Hel~enika

where he only grudgingly admitted that the great Theban

was a brilliant general.

He passed over in silence the Boiotian

constitution and the changes it underwent after 386.

He makes no refer-

ence to the revival of Athens' maritime league in 377 and failed to
explain the causes and significance of Kinadon's conspiracy at Sparta
in 398.

These

omissions lay bare his difficulty in rendering data into

a coherent and meaningful whole despite his considerable literary
ability . 11
Some scholars have judged Xenophon rather harshly. 12
has taken a more balanced approach.

Heyer

He admits that the Hellenika betray

lOBrown, 96.
llLesky, 693; Brown, 96.
12Beloch, 3.1, 401, remarks that "Xenophon's Griechische
Geschichte ••• ist kaum mehr als eine recht unvollstandige

6

much evidence of bias and partiality, but cautions that it \Wuld be a
mistake in most cases to doubt the reliability of the evidence which
Xenophvn presents.

13

On balance then, Xenophon's testimony about Agesilaos must
he approached with certain things in mind.

It i.s necessary to be

atlare of Xenophon' s monarchic sympathies and qualified pro-Spartan
perspective.

As a friend of Agesilaos he almost always strove to

present his benefactor in a favorable light.

This tendency caused him

to gloss over or suppress what another author would set forth routinely.
Finally there is a clearly episodic tone to the Helleni.ka in which
Xenophon sketches certain details with great literary flair.

The work

nonetheless is marred by serious omissior,.:;, occasional negligence,
antipathy to Thebes and a lack of thematic and interpretative unity.
Also because Xenophon abandoned Thucydides' scheme of dividing years
.into sununer and '-:inter phases after book two, his chronology often is
vague and confused. 14
Although as an historian Xenophon falls short of the stature
of Herodotus or Thucydides, he is still valuable and the information

Materialensammlung, die in diese Form 'vahrscheinlich gar nicht zur
Herausgabe bestimmt war." Hatzfeld, Les Hellefniques de Xenophon,
Vol. 1, Paris, 1939, 15, wrote that Xenophon lacked the qualities of
a true historian, grasping as he did only details, not substance.
See also Jacoby, RE Suppl. 2, 513.
13Meyer, Vol. 4.1, 263.
14

Breitenbach, RE 9A.2, 1671-72.

7

"t.;hi.ch he presents, tvhile incomplete, is usually reliable.

15

The Oxyrhynchos Historian
A contemporary of Xenophon who also wrote a continuation of
Thucydides' work is the as yet unidentified Oxyrhynchos historian,
usually referred to as P.

Some tantalizing problems emerged with the

ptililication of fragments from this author's work.
that P continued Thucydides' history. 16

The consensus is

It was originally supposed

that P concluded his history with the battle of Knidos in 394, but
with the publication of additional fragments in 1949, some scholars
decided that he carried his account of Greek affairs
tio.1 of the King's Peace in 386. 17
the author's identity.

do~~

to the imposi-

There is even less agreement about

Grenfell and Hunt, who discovered the longest

15Meyer, Vol. 4.1, 263; Beloch 3.1, 401; Lesky, 693; and
.dro•m, 87. Ivo Bruns, Das Literarische Portr~i'J:. der Griechen in funft~
und vierte Jahrhunderts vor Christi Geburt, Hildesheim, 1961 (rep~int
O'f""1898 edition), 41-42,Writes that Xenophon does not attempt to
analyze Agesilaos' motives. His descriptions of the king are to draw
attention to the subject, not the context of events. Bruns also
remarks, 136-37, that in the enkomion Xenophon presents Agesilaos in
such a way that the reader can draw his own moral conclusions, a
tendency which derives from Isokrates. Even less than in the
Hellenika, however, does Xenophon attempt to analyze Agesilaos' goals
or mentality. Instead, he presents a mere narrative of events.
Unlike Thucydides, Xenophon does not ask about a man's absolute worth
which depends not on moral activity, but rather the forces of nature.
16

See Jacoby, Fr.Gr.H., ~ol. 2A.2, 6; Ed. Meyer, Theopomps
Hellenika, Hildesheim, 1965, 88; Laqueur, RE 5A.2, 2193; Ac~ame,
Ricerche intorno alla guerra corinzia, Naples~ 1951~ 5-6; Bruce, An
Historical Commentary on the Hellenika Oxyrhynchia, Cambridge, 1967,
3; Lesky, 700.
17

See Accame, 5-6; Bruce, 4 and Lesky, 700.

8

fragment in 1906, argued for Ephoros. 18
of Chios was the most likely candidate. 19

Heyer believed that Theopompos
Jacoby believed that Dai.-

machos of Plataia was the best choice because P shows a remarkable knowledge of Boiotian matters.

20

Kratippos, Diyllos or Androtion have also

been mentioned as possibilities, 2 1 but Bruce's suggestion is perhaps
the best.

He belizves that we indeed have the Oxyrhynchos historian's

name before us, but cannot decide vhich name is the right one for lack
cf evidence. 22

In any case it is unlikely without further papyrological

finds that the Verfasserfrage will ever be satisfactorily resolved. 23

18

Grenfell and Hunt, Oxyrhynchus Papyri, Vol. 5, London, 1908,
142-44. Jacoby convincingly eliminated Ephoros from contention by showing that Ephoros' arrangement KaT~ y(vos
(P followed Thucydides' annalistic framework) and the fact that he himself used P obviously precluded
the possibility of Ephoros and P being the sao.e person. See Bloch,
Abhandlt~ .~ur Griechischen Geschichtschreibung, Leiden, 1956, 319-20.
19Meyer, Theopomps Hellenika, 17-20. Jacoby in Bloch's
Abhaudlung, 316, also shatvs that although Theopompos did continue
Thu,~ydi.des, his pro-Spartan bias, Isokratean style and the fact that he
•..ras not a source for Ephoros eliminate him from contention.
20

Jacoby, Fr.Gr._!!., 2A.2, 4-7.

21 Laqueur, RE 5A.2, 2196. Jacoby believes that Kratippos,.
though he also continued Thucydides, was a poseur 1:vho lived in the first
century B.C., not a genuine 4th century writer. See Bloch's
Abhandlung, 329-30.
22Bruce, 26-27. Bloch, "Studies in Historical Literature of
the 4th Century B.C.," Athenian Studies, Presented to }i_.~. Ferguson,
Harvard, 1940, 340-4l,who prefers to leave P anonymous, writes that it
is best ''not to force the leading historians of the 4th century into the
Procrustean bed of the Hellenica of Oxyrhynchos." Bloch believes that
P's work did not survive because the work of his plagiarizer Ephoros
superseded it, his style was rather dull and, unlike Ptolemy Soter whose
work lay unused in the Library of Alexandria for centuries, P found no
Arrian to resurrect him (Bloch, 339-40).
23

That such finds are possible has been shown with the recent

9

P has an important bearing on the early phases of Agesilaos'
reign because he provides a remarkable counterpoint to Xenophon's
description of the Asian campaign in 395. 24

Adhering to the chronolog-

ical framework of Thucydides, he provides parallel accounts of Konen's
naval activity, the outbreak of the Korinthian War, and the best
description of the Boiotian constitution before 386 to survive from
.

.

ant~qu~ty.

25

Almost at once P came to be regarded rather highly for his
conception of history.

He exhibits an excellent knowledge of

Anatolian geography, and gives detailed accounts of naval and military
operations.

Also

. . h t. 26
an d ~ns~g

his political analysis evinces superior judgment

P is clearly inferior tc Xenophon in literary ability

as his style is rather plain, but his interpretation of history surpassed that of his more renowned Athenian contemporary. 27

He ha~ a

publication of a fragment of P which deals with events of 409/08 in
Ephesos. Ludwig Koenen, working in the Cairo Museum, has brought this
new piece of evidence to light. See Koenen, "Papyrology in the
Federal Republic of Germany and Fieldwork of the International Photographic Archive in Cairo," StudPap 15, 1976, 55-67.
2 4see ch. 4.

25 Bruce, 157-64.
26 Jacoby, Fr.Gr._!!., 2A.2, 6-7; Laqueur, RE 5A.2, 2197; Neyer,
TheopomEs Hellenika, 17-20; Walker, The Hellenica Oxyrhynchia, Its
Authorship~ Authority, Oxford, 1913, 119-20, 132, believed that P
is superior to Xenophon in matters of operational detail, but falls
short of the latter's political insight. This opinion is not shared,
however, by Griffith, "The Greek Historians," 198-99, in Platnauer's
Fifty Years (and Twelve) of Classical Scholarship, Oxford, 1968 or
Bruce, 17-20.
27 See Bruce, 8, 11.

10

better grasp of detail and analytical ability than Xenophon.

Because

of the foregoing and his work's central focus, he was one of the most
reliable writers of history in the ancient world.

It therefore is much

to be regretted that P wrote in an age when rhetorical ornament was more
important than sober historical analysis. 28

It is likely that his

bare, rather lapidary style probably doomed his work to eventual
neglect. 29
In addition to his limited literary ability, P exhibits an
occasional weakness despite the generally favorable regard he enjoys.
For example his preoccupation with military detail often leads him to
omit or gloss over diplomatic matters.

He apparently disapproved of

the radical Athenian democrats and the Ismenian faction in Thebes.
In general he manifests a distinct sympathy for oligarchic government
and a favorable attitude to Sparta. 30

A significant oversight in his

account of the campaign of 395 is his failure to mention that Agesilaos
was appointed supreme commander both by land and by sea, the first time
in Spartan history such a thing had happened. 31

28

P does, however, offer

Griffith, 198-99 and Lesky, 655-56, 689, 699-700.

29 Bruce, 9-10.
30see Bruce, 10-11.
3lsee ch. 4.
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a much more realistic analysis of Agesilaos' Asian campaign than
Xenophon despite his occasional lapses or omissions.
Had P's Hellenika come down to us intact, it is almost certain
that our knowledge of the end of the fifth and beginning of the fourth
century would be considerably greater than it is.

This is especially

so if Accarr.e's assertion is true that P concluded his work with the
PeRc~
0

f

L" . •

~11

cf Antalkidas in 386, not as originally supposed, with the battle
d OS. 32

Finally is is important to note that P,

~.;ho

was Ephoros'

source for the years from 411-386 B.C., had an indirect influence on
Diodorus.
The Ephoran Tradition of Diodorus
Anoth2r important source of information about Agesilaos is
Diodorus Siculus whose work from Book 11 to Book 16 is an epitome of
Ep h oros.

33

Born in Kyme during the first quarter of the fourth century,

Ephoros began his work sometime after 350 B.C.

His was the first

universal history,34 arranged in part episodically and in part
geographically.

His work in thirty books, beginning with the Dorian

migrations and ending ~.;ith the life of Philip of Nakedon, 35 strongly

32 Accame, 5, 17-20.
33

The major study which established the relationship
between Ephoros and Diodorus' Books 11-16 is Untersuchungen uber die
Quellen. der Griechische und sizilische Geschichte bei Diodor XI-XVI,
Kiel, 1868. See also Jacoby, Fr.Gr.ft., lA.l, no. 70 and 2A.2, 22-27.
34 Lesky, 701.
3 5 Book 30 detailing the life of Philip was completed by his
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reflects the "rhetorical" tradition of his teacher Isokrates.

The

Isokratean vie•..r of history, \vhich ultimately came to prevail, was that
it should be the handrnaiden of politics. 36

Despite his penchant for

moral pronouncements, his work lacked political passion and human
warmth 'tvhich made him quite distinct from his contemporaries
Theopompos of Chios and Kallisthenes of Olynthos. 37

Unlike the

Ionians, Ephoros had little interest in geography, nAtural science
and the human condition.
p~ople

events.

His work is a universal history of the Greek

at home and in the colonies which induced him to discuss barbarian
Yet barbarian matters did not concern him

they affected the Greek world.

~

se_, but only as

Because of his lack of int"rest in other

lands he was the fil·st historian to separate .:ompletely geography from
its historical context, describing it in Bks. 4 and 5, but largely
neglecting it later. 38

Since his work spanned 700 years. dealing with

matters all over the Greek world, he \?as compelled to choose a thematic

son Demophilos; see Lesky, 701.
36

.
Finley, The Use and Abuse of H~story, New York, 1975, 3031, 33 observes that, for the ancient Greeks and Romans, historiography
was contemporary; the distant past was nearly irrelevant except for a
general sketch. Information about remote periods, the Dorian migrations for example, was even scantier for Ephoros than for the modern
author who has at least the archaeological remains with which to work.
Thus the chief purpose of non-contemporary historiography had become
to serve up moral paradigms by the mid-fourth century B.C. Jacoby,
Fr.Gr.H., lA.l, no. 70 and 2A.2, 22-27.
37Jacoby, Fr.Gr.~. 2A.2, 23.
38 Jacoby, 25.
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arrangement in contrast to Thucydides' annalistic approach, which is
suitable only for war mongraphs. 39

His work which lacked Thucydides'

intellectual incisiveness, resembled that of Hellanikos or Herodotus,
though inferior to the latter in literary merit. 40

On balance, then,

Ephoros succeeded rather well in giving his work a unifying focus amassing a great deal of information, and clearly distinguishing the vague
unreliable tales of the mythical period from the much more ascertainable
data of the recent past.

His weaknesses were that he was somewhat defi-

cient in critical faculties and his work is ·marred by a dull, heavy-handed moralism.

His work is not as strongly biased as Xenophon's or

Plutarch's Agesilaos despite a mildly pro-Athenian cast and a tinge
of chauvinism for his native Kyme.

What he reports of the early fourth

century through his epitomizer Diodorus, therefore, will often supplement
or correct information missing or distorted in Xenophon and Plutarch.41
Diodorus' history is a universalist compilation written in the
first century B.C. which presents Greek and Roman history in the form of
synchronistic annals.

42

Diodorus gathered material for his work frvm a

39 Jacoby, 27.
40Brown, 109 and Lesky, 701.
4lsee Schwarz, RE 6.1, 15-16; Brown, 114-15; Jacoby, 28; and
Barber, The Historian Ephoros, Cambridge, 1935, 105, who notes that
some of Ephoros' weaknesses stem from the fact that "he lived in an
age when the pragmatic historian was also a rhetorician." In antiquity
Polybios (12.28.10) generally assessed him favorably as a historian.
42 Lesky, 871.

variety of different authors, but as noted earlier, for Agesilaos'
lifetime, his ~vcrk is an epitome of Ephoros. 43

In general Diodorus 1

value depends upon the reliability of his source, since he merely
summarized the author he happened to be reading at the time.
j.;;

His work

flm.;ed by carelessness, poor critical judgment, confused chronology

and lack of central intellectual focus.
/

R~BAto8nKn

The chief value of his

is that it preserves fragments of better historians and an

oc~asional bit of information not available elsewhere. 4 4
For the career of Agesilaos, Diodorus is important

beca~se

the Ephoran tradition which he preserves is often at variance with that
of Xenophon and Plutarch.
ia

~.;h~t

thE

thre~

There are for example many discrepancies

authors \·r:rite of Agesilaos 1 campaign in Asia Hiner,

the liberation of Thebes and Agesilaos' reaction to it. 45

Therefore

despite the many flaws and \.reaknesses in his rambling compendium,
Diodorus at times provides insight into aspects of Agesilaos' life
w·hich other authors have neglected or suppressed. 46

43 see note 33.
4 4Beloch 2. 2, 26, believed that Diodorus \vas important because he has preserved a more or less continuous history of the Greek
west. Meyer, 4.1, 237, 265, writes that his careless and imprecise
annalistic arrangement has often produced great chronological confusion
and outright error.
45 For details see chs. 4, 8 and 9.
46

Judgments of Diodorus' general worth are not especially
favorable. ~Vhile not dismissing him out of hand, Schwarz, RE 5.1,
663, states "ein Werk kann man das Buch nicht nennen." Rose; A Handbook
of Greek Literature, Ne~v York, 1960, 412, preserves Macauley's-even
harsher assessment that he was "a stupid, credulous, posing old ass."
Rose goes on to say, "and it goes without saying that the best which
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Plutarch
After Xenophon the most extensive source for the career of
Agesilaos is Plutarch, especially his biography the Agesilaos.
Although Plutarch's fame derives chiefly from his biographies, 4 7 one
should resist the impulse to include him in the ranks of ancient
historians for the following reasons.
is an interest in antiquarian material.

First one of his major traits
This leads to the various

collections of anecdotes which have little or no central purpose other
than their amusing quaintness.

These collections were common in

Hellenistic times and the early principate, 48 but as such they are not
connected history.

Also Plutarch's secondary aim in writing the•

biographies in pairs was to preserve Greek tradition in a world where
Roman might had long since subsumed Greece politically. 49

Nonetheless

Plutarch strove to show underlying similarities in the two cultures,
especially as Rome had adopted much of the Greek intellectual and

can be expected of him is that he will copy his authorities correctly
and arrange events under the right dates so far as he knows them. His
book is a mine in which to dig for fragments of better works. If we
had the older historians, no one would read him." Lesky, 842,
writes that he is only as good as his sources because he vollig
unselbstandig arbeitet.
4 7Lesky, 921.
48Lesky, 920.
49 Plutarch composed his biographies in the second half of
the first century a.d. See Lesky, 922-23.
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artistic tradition.

His purpose was to reconcile Greece and Rome

by highlighting similarities in their greatest historical figures. 50
Finally his major purpose was to exemplify private virtue (or vice) in
the careers of great men.

This leads to an emphasis on the subject's

education, personal manners and lifestyle tvitll a heavy reliance on
anecdotal material. 51

He tells us himself that his object is not to

write history, but rather to reveal

Ta Tns

~xns crn~c::1a.

52

He

is, therefore, not primarily interested in analytic history which seeks
th2 causes and explanation for events and trends as part of nature, but

rather he seeks to portray great figures as their many small deeds
reveal them. 5 3

This moralistic influence on his purpose and nianner

of cvmposition is traceable to Isokrates' Euagoras and Xenophon's
The ?)eos of the subject is revealed by his npai;C::lS
That certain traits and similar situations can recur makes possible the
vari.ous

which Plutarch appends to each parallel pair.

Nonetheless many of these comparisons are

some~vhat

forced and today they

are regarded as largely ineffectual. 5 5

50Lesky, 923; Ziegler, RE 21.1, 899-901.
51

Lesky, 922; Ziegler, RE 21.1, 909; Russell, OCD, 2nd Ed.,
Oxford, 1970, 849.

52 Plut. Alex.
1. 2-3.
53
54

55

Lesky, 922.
ziegler, RE 21.1, 905-08.
Lesky, 923.
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In composing the Agesilaos, Plutarch drew upon several
sources for information, but relied most heavily on Xenophon.

There

is, nonetheless, information in Plutarch's biography which cannot have
come from the writings of Xenophon.

Plutarch refers directly to

Theopcmpos of Chios and obliquely to Ephoros of Kyme in the Agesilaos. 56
From this testimony and comparison of other passages in the biography
with fragments of these two fourth-century writers, it is clear that
Plutarch had their works before him while writing the Agesilaos. 57
By the same technique the influence of Kallisthenes of Olynthos is
also discernible in Plutarch's narrative fabric. 58

By consulting these

authors Plutarch occasionally expanded on Xenophon's version of events,
but only rarely contradicted his chief source. 5 9
In addition to these authors Plutarch also drew upon his own
collection of anecdotes in a section of the Moralia known as the
Apothegmata to compose the biography.

It is likely that Plutarch

compiled these anecdotes to serve as notes for the composition of all

56Plut. Ages. 10, 30 respectively.
57 nippel, Quae ratio intercedat inter Xenophontis historiam
Graecam et Plutarchi vitas quaeritur, Diss. Gissae, 1898, 76-77, 90-91.
58nippel, 116.
59 D1'ppel, 115-16,· .eyer,
~1
Vo 1 • ~.
~ 195 - 96 ; J aco b y, _£._£._.
F G H
2B.l, 357-58; and Ziegler, RE 21.1, 905-08 also discuss the influence
of Theopompos on the composition of Plutarch's Agesilaos. Jacoby, RE
11.2, 2069, observes that Ktesias of Knidos, court physician to
Artaxerxes, influenced Plutarch's biography of Artaxerxes and was also a
source for his writings about Greeks who had extensive contact with the
Persian empire, including Agesilaos.
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.
h"1es. 60
his b 1ograp

By themselves the Apothegmata most closely resemble
t~bile

the genre of Sammlungen represented by Aelian's Varia Historia.

the Apothegmata cannot be regarded in any sense as connected history,
they often furnish useful information not elset.;here available. 61
The Strategemata of Frontinus and Polyainos
Another type of Samml,mg which has a bearing on the life of
Agesilaos is the Strategemata.

Frontinus, who lived in the first cen-

tury a.d., wrote series of military reminiscences arranged by type of
operation.

Although his work includes famous Greek commanders, most

of the stories concern Romans.

It is unfortunate that he did not pre-

serve more episodes from Agesilaos' career, because not only his arrange-

ment of material, but his judgment in selecting it greatly exceeds that
of Polyainos who wrote a century later. 62

Polyainos, a :Hakedonian by birth, compiled a similar -:.;ark which

he dedicated to the Roman emperors Lucius Verus and Harcus Aurelius.
Unlike

Frontinus~who

was a man of considerable military experience, it

is quite evident that Polyainos was primarily a rhetorician.63

Although

60see Ziegler, RE 21.1, 905-08 and Lesky, 921-22.
6lziegler, RE 21.1, 863-65. It is interesting to note that
Plutarch's collectio;-preserves more stories about Agesilaos than even
Alexander or Caesar.
62

. .
See Bayet, Litterature Lat~ne, Paris, 1965, 359; Rose,
A Handbook of Latin Literature, New York, 1960, 435; Kappelmacher,
iE 10.1, 591-605.
63Lesky, 952, so describes him and deems his collection quasihistorische.
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he had access to Thucydides, Ephoros, Theopompos and others, he
exercised little or no judgment in the selection of examples.

He

arranged his material in chronological order by individual commander,
though his information is only as good as his sources.

At times

Polyainos' anecdotes offer important insight into events and personalities, but his carelessness and credulity too often make them misleading or even worthless. 64
The Attic Orators
Of the rhetoricians in Athens, the three who shed the most
light on aspects of Spartan policy from Athens' defeat in 404 to the
revival of her naval alliance in 378/77 are Isokrates, Lysias and
Andokides.

The latter is important because his speech

/
AaKsoat~ovtous

>

I

stpnvns

'

TIEpl

"
1ns

'

TIPOS

is the only source attesting directly to a

second peace conference in 392.

The first occurred in Sardis and in-

valved both Greeks and Persians, but the second some months later in
Sparta had only Greek participants.

Andokides was one of the legates

who pled the cause of ending the Korinthian War, but his plea was unsuccessful and the irate Athenians forced him into exile for the
second time.

His speech highlights the differing aims of groups in

both Sparta and Athens, including that of Agesilaos. 65

64 Lammert, RE 21.2, 1432-36; Rose, A Handbook of Greek
Literature, 394; Lesky, 952.
65see Lesky, 403 and ch. 5 for detailed analysis of the
events in 392.
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Lysias' speech KaTa
cpaToaesvous

starkly and dramatically

reveals the excesses of Lysander's small cliques of extremist
oligarchs.

In many areas of the Greek world after 404 B.C. the

Spartans tacitly supported these cliques in the name of restoring
I

I

naTPlOl TIOAlTElal .

\

)

I

This speech and the KaTa AyopaTOU

help make

plain the serious decline in Sparta's prestige as liberator of Hellas
and the anti-Spartan resentment which eventually led to the outbreak
of the Korinthian war in 395.66

Also important for grasping the partial

revival of Spartan prestige after the Korinthian War is Lysias' fragmentary oration, the Olympiakos which was probably delivered in 384. 67
Most interesting is the strong contrast in tone between the
attitude expressed about the Spartans in Lysias' Olympiakos and
Isokrates1 Panegyrikos which was written for the Olympiad of 380.
Although Agesilaos is nowhere mentioned by name, the Spartan policy
of which he was architect after 386 is bitterly denounced.

Besides the

tone of the work, the oration also provides many scattered, but useful
bits of information about Spartan policy over a 25-year span. 68
In a sense the Panegyrikos is a more developed expression of

66 see Lesky, 666 and ch. 2 for details.
67 Lesky, 666. Although there is some question about its
date (388 is possible), the Olympiad of 384 seems the better choice.
See also ch. 7.
68see Lesky, 656-57.
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sentiments originating in the immediate aftermath of the King's Peace
of 387/86.

In his rrsp~

s?pnvns

Isokrates laments the overweening

influence of foreign po\vers (i.e. the Persians) in Greek affairs, an
influence to which the Spartans and Agesilaos had acquiesced.

In

his letter to Archidamos, Agesilaos' son, lsokrates expresses admiration for Agesilaos, but points out a certain inconsistency in his
policy toward other Greeks in the king's long reign.69

Isokrates'

Harks are thus a minor, but important source for kno,,rledge of
Agesilaos' career, not only for the information contained in them, but
also because they shmv the shifting attitudes of other Greeks to the
Spartans avet'a long period of time.

Also his encomiastic tribute to

Euagoras, Kypriote king and long-standing ally of Athens, influenced, as
did Xenophon's eulogy of Agesilaos, all subsequent Greek biographical
writing. 7 0
Cornelius Nepos and Justin's EPitome of Pompeius Tragus
·Apart from Frontinus, there are

t~vo

occasionally touch on the life of Agesilaos.

Latin authors whose works
The first is

Cornelius Nepos, a contemporary of Cicero, whose compendium

69see ch. 7 and Lesky, 656-61.
70

see Lesky, 658 and note 4. The notion that Isokrates'
letter to Philip of Makedon was a redac·tion of an earlier epistle to
Agesilaos has now been discredited. See Blass, Die Attische Beredsamkeit, Vol. 2, Berlin, 1874, 89, 293 and Norlin, ISOkrates, Loeb Ed.,
Vol. 1, XL The reason for rejecting such a view is the strong antiSpartan tone of the Partegyrikos which was composed at the height of
Agesilaos' power and influence. There is, in the writings of Isokrates,
an admiration for Agesilaos as a man, but marked ambiguity about his
purpose and policies.
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of sketches of famous foreign leaders (de excellentibus ducibus
exterarum gentium) contains a synopsis of Agesilaos' career.

These

rhetorical exercises,which rely on matters of education, personal
manners, and major events in the subject's life,are much more
anecdotal than analytical.

Nepos' synopses represented an early

culmination in Latin letter3 of the Hellenistic tradition which found
its fullest and most charming
Plutarch. 71

expressi0~

i~

the Parallel Lives of

Although Nepos is little more than a popularizer of

doubtful skill whose style is dull or pretentious, his sketches of
Agesilaos and other Greek leaders of the fourth century are not
entirely without merit. 72

Although his work traces only the barest

outlines of his subjects' lives, Nepos' biographies sometimes afford
glimpses of Spartan policy or an aspect of Agesilaos' career not
preserved elsewhere.
The final ancient author whose work occasionally sheds light
on Agesilaos is M. Iunianus Iustinus who epitomized the histories of
Pompeius Tragus.
century B.C.

Tragus wrote in the latter half of the first

His universal history in forty-four books had for its

central focus the Makedonian conquest and the spread of Greek
civilization especially to Rome and the west.

He evidently exercised

considerable care and good judgment in the selection of his material ,

71 see Lesky, 920-23.
72 Bayet, 177-78 and Rose, A Handbook of Latin Literature,

208-09.
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eschewing rhetorical devices to present an analytical rendition of
fact. 73
Much like Diodorus who synopsised large portions of Ephoros'
work, Justin has preserved the histories of Trogus in epitome.

Un-

fortunately while Justin's work is at times valuable for the information
it contains, it does not exhibit anything approaching the apparent good
historical sense of Trogus' original.

In addition to providing only a

"sampling" of his model, Justin, by eliminating everything which had no
dramatic or moral interest, robbed his own work of a unifying focus.
Despite his occasional flair for detail and mastery of basic rhetorical
technique, Justin's compilation is stylistically and historically little
better than mediocre. 74
With the discussion of Justin's Epitome of Trogus, the brief
survey of the ancient sources dealing either directly or obliquely with
Agesilaos is complete.

How these sources illuminate the aftermath of

the Peloponnesian War and the events immediately preceding Agesilaos'
accession is the next matter for investigation.

73Bayet, 292; Rose, A Handbook of Latin Literature, 312.
74Bayet, 420; Rose, A Handbook of Latin Literature, 312-13.

CHAPTER II
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO AGESILAOS' ASIAN CANPAIGN
Before considering the Spartan campaign in Asia (396-394), it
will be necessary to review briefly the course of events from the
close of the Peloponnesian Har in 404 to the decision to mount the
expedition in 397.

Although a detailed analysis is not needed, some

discussion of the relations among the Gre.ek states and the major thrusts
of Spartan policy in these years will be helpful.
this chapter

~.;ill

deal with the Spartans' treatment of the Greeks of

Asia a!'ld the Aegean.

In the next, the focus Hill be on her relations

·tdth the members of her Peloponnesian alliance

mainland.

The first sections of

The final section

~vill

and other poleis on the

be a review of her dealings with the

Persians.

What the role of the Spartans in Greek affairs after the \var •vith
Athens might have been and how it actually developed is given e sad,
and perhaps intentional, irony in Thucydides.

The occasion was

Alkibiades' address to the Spartan assembly Capella) in 414.

In the

speech, 1 he urged his listeners to come to the aid of the beleaguered
\

Syracusans and concluded his plea with the following words: KU1

1

.

~ETa

(6.92.5), see Gomme and Dover, An Historical Commentary on
Thucydides, Vol. 4, Oxford, 1956-81, 366, who observe that the rule of
an dpxnby force is the norm. To rule by good will alone would be a
rarely achieved ideal. Alkibiades' plea here is compared with that of
the Theban embassy to Athens in 395 (Xen. Hell. 3.5.14).
24
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Kal ou S1aI. KaT'EuvolaV nyna8E.
After the surrender of the Athenians in 404, Alkibiades' prediction proved to be only partially correct.

Sparta indeed ruled all Hellas

in relative security, but only by relying on force and with little good
will on the part of her subjects by the time Agesilaos departed for Asia.
With the collapse of Athenian resi.:;L.ci.uce in the spring of 404, Agis withdrew the allied army from Dekeleia and dismissed the several contingents
to their native cities.

At the same time, Lysander set sail to Samos to

suppress the last pocket of resistance to the Peloponnesian victory.
After the Athenians' defeat at Aigospotamoi, the Samians al9ne refused
to desert them and actually rose up to massacre their oligarchic
leaders.

The response of the grateful Athenians is preserved in an

inscription which praises the loyalty of the Samian demos and grants them
citizenship. 2

Upon arriving in Samos, Lysander laid siege to the demo-

cratic defenders who had refused his terms.

Faced with the overwhelming

superiority of the allied forces, the Samians eventually capitulated
without a struggle on the following terms:

each person was to leave the

island with only one cloak; all else was to remain behind; the oligarchic
faction would be restored and Lysander would choose ten from their
number to form the government.

This was the first of the notorious

dekarchies to be installed after the conclusion of the general peace.
The activity of Lysander was not confined, however, to the suppression of

2xen. Hell. 2.2.6; Tod, Greek Historical Inscriptions, Vol. 1,
no. 96, 231-34, Oxford, 1946, and Meiggs and Lewis, Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End £i the Fifth Century B.C., no. 94, 283-87, Oxford,
1969.
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the democrats on Samos.

At this time the Spartans were busily engaged

in the dispersal or forced expatriation of Athenian klerouchs from
Euboia, Lesbos, Naxos, Helos, Histiaia, Skione, Torone, Poteidaia and
elsewhere. 3

The purpose of this, of course, was to complete the
:>

/

extinction of all vestiges of Athens' maritime apxn.
The nature of Spartan policy and the manner in which she sought
to implement it throughout the Greek world have been examined in
in two major studies. 4

~~tail

These studies and evidence from antiquity show

that Sparta's relations with the Greeks rested on three bases.

The

first was a system of harmosts and garrisons, the second, that of
Lysander's forced oligarchies which the ephors later modified to rraTp101
TIOA1TE1al, and, finally, an abrasive and intimidating diplomacy against
both allies and adversaries not under her military supervision. 5
Sparta undertook these harsh measures for a number of reasons.
First, the male Spartiates numbered only about 4,000.

6

These homoioi

ruled over perhaps 250,000 to 300,000 people in Lakedaimon and Messenia
"7

and held sway over as many as two or three million.'

Second, the

3A wealth of literary and inscriptional evidence attests to the
extent of the Spartans' efforts in this regard: Xen. Hell. 2.2.9; Plut.
Lys. 14, Diod. 14.10.1. See also Tod, GHI, nos. 94 and 95, and Meyer,
Geschichte des Altertums, Vol. 5, 6, Stuttgart, 1958.
4 cavaignac, "Les Dekarchies de Lysandre," Rev. Et. Hist. 90, 1924,
285-316 and Parke, "The Development of the Second Spartan Empire, JHS 50,
1930, 37-79.
5For a very clear formulation of this in antiquity, see Herodes
764A.
6see Meyer, Vol. 4.1, 440, n. 1.
7Beloch, Griechische Geschichte, Vol. 3.1, 307-13.
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Spartans lacked economic contacts and did not mint their

o~vn

money.

Individual Spartans were actually forbidden to own precious metals, and
those who were caught with such in their possession could face the death
penalty.

8

For ordinary commerce between themselves, they relied on

"leather coins," and, for exchange with the rest of the -vwrld, they used
the monies of Persia, Aigina and Athens.

9

A third reason was that Sparta

had little experience in dealing with political systems different from
her own.

Finally, the Spartans relied heavily on the good will of at

least two foreign powers, the Persians and Syracusans.

If one bears

these things in mind, the direction of her foreign policy becomes readily
explicable.
After Lysander had reduced Samos, installed a dekarchy, uprooted
the Athenian klerouchies and resettled the natives whom the Athenians
had displaced, he dispersed the various allied contingents to their
native cities.

He then took all but twelve triremes captured in the

Peiraeus back to Lakedaimon.

With these, he brought the crowns awarded to

him by the various cities, 470 talents left from the money assigned by
Kyros for prosecuting the war and all other booty.

~foreover,

he had in-

stituted a system of tribute which would bring the Lakedaimonians an
annual revenue of 1,000 talents.
the end of the summer of 404.

He delivered all of the foregoing at

10

8Aristotle, Pol. 1269-70; Xen. Lak. Pol. 7, 14-15:
14.29; Plut. Lyk. 30.
9

Aelian V.H.

Xen. Lak. Pol. 7.6 and Meyer, Vol. 5, 24-25 with notes.

10niod. 14.10.2; Xen. Hell. 2.3.8-9.
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In 405/04, Lysander established a series of dekarchies throughout
that part of the Greek world formerly subject to Athens. 11

The members

of these governments in each case were drawn from the oligarch clubs.
C

I

Cavaignac supposes that the members of these £Talplal

were of the same

approximate age, shared a common interest in art, music and politics, and
had banded together to protect themselves from the excesses of the extreme
democrats.

12

numbers were usually small, ranging from perhaps

~~~i~

twenty to thirty.

They were drawn from the aristocracy and wealthy

mercantile class whose interests were best served by social stability and
peace.

Many of them had participated in the Ionian defections from

Athens in 412/11.

They had attempted to force oligarchic governments on

their cities in the hope of suing for peace with Sparta.

After the battle

of Kyzikos in 410, however, many of these club members were forced into
exile.

Eventually they found refuge with the satraps or the Spartans.

They later became ardent supporters of Lysander at his headquarters in
Ephesos from 407 to the end of the war. 13
We can be certain that it was from their ranks that Lysander
created the dekarchies.

Although ancient authors referred to them only

in general terms, 14 Cavaignac believes that we can recover at least some
of their names by considering the victory monument dedicated to Pythian

llPlut. Lys. 13.3-5, 14.1; Diod. 14.10.1.
12cavaignac, 289.
13 ibid., 289.
14 e.g. Diodorus 13.70 and Plut. Lys. 5.3.
Xenophon (Hell. 2.4.19)
mentions Charmides, son of Glaukon, as one of the ten who held sway in
the Peiraeus while the thirty ruled in Athens.

29
Apollo by Lysander in honor of his triumph over the Athenian navy at
Aigospotamoi.

This monument lists the allied navarchs who aided in the

Athenians' defeat.

From it we might deduce a partial inventory of the

dekarchs who ruled in Asia Minor and the islands after the Peloponnesians' triumph.

The names appearing on the monument are those of the

commanders from the Dorian islands, such as Melos and Rhodes, and the
Ionian poleis, like Miletos, Ephesos and Chios.

An examination of the

epigraphic evidence and Pausanias will reveal the names of a few of
these characters who later became dekarchs. 15

Cavaignac's supposition,

of course, is that Lysander would likely have assigned those who
supported him in war to positions of authority in their native cities
in peacetime. 16
Not all of Lysander's undertakings in 405/04 were narrowly
partisan or destined to incur the outrage of the Greek world.

There

apparently was widespread approval of his measures to restore the
Aiginetans, Melians, Skionians and others to their native lands.

The

Athenians had uprooted and expelled all of these peoples during the
Peloponnesian War.l7
Still on the whole the reaction of most Greeks was one of
bitter disappointment.

They quickly perceived that public affairs were

15see Tod, GHI, Vol. 1, nos. 94/95, and Meiggs and Lewis, GHI,
no. 95 for a complete-listing from the 13 marble fragments recovered at
Delphi. Pausanias (10.9.7-10) lists some names which are now lost from
the inscriptions.
16 cavaignac, 300.
17Plut. Lys. 14.3.
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to be in the hands of the most ambitious and violent of Lysander's
partisans to the exclusion of all others.

18

The story was told of the

Spartans who, like mischievous barmaids, gave the Greeks a sip of the
sweet wine of freedom, only to dash it with the bitter vinegar of
. d e. 19
serv:J.tu

On the eve of Leuktra, Autokles, a delegate from Athens

to the peace conference at Sparta, recited a catalogue of Spartan
abuses after their victory in 404.

20

The Spartans, he said, were the

greatest obstacle to autonomy despite their vaunted advocacy of it.
They compelled submission from their allies, even forcing them to make
war on cities with which they enjoyed friendly relations.

They set up

odious governments of ten or thirty to support Spartan policy without
question.

Finally, he accused the Spartans of securing their aims by

force (the ubiquitous harmosts and garrisons), not by law, thereby
making a mockery of their slogan "freedom for the Greeks," and showing
themselves in truth to be the champions of despotism.
In 403/402, there were two developments which illustrate the drift
of Spartan foreign policy and the impact of changed conditions on her
society.

The first occurred during the civil strife in Attika when the

thirty tyrants had appealed from Eleusis to Lakedaimon for aid against
both Thrasyboulos' democrats in the Peiraeus and the moderate oligarchs
who held the city.

Lysander was initially given command of the army and

his brother Libys was made navarch to cut off the Peiraeus by land and

18.b'd
l. l. •

13.4-5.

19 ibid.

13. 6.

20 xen. Hell. 6.3.7-8.
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sea.

King Pausanias, however, persuaded three of the five ephors to

raise another army.

He did so to counter the self-serving interests

of Lysander (whose creatures the thirty were) and to achieve a more
equitable settlement.

Pausanias relieved Lysander and eventually

brought off a compromise whereby the democrats and moderate oligarchs
were reconciled.
~eceded

The remnants of the thirty and their supporters

from Attika and created a separate state in Eleusis.

They were

eventually attacked and killed at a peace conference in 401, and Attika
once again became a single political entity.

The important thing, how-

ever, is that Lysander's power and influence at Sparta suffered a major
setback because of internal political opposition.

As subsequent events

would show, Pausanias may have been the leader of a conservative and
traditionalist faction.

The aims of this group were two-fold:

they

wished to curtail drastically adventurism beyond the Peloponnesos and to
uphold

uns~ervingly the Lykourgan politeia. 21
Pausanias (3.5.2) preserves further evidence of internal political

wrangling at Sparta.

He records that the enemies of King Pausanias

brought him to trial upon his return from Attika.

Cavaignac points out

that these were the supporters of Lysander who did so in order that their

• ht
1ea der m1g

II

•
•
1 I ascen d ant qu1• 1 u1• ec
, happa1t.
• !1 22
ressa1s1r

Although Agis,

the other king and once a friend of Lysander, may have sympathized with

21 Xen. Hell. 2.4.28-42; Plut. Lys. 21.1-3.
22 cavaignac, 300
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Pausanias' efforts to curb the famous navarch, he voted with fourteen
of the twenty-eight

/

to condemn his colleague.

YEPOVTES

23

That

Lysander's influence was on the wane, however, is indicated by the fact
/

that Pausanias was absolved.

Although fourteen of the YEPOVTES

and

Agis had voted against him, the other fourteen and all five of the ephors
had voted to acquit.
In the fall of 403, after his chastisement in Attika and the
acquittal of Pausanias, Lysander set out for Asia at the ephors' behest.
He clearly intended to strengthen the hand of his supporters in the Greek
cities, the various dekarchs.

24

Many cities, perhaps heartened by the

acquittal of the conciliatory Pausanias, sent delegations to Sparta to
complain of the highhandtdness of Lysander's creatures.

Finally,

Pharnabazos, satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, perceived an opportunity
to take advantage of turmoil in the Greek cities of Asia and wrote a
letter to the ephors in which he protested the policies and conduct of
Lysander.

Fearing for his position, Lysander attempted to win over the

satrap with blandishments.

He pleaded with the hostile Pharnabazos to

send another letter withdrawing the accusations of the first.
Pharnabazos agreed and even showed Lysander the conciliatory epistle.
The wily satrap, though, had secretly ?enned yet a third letter in which

23

Rahe, Lysander and the Spartan Settlement, 407-403 B.C., Diss.
Yale, 1977, 19-22, suggests that Agis, who greatly advanced Lysander's
career, may have withdrawn his support by the time of Pausanias' incursion into Attika. The reason would be that both kings may have feared
the navarch's vaunting ambition and his appetite for power.
24

xenophon passes over this episode in silence and Plutarch (Lys.
19-21) erroneously places it before his command in Attika. See Grote, A
History of Greece, Vol. 7, 372, n.2; Meyer, Vol. 5, 41, n.l; Beloch, 3.l,
16, n.l.
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he repeated the accusations of the first.

The ephors had summoned

Lysander to answer the many charges and, with what he believed was
Pharnabazos' letter of retraction, he departed for Lakedaimon.

When he

arrived, however, he was removed from command and became a laughingstock upon the ephors' receipt of the satrap's letter.

Pharnabazos had

deviously substituted the inflammatory third letter for the second when
.
.
25
he aff1xed h1s seal.
At the same time, Lysander's friend Thorax, harmost of Samos, was
tried on a charge of possessing private money.

He was recalled, convicted

and executed by the strict Lykourgan rhetra which forbade private owner. o f any prec1ous
.
meta 1 s. 26
s h 1p

In addition, other Lysandrians such as

Derkylidas, harmost of Abydos, and Klearchos, who had
as harmost of Byzantion, were recalled.

repla~ed

Sthenelaos

27

The affair of Klearchos is interesting in that it shows the effect
upon Spartans that access to great wealth and the wielding of nearly
absolute power in other Greek cities might have.

Klearchos apparently

had proved ruthless, arbitrary, and brutal in imposing his will in
Byzantion.
protest.

As a result, the citizens secretly sent to Lakedaimon to
/

The ephors, in keeping with their campaign of restoring TiaTplOl

25

Plut. Lys. 19ff.; Nepos Lys. 4, and Polyainos 7.19.1. Beloch,
Vol. 3.1, 16, n.l, observes that the dating of this incident is highly
problematical. Nepos and Polyainos give no chronology and Plutarch's
is confused. Andrewes, "Two Notes on Lysander," Phoenix 25 (1971),
212-13, believes that the story of the satrap's deception does not
"sound like the stuff of serious history," and believes it to be a "lowgrade fiction."
26

Xenophon (Lak. Pol. 7.6), Plutarch (Lyk. 30), and Aelian

c:y_. _g. 14. 29 ).

27 xen. Hell. 3.1.9; Diod. 14.12.
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TIOA1TS1a1

wherever possible, sent an army under Panthoidas in the spring

of 402 to relieve Klearchos of his command.

After withdrawing his

troops and booty from the city. however, Klearchos decided to resist.
He was subsequently defeated and fled to Kyros, who received him
hospitably.

The ultimate consequences of Klearchos' excesses and de-

fection to Kyros are the subject of Xenophon's Anabasis. 28
Thus it was probably in the spring and summer of 402 B.C. that
the ephors disseminated their directive throughout the Aegean and Greek
Asia that the naTp10l TIOA1TSlalwere to be restored.29

The man who had a

statue of himself being crowned by Poseidon set up at Delphi and who had
been accorded divine honors by the Samians 30 found himself out of favor
less than two years later.

Parke believes that a fragmentary inscription

from Delos3 1 was at least in part a manifesto reasserting the power of the
ephorate and kings.

Cavaignac thinks that the five ephors listed on the

inscription, if it can be dated to 402, were the same five who voted to

28 xenophon (Anab. 1.1.9, 2.6.2) depicts Klearchos as the ideal
military leader. The Ephoran tradition of Diodorus, of course, is not
so clearly pro-Spartan as that of Xenophon and presents Klearchos'
flaws as well as his virtues. Plutarch (Artax. 6) preserves a tradition
in ~vhich the ephors ordered Klearchos to aid Kyros.
29 Xen. Hell. 3.4.2.
3°Paus. 10.9.7ff.; Plut. Lvs. 18.4; Bengtson, Die StaatsvertrHge
des Altertums, Vol. 2, 152-158, has conveniently collected all evidence
relating to this period. For a more sympathetic view of Lysander's role
during these years, see Prentice, "The Character of Lysander," AJA 38
(1934), 37-42.
31 Parke, 54; cf. also Tod, GHI Vol. 2, n.99.

35
32
.
. Pausanlas.
acqult
in

~.;rhich

F.lna 11 y, Par k e suggests t h at t h e lnscrlptlon
.
' ' 33

the Athenians praise the Notians and Ephesians for having

sheltered the democratic exiles from Sames indicates the demise of the
dekarchies.

This inscription, which dates to 403/402, could scarcely

have been promulgated if the dekarchies were everywhere still in power. 34
Lysander, on pretext of a vow made to Zeus Ammon, then departed
to Libya to cloak his

oisg~Jce.

of the visit was more complex. 35

According to Ephoros, the actual purpose
Briefly, Lysander, after having failed

in similar attempts at Dodone and Delphi, tried to bribe the oracle of
Ammon as part of a plot to abolish the hereditary kingship.

Since

Agesilaos played a role in the discovery of this plot after Lysander's
death, discussion of

th~

matter will be postponed to a later chapter.

It seems likely that the infamous dekarchies of the "uncrowned
king of Hellas" 36 endured from the summer of 405 to the spring of 402 B.C.,
a period of about three years.

37

Isokrates (Panegyr. 113) suggests that,

in one three month period in 404/403, the Spartans might have executed
more men summarily than the Athenians had brought to trial during their

32 cavaignac, 300.
33M. Tod no.97.8-9; Meiggs and Lewis, 286-87; see also Andrewes,
"Two Notes on Lysander," Phoenix 25 (1971), 219.
34

Parke, 52.

35 Plut. Lys. 20.6. Thus Plutarch and Xenophon, in writing of
this matter, may derive their information from the same source.
36Meyer's felicitous phrase, Vol. 5, 32, "Er war in der Tat der
ungekronte Konig von Hellas."
37 see Meyer, Vol. 5, 41, n.l; Beloch, 2.1, 16; Cavaignac, 300-01;
Parke, 52-53.

36

' /
entire apxn

The disavowal of these extremist oligarchies by the

authorities in Sparta did not signal the end of Spartan domination in
the Greek world.

The dekarchies may no longer have enjoyed the support

of harmosts and garrisons, but, as Parke has shmro, this system
was still intact in Hellas.

38

In fact, Sparta's next undertaking in

the effort to sustain her hegemony was a military struggle against a
neighboring state in the Peloponnesos.

Shortly after conducting this

campaign, king Agis would die, and the stage would be set for the unusual
and momentous accession of Agesilaos.
The

~ar

Against Elis and the Death of Agis

A major Spartan undertaking in mainland Greece between 401 and
397 was the war against Elis.

Although the conduct of the war, at least

in outline, is clear enough, there is a certain degree of confusion as
to the chronology of its outbreak and duration. 39

38

Parke, 41.

39 Two of our three sources (Xen. Hell. 3.2.21-31; Died. 14.17.4,
34.1) assign a duration of about one year for the war, but one
(Pausanias 3.8.5) writes that it lasted for more than two. According to
Diodorus, the war began in 402, but Xenophon synchronizes it with the
activities of Thibron and Derkylidas in Asia (400-399). Meyer, Vol. 5,
184, n.l; Beloch, 3.1, 34-35; Grote, Vol. 7, 375, who dates the beginning
of Derkylidas' tenure to 398, all comment on this difficulty. It seems
most likely that the Eleians excluded the Spartans from the Ol)~pics in
420 B.C., when they contracted an alliance with Athens, Argos, and
Mantineia. Meyer, Vol. 5, 48, n.3; Beloch, 3.1, 17-18 discuss the
chronology of this conflict. Beloch believes the war started in 402/401
and was over in 401/400. Meyer thinks 401-400 are the likely dates.
Grote, (in following Pausanias' notion of its duration) Vol. 7, 391-396,
believes that the war lasted from 402-400. See Ferguson, CAH 5.9, 255258, 270-271, and Cary, CAR 6.2, 33-35.

37
Xenophon's account of the struggle is as follows:

while

Derkylidas was engaged in Asia, the Lakedaimonians had undertaken a
. .
.
El'1s. 40
pun1t1ve
war aga1nst
several.

Their grievances against the Eleians were

First, the Spartans accused the Eleians of having joined an

alliance with the Argives, Mantineians, and Athenians in 420 B.c. 41

The

Eleians had also excluded the Spartans from the Olympic games of that
year.

In spite of the Eleians' interdiction, a Spartan named Lichas

entered a chariot with a Theban driver.

When his chariot won, Lichas

stepped forward to crown the victor, as was customary.

The Eleians, how-

ever, recognizing him as a Spartan, beat him about the head and body and
drove him from the sacred precinct.
and a Spartan of some note.

42

Lichas was an old man at this time

His mistreatment at the hands of the

Eleian officials undoubtedly was not well received in Sparta.

The final

insult which evidently tipped the scales in favor of war was that, during
the occupation of Dekeleia from 413-404, Agis had been denied access to
the temple of Zeus at Olympia where Pythian Apollo had instructed him to
offer sacrifice.
senses

II

,

The Spartans now decided to "bring the Eleians to their
)

/

(ao¢pov10a1 auTous ).

43

The embassy sent to Elis also accused the Eleians of not having

40 Hell. 3.2.21-31.
41 Thuc. 5.39-48. See also Tod, GHI, no. 72; Bengtson,
Staatsvertr~ge 2, no. 193; Gomme et al., Vol. 4, 54-57.
42 He was sixty years old in 420; see Lenschau, RE 13.1, 211-12, under Lichas. See Xen. Hell. 3.2.21 and Thuc. 5.49-50; Gomme ~ al., Vol. 4,
66-67.
43 Xen. Hell. 3.2.23.

38

contributed their share of expenses for conducting the war against
Athens. 44

Since the other grievances may have been almost

t~..renty

years

old at the time of the embassy, perhaps this is the proximate cause of
the war, rather than the items enumerated by Xenophon.

The Spartans de-

manded that the Eleians restore autonomy to several outlying villages
>.Jhich they had annexed.

They kne\v, of course, that this demand \vould be

refused and, when it was, the ephors called out the ban.
L.5

one town specified by the Spartans in their demand. ·

Lepreion was

The allied army

was 4,000 strong, with contingents from all allied states except Korinth
1+6
.
.
.
and Bo1ot1a,
wh.1ch explicitly disapproved o f Sparta ' s motlves.

Agis led the army into Ells by way of the Larisos river, but turned
back because of an earthquake.

At this unexpected turn of events, the

Eleians took heart and sent out legates to other Greek pcleis, especially
Korinth and

Thebes

to seek aid.

by everyone except the Aitolians,

The Eleians \vere disapp0inted,
~vho

sent 1,000 picked hoplites.

hc~;ever ~

The

others were simply too cautious to flout Sparta openly. 47
The ephors called out the ban again in the following spring
(either 401 or 400 B.C.), and Agis proceeded first to Olympia and then to
the outskirts of Elis city.

Here he was aided by the defections of the

Lepreians and the inhabitants of five other small towns in the south
(Triphylia).

\.Jhile Agis '\vas laying '\vaste to the surroundir.g country, an

44 oiod. 14.17.5.
Oxford, 1968, 151-55.
45

See also Larsen, Greek Federal States,

Paus. 3. 8. 3; see Larsen, RE 19.825-28. Elis \vas divided
into three areas: Elis proper (KOlAn RAts ), the northernmost section,
including Elis city; the central area containing Olympia; and the southern segment containing Lepreon and the other rebellious to\vns.

46

Diod. 14. 17. 6

47D.1.0d • 14.17.9
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oligarchic plot led by a pro-Spartan Eleian named Xenias within the city
failed.

The reason for the failure was the discovery that the leader of

the democrats, one Thrasydaios, had survived an initial clash between
the two factions.

A man resembling Thrasydaios had been killed in the

fray, but the real Thrasydaios had been in a drunken sleep when the melle
broke out. 48

Upon awakening, Thrasydaios rallied his supporters, who

then defeated the oligarchs and forced them to flee to the

S~~~tduS.

with the approach of winter, Agis withdrew to Lakedairnon and left
Lysippos as harrnost to plunder Eleian lands until the corning of spring.
Diodorus, however, reports that Agis wintered in Dyrne on the Patraic
gulf (14.17).
By the following summer (400 or 399), Thrasydaios sued ror peace
with the Spartans on their original terms.

The Eleians claimed a right

to only one of the outlying towns, saying that they had purchased it for
thirty talents.

The Spartans, though, deemed that a forcible purchase was

no more just than a forcible seizure and denied the Eleians' request.

49

They did not, however, deprive the Eleians of their presidency of the
Olympic games.

They agreed to this because the Eleians promised not to

debar the Spartans from future games and because the Pisatans who had
originally held the presidency were now too few to perform the function. 50
When all these matters were settled, peace was concluded and Elis joined

48xen. Hell. 3.2.28-29.
49xen. Hell. 3.2.30-31.
50 Paus. 3.8.5.

40
the Peloponnesian alliance.

51

Three other instances of Sparta's conduct toward the European
Greeks remain to be discussed.

Another demonstration of Spartan intent

to quell dissent '"ithin the Peloponnesos '"as the campaign against their
centuries-old subjects, the Messenians. 52

Their purpose was to expel

Messenian agitators from outposts in Kephallenia and Naupaktos. 53
Since the former is an island, the decision presumably involved a naval
operation, but our only source is content to note that the Spartans
succeeded without giving any details.
outpost to the Kephallenians.

The Spartans then returned the

In the case of Naupaktos, located in

Ozolian Lokris, the Spartan investiture probably also had a naval
phase.

Diodorus again supplies no hint as to

th~

nurr.bers involved, the

name of the commander, or the nature of the operation.

As with

Kephallenia, he records only that the Lakedaimonians were successful.

51

swoboda,·RE 5.2, 2400-01 under Elis points out that the
chronology of the Eleian war is a classic locus vexatus. Hatzfeld,
,
----"Notes sur la chronologie des Helleniques," REA 35(1933), 397, proposes
that the lvar began in 400 and ended in--398. Agis was reluctant to
attack and used the earthquake as an excuse to withdraw rather than
desecrate the Olympic festival in 400. No such compunction stayed the
Spartans, however, in 399. Finally in 398 (a Pythian year), a victorious Agis could dedicate his spoils at Delphi. Xenophon's rough
synchronism of this campaign with Derkylidas' activities in Asia, however, could easily refer not to the second, but rather the third and
final year.
This would eliminate the need to begin a sacrilegious
campaign in an Olympic year. Thus the seismic shock would occur in
401, the major effort in 400, and the end of the war and Agis' death
in 399. Pausanias (3.8.3-5) observes that the war stretched into a
third year, but lasted only a little more than two calendar years.
52
53

niod. 14.34.2-6.

see. Thuc. 5.35.7 (w. 421/0 B.C.) and 4.41.1 (s. 425 B.C.)
and Gomme et al., Vol. 4, 37-38 and Vol. 3, 481 and 495. During the
Archidamian-war, the Athenians had settled dissident Messenians in
Naupaktos and Kephallenia to harass the Lakedaimonians.

41
The Athenian navarch Tolmides had handed Naupaktos over to the
Messenians in 456 B.C., and the Spartans now restored it to the
.
54
western Lok r1ans.
Diodorus concludes his discussion of these operations by observing
that many of the Messenians driven into exile eventually found employment as mercenaries.
Syracuse.

Some served in the armies of Dionysios I of

Others who departed for Kyrene in Libya were apparently all

but annihilated in a bloody Kyrenaian civil war.
The second item of note for the period between 404 and 399 is
the occupation of Herakleia in Trachis by the Spartan Herippidas.
Sparta had intervened militarily in the region of the Malian gulf as
recently as the winter of 413/412 B.C.

Agis at that time had set out

from Dekeleia to collect tribute for a Spartan ship-building effort.

He

had compelled the Oitaians, Phthiotic Achaians, Malians and others to
contribute money and hostages much against their wi11. 55

The civil

strife that had broken out in Herakleia furnished the Spartans with an
ideal pretext to set up an outpost in north-central Greece near
Thermopylai. 56
rest.

Accordingly, Herippidas was sent out to quell the un-

He convened an assembly in the town and, on determining the 500

5 4Diod. 11.84.7; Oldfather, RE 16.2, 1986, 1989, discusses these
events in some detail and takes note of the chronological uncertainty.
See also Diod. 14.78, 15.66 and Pausanias 4.26.2, 10.38.10.
55 Thuc. 8.3.1; see Gomme et al., Vol. 4, 395. Thuc. 5.51-52
notes that, in 419, the Boiotians had occupied Herakleia. By 412,
therefore, it must have been back in Spartan hands. Possibly the
Boiotians were inciting unrest in this area ca. 399; see Gomme et al.,
Vol. 4, 68-69.
56D.10 d • 14.38.4-5.
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men most responsible for the strife, executed them all.

Moreover, he

expelled the rebellious inhabitants around .Ht. Oite (who included
Oitaians, Malians, Ainianians and Phthiotic Achaians).

These people

fled to Thessaly with their families, where they remained in exile
until the Boiotians restored them five years later. 57
A final indication of Spartan activity in northern Greece stems
from unsettled conditions obtaining in Thessaly.

Lykophron of

Pherai was able to defeat a coalition under Larisaian leadership for
loca 1 supremacy a b out t h e

.
t~me

58
o f a part i a 1 so 1 ar ec 1'~pse.

By 400 B.C., Sparta's interest in north central Greece appears
to have extended to Thessaly and Makedonia.

A group of Larisaian exiles

were debating whether they shGuld join the Spartans in a war of
aggression against the Makedonian barbarians who had occupied their city.
The contemplated hostilities, however, did not materialize and so the
point was moot. 59

57 Diod. 14.82.6-7; Xen. »ell. 3.5.6; Meyer, Vol. 5, 50, n.2, dates
Herippidas' occupation of Herakleia to 398. See also Beloch 3.1, 21, who
ascribes the unrest in the region to a conflict between natives and the
~TIOlKOl of Agis' incursion in 413/2. Aristophanes (Lysistrate 1168-70)
alludes to the Spartan presence, and Xenophon (~. 1.2.18-19) records
an uprising in which 700 people, including the harmost Labotas, were
killed. See also Meyer, Vol. 4.2, 323-24 and Parke, 39,41.
58xen. Hell. 2.3.4. The eclipse in question occurred on 3 Sept.
404 B.C.; see Oppolzer, Canon of Eclipses, Harvard, 1962, 78, no. 1936.
59our only evidence for this affair is a document entitled
,
,
Hpwoou
nspl TIOAlTElaS.
Modern scholars, though, have concluded that the
speech is an authentic product of the late fifth or early fourth century
B.C. They have advanced sundry hypotheses for its date (see Wade-Gery,
"Kritias and Heredes," CQ 39, 1945, 22, n.l and Sordi, "A proposito di
uno scritto politico dey-401-400 A.C.: Il nsp~ TIOAtTEtas della pseudoErode," Riv. di Fil. 33 (1955), 175ff). Others who have troubled over
date and authorship are Beloch, Vol. 3.2, 132, n.2; Meyer, Vol. 5, 50,

'
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Summary of Spartan Policy in Greece, 404-399 B.C.
The reaction of various groups within the city to her newly
won hegemony determined the major outlines of Sparta's policy from
404 to 397.

At first, this policy was essentially the creation of

one man, Lysander.

Building upon the existing system of harmosts and

garrisons which had arisen during the Peloponnesian War,

60

Lysander was

able to install small groups of people loyal to him in the poleis of
Asia Minor and the Aegean.

These narrowly constituted governments of

extremist oligarchs, the dekarchies, also included the thirty tyrants
at Athens.
After Lysander's two setbacks (Pausanias superseded his command
in Attika in 403, and Pharnabazos denounced him to the ephors in 402),
his political ascendancy was ended.

It is to this period that most
/

scholars date the decree calling for the restoration of the TiaTP101

,
TIOA1TE1a1

. 1 an d s an d po 1 els
. o f As~a.
. 61
i n t h e ~s

-

I

-

\

From 402 to Agesilaos'

..

I

n.3; Drerup, /Hpwoou I TIEP1 TIOAlTElaS, Studien z. Gesch. und Kult. d.
-Alt. 2.1 (Paderborn, 1908); and Munschen, RE 8, 951-53. The best
hypotheses for its date seem to be either 404, if Kritias is the author,
or 401/0, if Thrasymachos or one of his students wrote it. In any case,
its subject is resistance to the designs of Archelaos, king of Makedonia.
60 Parke, 44-49.
61 rn a recent study, Hamilton has argued on the basis of his reconstruction of internal politics at Sparta that the decree may have been
promulgated as late as 397, that the ephors perhaps ordered the disbanding
of the dekarchies to conciliate the Persians in the wake of Derkylidas'
truce with Tissaphernes, and that the grave domestic turmoil revealed by
Kinadon's conspiracy could have dampened the Spartans' fervor for overseas
adventurism. See Sparta's Bitter Victories, Cornell, 1979, 117, 128-29.
I am inclined, nevertheless, to accept the earlier date for two reasons.
First, there is the inscriptional evidence of the joint decree of ephors
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succession (ca. 399), there seems to have been little factional strife
in Sparta.

The Lysandrians could no longer dominate policy as they had

from 405 to 402.

Similarly, the trial of Pausanias despite his

acquittal shows that the most conservative Spartans (whose leader was
Pausanias) were unable to assume the ascendancy.

That Agis was able

to undertake a punitive war against Elis by 401 hints at a consensus
for limiting activity to European Greece.

With the waning of Lysander's

influence, Sparta's attention no longer focused primarily on Asia
Minor or the Aegean.

Rather she busied herself with the chastisement

and kings at Delos (Tod, no. 99) and that of the second Athenian
decree (Tod, no. 97.9-10) which date to 403/02. See Beloch 3.1, 19,
n.l; Meyer, Vol. 5, 43. Grote, Vol. 7, 365-66, believes that some
withered for lack of Spartan support, but that other endured until
as late as 396. As Andrewes, "Two Notes on Lysander," Phoenix, 25
(1971)213-14, observes, Tissaphernes actively worked to undermine
Lysander and Kyros by giving refuge in Lydia to a thousand democratic
exiles, (Diod. 13.104.5-6). Andrewes also refers to the notion of the
dekarchies' survival until 397 as "reviving an old heresey" (ibid.,
206). The Delian decree appears to be a reassertion of traditional
Spartan authority after Lysander's d~bacle in Attika (Cavaignac,
300). In the second Samian decree, the Athenians praise the Notians
and Ephesians for offering shelter to ~xiled Samian democrats, while
the dekarchs held sway on the latters' native island. It thus
seems unlikely that the dekarchs in Samos, ~otos, or Ephesos (which
had been Lysander's headquarters) could have held unchallenged
authority in those cities at the time of the decree (Parke, 52).
Second, the decree was probably as much a formality as that of late
404 which forbade any polis from aiding Athens' democratic exiles
(Diod. 14.6.1-2). The only practical effect of the decree would have
been to deprive the dekarchs of the unconditional support of harmost
and garrison. With that prop removed, the extremist oligarchs could
not prevent more moderate elements from resurfacing or returning
from exile to participate once again in public life. This is not to
imply that all dekarchs were at once deposed, arrested or exiled,
however, since harmosts and garrisons would remain to aid in
dampening violence and recriminations.
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. .
of luke-warm or reca 1 c~t~ant

. hb ors. 62

ne~g

Concerning Sparta's relations with the Greek states in Europe,
the following points should be made.

Some of Sparta's staunchest

allies during the struggle with Athens quickly began to have second
thoughts after the demise of their common foe.

Following Lysander's

settlement in Attika (404 B.C.), Thebes, Korinth, Argos and Megara
joined in

contr~ve~ing

democratic exiles.

the Spartans' decree against aiding Athens'

Thebes even went so far as to issue a counter-

decree imposing a fine on anyone who turned an exile back to the
thirty.

The Thebans also aided Thrasyboulos in mounting his attack on

.
63
t h e Pe~raeus.

Korinth and Thebes again spurned the Spartans when

62 some scholars have postulated the existence of three political
factions at Sparta during this epoch. The most recent of these is
Hamilton, Sparta's Bitter Victories, Cornell, 1979, 80-96 with notes.
Hamilton speculates that the partisans of Lysander sought a naval as well
as military hegemony and a sharp break with the archaic Lykourgan
politeia. This would require the upkeep of a fleet, the imposition of
tribute, and the introduction of currency at Sparta. Such p~ople also
contemplated the evolution cf a more egalitarian society and the
abolition of the hereditary kingship. See Aristole Pol. 5.1.5. and
5.6.2; Isok. 12.67-69; Diod. 14.10.2, 13.2-8; Polybios-6.49.8 and
Plut. Lys.24-26, Ages. 8; Nepos Lys. 3, for evidence of Lysander's
covert plans. The second group under King Agis favored a more modest
hegemony confined to European Greece. These Spartans would reduce the
original Peloponnesian allies to near vassalage and extend Spartan
influence beyond the Isthmos (see Diad. 14.38.4-5 for Herippidas'
occupation of Trachinian Herakleia in 399.). The Third faction, led
by King Pausanias, represented the most traditional elements in the
state. Unlike either of the two hegemonist factions, this group would
tolerate no deviation from the Lykourgan system and preferred to remain on terms of rough equality with the allies. They also would have
carefully delimited Sparta's role in central Greece, the Aegean and
Asia Minor. Hamilton ably discusses the balance of power among these
factions, but Cawkwell, CR,30 (1980), 242-44, believes that Hamilton's
c?njectures far exceed the evidence, and Tritle, CP 1 76 (1981), 234-37,
f1nds the notion of this factional wrangling too reliant on ideology
to the neglect of personalities.
63 For Theban aid to Thrasyboulos, see Lysias fr. 120; Hell. Ox.
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Lysander undertook his Attic campaign of 403.
to send soldiers.
discern.

Both poleis refused

One reason for this antagonism is not difficult to

Once Lysander had embarked the Spartans on a program of

Panhellenic hegemony, they arrogantly appropriated all spoils of
victory to themselves.

The sole exception to this pattern occurred

when the Boiotians,

were the largest contingent at Dekeleia, simply

~vho

took their share by force.

The other allies

re~Pived

no share at all.

Horeover, Lysander imposed an annual tribute of 1,000 talents on the
Aegean and Asian poleis to underwrite the nascent hegemony.
In 401 Thebes and Korinth, by refusing to participate in Agis'
campaign against Elis, had faried yet a third time to support Spartan
designs.

The polis mentality (a deeply

ingrai~ed

desire for local

autonomy) and earlier alliances could explain this reluctance in part,
but the Lakedaimonians' short-sighted hybris was progressively
alienating some of their most important supporters.

The eventual re-

sult was that a powerful coalition of former friends and foes would
take the field against Sparta less than a decade after the fall of
Athens. 64

17; Xen. Hell. 2.4.2; Diod. 14.6.1-3; Plut. Lys. 2.7.2 and Justin 5.9.8.
That the allies had no share in the spoils of victory is attested by Hell.
Ox. 17.4-5; Xen. Hell. 2.3.8, 3.5.5; Diod. 13.106.7; and Justin 5.10.~
~superb and moving account of the excesses inflicted by one of the
thirty at Athens is preserved in Lysias' KaT~ EpaTooetvous
Here
the orator pleads for justice against his brother's murderer.
64 see also Hamilton, 326-27, for the eventual consequences of
Sparta's high-handedness after 404 B.C.
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Sparta and Persia, 404-397 B.C.
The most significant development in the Persian empire between
404 and 397 'tvas the revolt of Kyros the younger.

In spite of the

failure to topple his brother from the throne, Kyros' attempt would
have repercussions for more than a decade.

Until the outbreak of the

revolt (which was due at least in part to Spartan instigation),the
internal areas of the Persian realm on the surface appeared quiescent.
Hith the revolt of Kyros, Artaxerxes could no longer ignore Spartan
perfidy and meddling in Persian internal affairs.

65

Because he had fought at Kunaxa and proved loyal to the Great
King, Tissappernes recouped the Lydian and Karian satrapies which he
had lost to Kyros.

By 400 he had arrived in Sardis and demanded that

the Ionian coastal cities be subject to him as was his right according
to the treaty he negotiated for Dareios in 412/11 B.c.

66

This prompted

65 xenophon's Anabasis, Diodorus (14.19-31) and the "lost history"
of Themistogenes of Syracuse set forth the details of Kyros' revolt.
Xenophon (Hell. 2.4.6) gives the name "Themistogenes" who is unknown except for this passage. Laqueur's conjecture (RE 5A.2, 1684-86) that he
may have written a history of Syracuse is pure-speculation. Prentice,
"Themistogenes of Syracuse: An Error of a Copyist," AJP 1947, 76-77,
ingeniously su~gests that 0€~lcrToylvt TQ ~upaKocrt~
may be a corruption of 0€~lcrTwS fvl TWV Kups(wv
in which case Xenophon would be
referring to himself. Meyer, Vol. 5, 176, n.2, asserts that
Themistogenes is Xenophon's pseudonym for himself. The accounts of
Ktesias, court physician to Artaxerxes, and Dinon of Kolophon survive
in fragments (See Jacoby, Fr.Gr.H., 3C, 522, 688; also Meyer, Vol. 5
174, n.l. and Beloch 3.1, 31,~.1). Dinan's account seems to have
been the source for Plutarch (Artax. 6). Xenophon (Hell. 3.1.1) and
Isokrates (4.103-7, 146) record Sparta's activity against the Persians.
Plutarch (Artax. 6) claims that the Spartans ordered Klearchos to
cooperate with Kyros! Diodorus writes that the Spartans cooperated with
Kyros in secret at first and by 401 quite openly (14.11-12, 19.4-5). See
Grote, Vol. 7, 181-82, Beloch 3.1, 34 and Meyer, Vol. 5, 184.
66 Thucydides 8.18, 37, 58 (see Gomme et al., Vol. 5, 40-42, 79-82,
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the Ionians to appeal for aid to Sparta as TIPOOTaTns

of Bellas.

Be-

cause of Ionian resistance, Tissaphernes laid siege to Kyme in the
summer and captured many of her inhabitants.

The coming of '"inter

forced him to lift his siege, but he ransomed his captives for a huge
sum of money. 67
Sparta's response to the Ionian plea '"as to send Thibron with a
force of 5,000 men from the Peloponnesos that same summer.

He aug-

mented this force by requesting some 300 horsemen from the Athenians
who were only too happy to comply with the request, because the 300 had
been supporters of the thirty tyrants.

He further increased the army's

size with the addition of some 5,000 veterans of Kyros '"ho had been
operating against the Hellespontine Thracians under Xenophon.
ly,

Final-

he was able to recruit some 2,000 soldiers from the cities of

Greek Asia, bringing his army to a strength of over 12,000 men. 68
Since Agis was engaged in the Eleian struggle, Sparta's response to the
Ionians' plea indicates the true thrust of her policy.

Agis' cam-

paign would seem to be· more a police action than a major effort.

The

and 138-46). Justin 5.1.7. notes the alliance, but omits any reference
to its terms. See also Bengtson, Staatsvertrage l• 138-43. Tissaphernes
and Pharnabazos also issued coins in the Great King's name with Greek
letters to pay the rowers. See Gardner, ~History of Ancient Coinage,
Oxford, 1918, 334; Hill, Historical Greek Coins, London, 1906, 57-60; and
Kraay and Hirmer, Greek Coins, N.Y., 1966,~368, 378 with notes and
bibliography.
67

Xen. Hell. 3.1.3-4, Diod. 14.35.

The exact amount is unknown.

68xen. Hell. 3.1.4; Anab. 7 .6-8; Diod. 14.37 .1-4. The chronology
for this campaign cannot be fixed with certainty. }fust scholars suggest
that Thibron did not arrive in Ephesos until the winter of 400 or spring
of 399, e.g. Grote, Vol. 7, 375; Meyer, Vol. 5, 184-85 with notes;
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influence of Lysander and his supporters is likely, because these
people routinely favored a Spartan presence in Asia, an area rich in
potential for exploitation.

With the arrival of the Ionian contingent,

Thibron marched to Ephesos and set up his headquarters.

He advanced

to Magnesia,which fell to his assault,and moved on to Tralles.

Here his

initiative failed because of the city's superior fortifications and
natural defenses.

He returned to Magnesia and transferred the

inhabitants and their property to a nearby hill called o'

I
9wpn~

He did so in the belief that Magnesia, unwalled and situated on level
ground, would be easy prey for Tissaphernes' cavalry.

When in fact the

Persians appeared in large numbers, Thibron withdrew to Ephesos. 69
At first Thibron's successes were largely

diploma~ic.

Almost

all Greek cities in Asia Minor were willing to cooperate with a Spartan
officer at the head of a sizeable force.

With the arrival of Kyros'

veterans from Thrace, he was able to move against Tissaphernes'cavalry
even in open places.

In Pharnabazos' realm, such cities as Pergamon,

Teuthrania, Halisarna, Gambrion, Palaigambrion, Myrina and Gryneion came
over voluntarily.

At Phrygian Larisa, however, the inhabitants

frustrated his attempt to invest the city, so the ephors ordered him to
lift his siege and abandon Aiolis altogether.

He was to march instead

against Karia and Tissaphernes. 70

Cary, CAH, Vol. 6, 37-39; Parke, 65. Beloch believes that he conducted
summer and autumn operations while Tissaphernes was besieging Kyme
(Vol. 3.2, 212-13). In any case, Derkylidas superseded him in command
by the late summer of 399 (see below).
6 9Diod. 14.36.
70xen. Hell. 3.1.5-7 and Died. 14.37.
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While he was in Ephesos preparing to march against Karia, the
ephors cashiered Thibron and replaced him with Derkylidas.

The

allies had complained that Thibron had allowed his troops to plunder
Greeks.

\~en

he returned home, the Spartans assessed a ruinous fine

against him and he went into exile.
Thibron' s replacement

~vas

71

a man of long experience in Asia

~linor.

He was renowned for his resourcefulness and bore the nickname
"Sisyphos," as well as a grudge against the Hellespontine satrap
Pharnabazos.

Cognizant of the mutual suspicions between Tissaphernes

and Pharnabazos, Derkylidas made a truce with the former.

72

Thus he

abandoned plans for the Karian campaign and marched against Aiolis
which was only loosely attached to Pharnabazos' satrapy.

~

By refusing

to allow his men to plunder Greeks, he quickly won over such cities as
Larisa, Hamaxitos and Kolonai on the coast.

Cities further inland,

such as Neandria, Ilion and Kokylion also came over to him voluntarily.
A subordinate of Pharnabazos named
Troa~

Meidia~

who was in charge of the

refused to admit him to Kebren, but the city's Greek inhabitants

finally forced Meidias to do so. By having Meidias accompany him on
subsequent forays, he was able to bring over the towns of Gergis and

71 xen. Hell. 3.1.8-9.
72 Derkylidas had served in Greek Asia in 411 B.C. (Thuc. 8.6062). He was also harmost of Abydos during the navarchy of Lysander
in 407/06. (Xen. Hell. 3.1.9). See Niese, RE 5.1, 240-41 and
Parke, 41, 66-67. -xs-to his nickname and reputed resourcefulness, see
Xen. Hell. 3.1.8-9 and Athenaios 11.101 (Jacoby Fr.Gr.H., Vol. 2A.l,
63, NO":"?"l under Ephoros).
---
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Skepsis to the Greek site.
cities in eight days.

Derkylidas had won the allegiance of nine

With the summer (399) campaigning season dra\ving

to a close, he decided to seek a truce with Pharnabazos.

His purpose

was at once to protect his Aiolic allies from Persian cavalry and not
to make himself a burden to them, as had his predecessor. 73
Pharnabazos, reflecting on the strength of Derkylidas' force
which had occupjpd n~arly all of Aiolis, decided to accept the truce. 74
Until he could reorganize and augment his own forces, his Phrygian
estates were in imminent peril.

Derkylidas then moved into Bithynia,

where he passed the winter in plundering the region.
,

He was joined by

a force of Odryssian cavalry and Thracian peltasts from across the
strait.

Apart fr8m a single reverse which occurred when a large mass

of Bithynians attacked his camp while his troops were absent on a raid,
the winter season was a success. 75
With the coming of spring (398), a deputation arrived from
Sparta to extend Derkylidas' command into the next year.

The three

Spartan legates also mentioned that the Greek inhabitants of the
Chersonesos had complained to the ephors about Thracian raids into their

73

xen. Hell. 3.1.16-2.1; Diod. 14.38.

74 In the spring of 398, Ktesias, court physician to Artaxerxes,
visited Konon and Euagoras in Kypros after Tissaphernes and Pharnabazos'
rapprochement. He also travelled to Lakedaimon on behalf of the Great
King to attempt a reconciliation between Persia and Sparta. See Jacoby
Fr.Gr.H., Vol. 3C.l, 483, no. 30 (Phot. Bibl. 72), under Ktesias; also
Beloch~ Vol. 3.1, 36 and Meyer, Vol. 5, 193. The Spartans at the same
time sent a legation to Sousa. The Persians, however, kept them under
house-arrest to conceal the naval build-up in Phoinikia and Kypros.
75 Xen. Hell. 3.2.2-5.
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territory.

Their land was very fertile, they said, but they were unable

to till it properly because of these raids.

They proposed that a force

of Peloponnesian allies be dispatched to build a wall from sea to sea
to keep the Thracians out.
to the Chersonesos.

Derkylidas, taking the hint, crossed over

En route, Seuthes received him amicably in

Hellespontine Thrace.

Upon realizing how rich the soil was and having

conferred with representatives of the twelve
built their wall.

Ch~rsvnesian

cities, he

According to the version of Diodorus the construction

of the wall coincided with Derkylidas' arrival the year before to assume
Thibron's command.

Diodorus places the Chersonesian embassy to Sparta

in the previous year and he states that they specifically requested
Derkylidas.

Xenophon, who was present in Asia at the time of these

events, is perhaps to be preferred since he was an eye-witness to many
of the things he describes and would have had reliable information
available for events he did not himself see.

Furthermore, it seems

likely that the Chersonesians may have waited until early 398 to
make sure that Derkylidas did not prove another Thibron who would fatten
his own men at the expense of the Greeks he was supposed to protect. 76
After completing the wall, Derkylidas led his army back to Asia.
He had determined that all was well and prospering in the Greek coastal
regions.

The sole exception was that a group of Chian democrats were

plundering Ionia from their exile stronghold at Atarneus.

He thereupon

undertook an eight months' siege and finally occupied the city.

76 Diod. 14.38.6-7; Xen. Hell. 3.2.6-11.

The
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defenders had held out for so long
sizeable supply of grain.

because they had laid in a

Derkylidas then restocked the city's

granaries for his own troops and departed for Ephesos after appointing
Drakon of Pellene his governor (F398).

77

In the spring of 398, the principal satraps of Greek Asia,
Tissaphernes and Pharnabazos) had decided to work in concert to
the Spartans.

exp~l

Putting aside their differences (although Pharnabazos

remained secretly jealous of Tissaphernes' appointment as supreme Persian
commander), they conferred in Karia.

Tissaphernes was receptive to his

rival, because an Ionian embassy to Sparta had insisted that the Lakedaimonians press the satrap to grant full autonomy to all Greek cities.
The Spartans accordingly decided to mount a two-pronged attack on Karia,
where Tissaphernes' residence was located.

Derkylidas was to lead the

army and the navarch Pharax would co-ordinate naval operations.

78

Thus after completing his siege of Atarneus, Derkylidas was preparing in the spring of 397 to march on Karia.

The Persians outflanked

him, however, and in anticipation of his attack, they recrossed the
Maiandros river.

Derkylidas alerted Pharax that the Persian forces were

in a position to plunder Ionia at will.

He thereupon withdrew to the

.
79
Nort h to protect t h e I on~ans.
In the midst of this hasty volte-face, Derkylidas suddenly

7 7xen. Hell. 3.2.11 and Isok. 4.144.
78 Xen. Hell. 3.2.12-13.
79 Hell. 3.1.12-15.
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realized that the Persian army was bearing do\vn upon him in the immediate
vicinity of the Maiandros.

Since he had assumed that the Persian objec-

tive was the area around Ephesos, his troops were not in formation.
Rather than offer battle, both sides agreed to a one-day truce.
Derkylidas was unsure of the reliability of his troops from Ionia (some
had fled at the mere sight of the Persians), and he was uneasy about
risking a pitched battle.

As for Tissaphernes, he was fearful of the

formidable reputation of the Greek hoplites.

In spite of Pharnabazos'

objections, he was therefore receptive to a peaceful resolution.
side presented its terms.

Each

The Persians demanded the departure of the

Lakedaimonians and all harmosts.
for all Greek cities in Asia.

The Spartans insisted on full autonomy

It was agreed that the truce should obtain

until Tissaphernes could confer with the Great King and until Derkylidas
could inform the authorities in Sparta.

80

Moreover, after Derkylidas had

made his truce with Tissaphernes in late 399, Pharnabazos enlisted the
services of the Athenian navarch Konon in 398.

Since the battle of

Aigospotamoi in 405, Konen had been living in exile at the court of
Euagoras, king of Kypriote Salamis.

After persuading the Great King,

Pharnabazos offered Konen 500 silver talents to outfit a fleet.
Euagoras and other leaders in Kypros were induced to furnish 100 triremes.
Konon agreed to accept command of the entire Persian fleet
hoped to avenge Athens' defeat and win glory for himself.

because he
Upon accepting

his commission in the Great King's na~J. Konon took forty triremes

80

Xen. Hell. 3.2.16-20; see Bengtson, Staatsvertrage

~'

164-65.
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already available and sailed to Kilikia to complete his preparations.

81

According to Plutarch, 82 Konen wrote to the Great King, suggesting
that he required a navy just as the king had need of a navarch.

No

mention is made of Pharnabazos' role in procuring the command for Konen
in this version.

Pharnabazos most likely did have such a role, as

Xenophon reports, but it may also be true that Kanan brought l'!imself
to the attention of the Great King.

Since Pharnabazos \vas jealous of

Tissaphernes' position as supreme commander of the land forces, it seems
reasonable that he •vould attempt to augment his own influence by
strengthening Artaxerxes' hand at sea.
Konen spent most of 397 recruiting mercenary seamen and overseeing
the construction of the Persian fleet in Kypros.

Thus while

Derkylidas and the satraps had negotiated a temporary cessation of
hostilities on land, Pharnabazos and Konen continued their clandestine
efforts to augment dramatically Persian naval strength in the Aegean
Sea.

This was the situation in the eastern

~fediterranean

on the eve of

Agesilaos' campaign.

81

Diod. 14.39.1-4; it is undoubtedly to this period that the
beautiful Kyzikene issue of silver dates with Pharnabazos' idealized
likeness and Greek lettering (not Aramaic). See Gardner, A Historv
of Ancient Co~~. Chicago, 1974, 334; Kraay and Hirmer,-G~~~
Coins, Ne"t-l York, 1966, 370 with notes; and Hill, Greek Historical
~. Chicago, 1976, 57-60.
82

Plut. Artaxerxes 21.1-3.

CHAPTER III
AGESILAOS' YOUTH AND ACCESSION, .!_HE CONSPfRACY OF
KLNADO~, AND PREPARATIONS FO~ THE ASIA?i _EXPEDITION
\Jhile Derkylidas ·.vas campaigning in Asia
events occurred in Lakedaimon.

~tinor,

two important

The second of these was the ephors'

discovery of a plot to overthrmv the government.

~vi.th

The year before,

the death of Agis, a dispute had arisen over the royal succession.

1

It was this dispute that first brought Agesilaos into the full light of
history.

Evidence for his life before he became king is, as might be

expected, meagre.

The future king

~vas

born in 44 1+ B.C., the son of

Archidamos II of the Eurypontid house and his second wife Eupolia.

2

1

see ch. 2, 36, and notes 39 and 51 for the insoluble chronological muddle. Though certainty is unattainable, the best dates for the
Eleian struggle are from spring 401 to summer 399. Thus Agesilaos'
accession would occur in late summer or early autumn and the detection of
Kinadon's plot in late spring or early summer 398.
2There is evidence for Agesilaos' life as a family man, but it is
rather sparse and scattered. Nonetheless at least the outlines are discernible from an occasional reference in our sources. This 1:1uch c<m be
ascertained: He married a woman named Kleora and had three children by
her, a son Archidamos who later became king, and two daughters Eupolia
and Prolyta. The evidence for Archidamos' birth occurs in Xenophon's
Hellenika 6.4.18. In his first command, he was summoned to aid in the
aftermath of the battle of Leuktra. Since a Spartan, even a san of a
king, would not normally assume a commanc before the age of thirty, perhaps Archidamos "t-Tas barn approxiMately l:.Gl B.C. in order to be old
enough to lead out his own army in 371; see nertzberg, Das Leben des
Agesilaos II von EParta, ,Hall~, 185S, 23S. Agesilaos did not command,
as Xenophon notes, 81.<\ acree:vtas. As to the dates of his daugl1ters'
births, there is no evidence surviving from antiquity. Hertzberg has
speculated that his marriage may have occurred some time after the
defeat of Athens in 404, perhaps in the following year. His assumption
that Archidamos was the eldest cannot be supported by the evidence.
Plutarch's Agesilaos 10.6, Xenophon's Hellenika 3.4.29, and
Justin 6.3 provide information about his wife's family, where her
56
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Since he was not his father's first born, he underwent the rigors of
~

/

the Spartan aywyn,
exempted. 3

It

because only those destined for the kingship were

was during this period of youthful training that

Agesilaos first made the acquaintance of Lysander, a man whose long
;elationship with Agesilaos' older half-brother Agis made possible
his final effort to win permanent influence in Sparta.

The former

Justin 6.3. provide information about his wife's family, where her
brother Peisandros' name appears (see Ehrenberg RE 19.1., 144).
Similarly Pausanias 3.9.3 gives her father's nam;-as Aristomelidas
(Ki1:chner, RE 2.1, 950), 'l.vho was sent to Thebes in 396 to enlist
Boiotian aid for the Asian campaign. Peisandros was left in co~~and
of the Spartan navy when Agesilaos departed for the interior of Asia
in 395.
Agesilaos had a younger half-brother by his mother (he and
(Ehrenb~rg, RE SA.l,
398-400), and a sister Kyniska (Honigmann, RE Vol. 12.1., 2).
Teleutias will figure prominently in subsequent chapters and Kyniska
achieved renm.;rn by becoming the first 'l.voman in history to enter a 'l.vinning
c~ariot in the Olympic games (Plut. Ages. 20.1).

AgiE, had sharerl the same father) naned Teleutias,

3Plutarch's biography is the only source for Agesilaos' life
as a private citizen and the major emphasis is moral. He notes, for
example, that Agesilaos was well suited to rule because he had learned
to obey. Hhile learning to .obey, he became enamored of Lysander, an
older member of his aye::\n or "herd" because he was smitten by the
latter's physical beauty. Agesilaos was lame in one foot, but the
bloom of youth was enough to make up for his deformity. In spite nf
his handicap, the future king did not shrink from challenge, no matter
how strenuous, and proved himself in every way a worthy competitor,
(Ages. 1.1.-2.2.). Although a resilient and hardened competitor, he
displayed a winning charm and affability. Hertzberg, 232, provides
a genealogical chart which summarizes the information about Agesilaos'
family. For his date of birth, see Hertzberg, 229, n.2a and 233, n.6;
Niese, RE Vol. 1.1, 802; and Kle~ne Paulv, Vol. 1, 127-28. As to the
date, there is no reason to doubt Plutarch's statement that the king
was ei5hty-four at the time of his death in Libya in 360 B.C. (Ages. 40.2).
Plutarch's reference to the exemption of eldest sons of the two royal
houses is the only one about this prerogative to survive from antiquity.
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navarch exerted his authority and popularity to win Agesilaos the
kingship, and two years later, he manoeuvered the king into his first
overseas command.

4

In addition to what can be gleaned from Plutarch, there is indirect evidence from the histories of Thucydides and, in one instance,
from Xenophon's Hellenika about Agesilaos' military experience.
In the summer of 419 B.C., Agis led the Lakedaimonians to their
northern border at Mt. Lykaion, but turned back because of unfavorable
omens.

5

One year later, at the request of the Epidaurians who were

suffering an Argive incursion, Agis led the allies against the Argolid.
Later that same summe~ having withdrawn from the Argolid, 6 he again
led the Lakedaimonians out
relief of the Tegeates.
victory. 7

,

Tiavon~E1

1

this time against Mantineia in

This expedition resulted in a major Spartan

In the winter of 417, Agis took the field against the

Argives a third time in full force with all the allies except the
Korinthians.

Although he seized and dismantled some walls and occupied

4Rahe, Lysander and the Spartan Settlement, ~07-403 B.C., diss.
Yale, 1977, 7-9, 19, believes that Lysander was a ~oea~~
and the protege of Archidamos and later Agis. Thus he participated in the
with Agesilaos, the son and half-brother respectively of his sponsors.

aywyn

5

Thuc. 5.54; see Gomme

~

al. Vol. 4, 73-75.

6 see Gomme ~ al., Vol. 4, 111-119 for a precise and detailed
analysis of this campaign.
7Thuc. 5.64, 5.75; see Gornne

~

al., Vol. 4, 91
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a small town, this action was indecisive.

In the early spring of 413,

the Spartans under Agis invaded Attika and fortified Dekeleia. 8
Finally Lysander was completing his preparations for the blockade of
Athens and requested King Agis to occupy Dekeleia a second time in full
force to reduce the city to starvation and surrender in the fall of
405 B.C.

9

One can surmise in all the instances cited, that Agesilaos
participated in these actions under the command of his older halfbrother.

In the first case, the abortive mission near Mt. Lykaion in

419, Agesilaos would have been about twenty-five years old.

In the

Spartans' final blockade and siege of Athens in 405/04, he would have
been approaching forty.

His military experience before his accession,

even to judge from this limited evidence, is likely to have been
considerable. 10
The Disputed Succession and Triumph of Agesilaos
After depositing one-tenth of the booty from the Eleian War at
Delphi, King Agis II fell ill and was carried back to Sparta where he
soon died.11

A conjunction of three peculiar circumstances made

8Thuc. 7.19; see Gomme et al., Vol. 4, 395.
9xen. Hell. 2.2.7; see also ch. 2.
10Hertzberg, 235.

See also ch. 2, 25 and 36, n. 39

llxen. Hell. 3.3.1, Paus. 3.8.7. Several ancient authors allotted
at least some space to the disputed succession and turmoil in
Lakedaimon after Agis' death. The year in question was in all likelihood
399 (see ch. two for a discussion of the chronological muddle of this
Period); the authors and their works are Xenophon in his Agesilaos 1.5
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Agesilaos' succession possible.

First, a cloud of suspicion had plagued

the young heir Leotychidas for most of his life.

From the time of his

birth, he had been suspected of being Alkibiades' bastard.

During the

latter's exile in Lakedaimon, rumor abounded that Timaia, Agis' wife,
had become pregnant by him. 12

As a result, when she gave birth in the

tenth month after Agis had forsaken her bed, the king refused to
..:1
h.1s patern1ty.
.
13
ac know 1ettge

Even the ephors were suspicious, and
It

"

Timaia's habit of referring to the child as Alkibiades in the presence
of her helot maids did little to advance the suspect heir's cause.

14

Second, the advocacy of Lysander that summer was crucial, because
an oracle-monger named Diopeithes had produced an old Delphic augury
warning the Spartans "not to lame the kingship."

Agesilaos' lameness

thus gave a pretext to Leotychidas' supporters to rally to the young
heir's side.
Third, in a more speculative vein, there may have been an undercurrent of factional wrangling.

The Lysandrians would back a man whom

and Hellenika 3.3.1-4, Plutarch in his Agesilaos 3.1-5 and Lysander
22.3-6, Pausanias in the Description of Lakonia 3.8.7-9, and Nepos in
his synopsis of Agesilaos' life 1.4-6. Xenophon is the contemporary
source, but the best description of events is in Plutarch's
biography.

12 See Thuc. 6.88.9-93.1; Isok. 16.9; and Plut. Alk. 23.1. Gemme
et al., Vol. 4, 360-61, 366, discuss the implications ~Alkibiades'
sojourn in Sparta. He arrived in the winter 415/14; thus in 399
Leotychidas could have been no more than 15 years old.
13A nocturnal earthquake had created in Agis' mind a superstitious
fear of Poseidon's wrath. Thus he chose not to sleep for a time in the
same bed as his wife.
14 Plut. Ages. 3.1-2, Alk. 23.7-8, Lys. 22.3-4; Xen. Hell. 3.3.2.

61
their leader believed "tvould be pliable and willing to support Spartan
expansion into the Aegean and Asia.
Spartiate~

On the other hand, more traditional

who believed in the great rhetra of Lykourgos and doubted

the ,.,isdom of simply taking over the maritime
likely support Leotychidas.

&pxn

of Athens> would

Agis after all had finally recognized the

boy as his son, and the \....-ords of a dying man counted for much .15
In addition to these

thre~

circ~mstances,

it is clear that

Agesilaos was eminently suited for the role of military leader.
scrupulously deferential to the ephors and the
the most power in the state at that time.
ulation he

~vas

y{poVTSS

He was

who wielded

By skillful and subtle manip-

able to augment his own pm.rer and largely circumvent

these two bodies whose function was to check the power and ambition of
the kings.

Similarly, he enjoyed cordial relations with ordinary

citizens by favoring those amenable to his purposes and winning over his
adversaries with encouragement when they served the state well.

His only

weaknesses were that he was overprotective of his friends and would
demonstrate an imperfect grasp of the importance of naval strength. 16
Clearly the issues which carried the day for Agesilaos were his
proven ability and the question of Leotychidas' legitimacy.

Since his

1 5Rice, Why Sparta Failed, diss., Yale, 1971, 10-11 and
Hamilton, Sparta's Bitter Victories, Cornell, 1979, 87-88, n.l, theorize
that three factions were competing for power at this time. See ch. 2
for a discussion of the varying aims of each group.
16 Plut. Ages. 4.3-5.2; Beloch, Vol. 3.1, 109; Meyer, Vol. 5,
197-98, 288-89. In this last regard, he was quite unlike his former
partisan and ~PCXO'T~S Lysander.
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nephew was a mere child, no older than fifteen years, the vigorous
and tested adult would appear to have been the better choice for the
state.

Because of Agis' deathbed acknm..rledgement of the youth,

Diopeithes' advocacy undoubtedly carried weight with the superstitious
Spartans.

This was so despite Xenophon's description of Diopeithes as

AswTU;<dn ouvo.yopc:uwv ':Jhich hints at political as well as religious motivation.

17

The key phrase in Lysander's ~cbut~al of the seer was that

the god (Apollo) did not care i f a king walked ~;.;ith a limp, oX\' c:l.
/
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18

This interpretation of the oracle, Agesilaos' contention that Agis had
forsaken Timaia's bed ten months before Leotychidas' birth, and probably
Agesilaos' maturity convinced the ephors to pronounce the more experienced
man king.

We are told that upon assuming the kingship, Agesilaos divided

the estate of his older brother among his mother's poor relatives and
drove the hapless Leotychidas into exile. 19
It should be noted that Lysander's successful
sally acclaimed as a triumph of justice.

r~se

was not univer-

From the remarks made by

Plutarch in his comparison of Agesilaos and Pompey, it is clear that
there was much doubt about the propriety of the accession in the ancient
world.

Although Agesilaos may have been a favorite of historians

17 Xen. Hell. 3.3.3.
18 Plut. Ages. 3.3.

19 Ibid. 3.6.
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beginning with Xenophon,

20

Plutarch condemns him for injustice and

self-serving expediency for the manner in which he became king. 21

He

and Lysander stand censured for condemning and exiling Leotychidas and
having done the state a disservice by "darkening the oracle of Apollo." 22
The Conspiracy of Kinadon
After describing Agesilaos' accession, Xenophon gives a flawed
(by modern standards), but remarkably revealing glimpse into Spartan
society in the years following Athens' defeat in 404

B.c. 23

The effects

of the war on the holdings of some of the Spartiates resulted in their
/

inability to keep up their share of the

crucrcr1 1:lC:t1 •

Because of this

failure, these men lost their voting privileges in the assembly (aoella).
One of their number, Kinadon, headed a conspiracy involving other

'
"
UTf01JSl0\JS5

1

as they were called,

~ioikoi,

whose purpose was to overthrow the government.

and Messenian helots
Xenophon's purpose in

recording the details of this plot was to highlight the role of his
friend, the new king.

Agesilaos' part was limited to

parti~ipating

in

unpropitious sacrifices at the time that the details of the plot surfaced, although he may have had a deliberative role in formulating the
countermeasures.

20 Nepos Ages. 1.1.
2lsynkrisis 1.2,2.1.
2 2Parke and Wormell, The Delphic Oracle, Vol. 2: The Oracular
ResPonses, Oxford, 1961, 50. The oracle originally appears in Diod.
11.50.4. This reference dates to 477 B.C. when it was already considered
"ancient."
23

Hell. 3. 3. 4.
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The details of the plot are the following.

Less than a year

after becoming king, Agesilaos failed three times to obtain favorable
omens at a sacrifice.

The seer performing the ritual interpreted the

contrary outcome as an augury of internal peril to the state.

A few days

later an informer came forward to alert the ephors that a man called
Kinadon

~vith

other "inferiors", perioikoi and Hessenian helots, was plot-

ting to murder the Spartiates and assume control of the state. 24

The ha-

tred among the few who were privy to the conspiracy was so intense that
they wanted "to eat the Spartiates raw."

The ephors at once consulted

with certain elders and devised a ruse to entrap Kinadon.

They would send

him on a spurious mission to the

They would

~fessenian

town of Aulon.

instruct him to arrest certain helots there and a beautiful woman who
reportedly was corrupting Lakedaimonians stationed there, young and old
alike.

In reality, however, those assigned to accompany him had secret

instructions to arrest him as soon as they were outside Sparta proper.
In case any of his accomplices should hear of the counter-plot, a squad
.
. h.1s d etent1on.
.
25
o f cava 1 ry was to ass1st
1n

It may be that Kinadon had

performed such services for the authorities in the past after losing his
status as an "equal"

c;
(Of.lOlOS

).

In any event, he did not find the

assignment unusual and thus played into the ephors' hands.

Vpon his

24 chambers, "On Messenian and Laconian Helots in the Fifth
Century B.C.," The Historian)40 (1977), 271-85, observes that much of
the difficulty and confusion about the helot problem would disappear
if Laconian helots were seen as largely loyal and those from Messenia
as disaffected.
25 Hell. 3.3.4-8.
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arrest, he was forced to reveal the names of his principal comrades,
and the list which his captors compiled contained even so respected a
man as the seer Tisamenes.

\Vhen the ephors had received Kinadon and

his fellows into custody back in Sparta, they asked him why had had undertaken such a thing.
no one in Lakedaimon.

His response was that he wished to be less than
He and the others were subsequently

~.;hipped

and

prodded in public, and 1='Ce::;umably executed. 26
As Hamilton has observed, 27 Xenophon surely "c orr.mi t s one of his
most serious sins as an historian by failing to analyze the causes and
results of Kinadon's conspiracy."

The root causes of the plot may have

been the growing inequality of wealth among the

q

0~0101

, which forced

some of them to default in their contribution to the OU001T{a1
common messes.
privileges.

, or

The penalty for such insolvency was loss of citizen

Hamilton suggests that there may have been in Sparta at

this time a crypto-democratic movement which hoped to achieve a more
equitable participation of all Lakedaimonians in the affairs of state.
It was certainly during this period that Lysander had plotted to open
the kingship to anyone descended from Herakles, not just the members of

26

(
I
Hell. 3.3.9-11. Reduction to U~0~€1WV
entailed loss of
voting privileges in the apella. Many Spartiates suffered this
embarrassment because they had been unable to contribute their share
to the common mess. During the long struggle with Athens, such men had
been unable to oversee their estates. See Meyer, Vol. 5, 26-27, 46;
Beloch, Vol. 3.1, 28. A brief notice of the conspiracy appears in
Aristotle's Politics 1306b, where a discussion of the weaknesses of
aristocratic governments is under way. Polyainos also briefly
summarizes the failure of the plot and the fate of the plotters (2.14.1).
Aristotle discusses the growing poverty in Sparta by 404 in Pol. 1269-70.
Xenophon (Lak. Pol. 14.1-7) hints at it.
27 Hamilton, 126.
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.
h ouses. 28
the two ru 1 lng
The internal situation at Sparta in 398 shm,'n by Kinadon' s plot
was remarkably volatile.

The obvious fear it aroused in the ephors,

elders, and likely the two kings hints strongly at the changes and
turmoil within the fabric of Spartan society.

Yet as we have seen, the

state easily suppressed the helot unrest, the "inferiors" dissidence
and any nascent egalitarian tendencies.
Preparation for the Expedition !£ Asia
In foreign affairs, specifically touching Greek Asia, the ineffectual Thibron had given way to the popular and successful Derkylidas.
After the Spartans' wide-ranging incursions into Lydia and Phrygia,
Tissaphernes, the Lydian satrap, had effected a temporary truce with
Derkylidas in the spring of 397 (see ch. 2).

Pharnabazos, the satrap

of Daskyleion in concert with Tissaphernes and Konon, had undertaken a

?9
huge Persian naval build-up in Kypros the previous summer (398 B.C.).The purpose, of course, was to challenge Spartan naval strength in the

28 For the discovery of Lysander's plot after his death at
Haliartos in 394: Plut. Lys. 24-26, Horalia 229f, 212Cd, Ages. 20.2-3;
and Nepos ~· 3. Both Hamilton, 126-28 and Cartledge, Sparta and
Lakonia, A Regional History, 11QQ-ill ]·.£·• Ne~v York, 1979, 273-75, perceive an intimate link between the conspiracy of Kinadon and deteriorating social stability in Lakonia at this time.
29 Although Spartan legates arrived in Kypros to discuss peace
terms, Euagoras and Konon detained them (F398). Pharnabazos and Konon
were thus able to conceal the naval build-up in Tyre for a full year.
When Artaxerxes' court physician Ktesias came to Euagoras' court with
a letter from the Great King, the Spartan legates were released, and
Ktesias accompanied them to Lakedaimon. See Fr.Gr.H., nos. 688.30.32
and Heyer, Vol. 5, 193-94 with notes.
---
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Aegean.

Tissaphernes' temporary truce with Derkylidas would permit a

similar massing of Persian land forces with an eye to ridding Greek Asia
of the troublesome Spartans permanently. 30
In the fall of 397, word finally reached Sparta of the impending
Persian designs on the Greek world of Asia Minor.
vith Derkylidas

~;,;as

Tissaphernes' truce

shmvn to be a sham, and the true nature of

Artaxerxes' and the satraps' intentions became clear from the testimony
of a Syracusan mariner named Herodas sailing with his cargo ship to
Tyre where he had seen 300 Persian ships either being fitted out or
constructed.

By discreet inquiry, he learned the purpose of this build-

up and set sail immediately for Sparta.

After hearing Herodas' story,

the ephors promptly summoned the allies to a congress in order to debate
the best course in the face of the Persian threat. 31
Lysander also was alerted about the activities in Asia Minor,
and

he lost little time during the allied congress in Sparta to urge

his supporters from Greek Asia to request Agesilaos as commander of the
expeditionary force.

He intended to manipulate the new king in order to

reassert his own influence in the Greek East.

32

He hoped to restore his

friends, the former dekarchs, who had fallen out of

favo~

and thereby

strengthen his own faction in Sparta.

His role in the deliberations was

to downplay the Persian naval threat.

He also hoped to restore the

30

xen. Hell. 3.2.16-20; Diod. 14.39; Plut. Artax. 21.1-3.

31 Xen. Hell. 3.4.1-2.
32 Plut. Ages. 6.1-3,

~·

23.1-2.
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dekarchies by procuring the command for his friend Agesilaos and then
using the king to advance his

o~~

designs.

33

Some

34

have seen in the

former navarch's machinations a final, desperate attempt to regain the
stature he lost in 402 with his friends' demise in Asia Minor.

As a

private citizen, he could never hope to rival the power or prestige of a
king or even that of an influential ephor.

Another successful navarch

and :l.::co<,lplished diplomat, Antalkidas, would come to a similar realization some ten or twelve years later.

Thus Lysander's only chance was

to manipulate a king who in some respects was obligated to him for his
kingship and command.
Agesilaos stepped forward to request the command, 35 when the
ephors had called the allied assembly.

His purpose was to offer the

Persians an honorable peace, or if they preferred war, to

forestal~

their design on the Asian Greeks and even to wrest Asia Minor from
Artaxerxes' control altogether.

Agesilaos clearly showed that he had

his own ideas about the expedition and was his own man, something which
did not augur well for Lysander's purposes.

In any event, the congress

voted to name Agesilaos commander and to furnish him with a levy of
2,000 neodamodeis, 6,000 soldiers from the allies, and a council of

33 Xen. Hell. 3.4.2.
34Meyer, Vol. 5, 194-95; Grote Vol. 8, 422; and Cary, CAH
Vol. 6, 41.
35xen. Ages. 1.6-8. It is curious that Xenophon eschews any
mention of Lysander's role in this version.
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thirty Spartiate advisors, chief of whom was Lysander.

36

At this

point, a closing observation about the neodamodeis in Agesilaos' army
is needed.

Because Diodorus does not even mention these troops while

Xenophon and Plutarch do so only cursorily, they have let slip an
opportunity to furnish us with an insight into the social conditions
obtaining at Sparta in the early fourth century B.C.
perhaps have overlooked yet another reason for
expedition.

~oreover

~vul!Ling

they

the Asian

It is certainly possible that the authorities at Sparta

undertook the campaign not only to meet the threat posed by
Artaxerxes and the satraps, but to dissipate the revolutionary fervor
of Kinadon's

conspiracy~

By drawing off an additional 2,000 of the

ablest and most vigorous of the non-Spartiate Lakonians, leading
Spartans may have hoped to eliminate the basis for other such plots
in the future.

The battle-tested neodamodeis could expend any residual

resentment by plundering the rich provinces of western Asia, rather
37
.
.
. La k e d a~mon.
·
th an b y f orm~ng
su bvers~ve
ca d res ~n
After decreeing the

levy of allied troops, neodamodeis and

advisors, the Spartans contracted an alliance with the Pharoah Nepherites.

36 xen. Hell. 3.4.2, Ages. 1.7; Plut. Ages. 6.3. Diodorus
(14.79.1) alludes to the 6,000 allied troops and the thirty advisors,
but is silent about the neodamodeis.
Grote, Vol. 7, 420-2~ succinctly notes that wide-spread
civil discord would serve as a motive for dispatching resentful
Lakedaimonians on "distant and lucrative military service." He cites
the pre~edent of Brasidas' Thracian expedition of 424-22. See Thuc.
bks. 4-5; 1,000 neodamodeis were already serving in Asia with
Derkylidas at this time (Xen. Hell. 3.1.4).
37
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The Egyptians, chafing bitterly under the Persian yoke and often in open
rebellion against the Great King, agreed to supply the Spartan navarch
Pharax with equipment for 100 triremes and 500,000 measures of grain.
From his base in Rhodes, the latter with 120 ships then blockaded
Konen's squadron of forty Phoinikian vessels at Sasanda in Karia.

From

this port, he laid siege to Kaunos, some 28 km. inland, but was coropelled
to lift both siege and blockade upon the arrival of a relief force
under Tissaphernes.

The Lakedaimonians withdrew to Rhodes, and Konon

sailed away to the Knidian Chersonese to recruit an additional forty
ships for the Persian fleet. 38

38 niod. 14.79; Justin 6.1-2; Meyer, Vol. 5, 172, 196; Beloch
3.1, 42, 3.2, 123; Bengtson, Staatsvertrage ~. 167: Egypt had been
in open rebellion against Sousa since 401 under two pharaohs,
Amyrtaios (404-399) and Nepherites (399-393). The most recent
opportunity for revolt had surfaced with the abortive attempt of
Kyros to dethrone Artaxerxes (Xen. Anab. 2.1.14, 2.5.13; Isok. 5.101).

CHAPTER IV
AGESILAOS IN ASIA, 396-394_ B.C.
The Fleet Assembles at Geraistos in Euboia
In deciding to campaign against the Great King, the Spartans had
several motives.

In 400 B.C., they had promised to maintain the

autonomy of the Greek cities in Asia.

The expeditions of Thibron and

Derkylidas were undertaken in fulfillment of that pledge (see ch.

2).

Moreover, they could best dispel the threat of internal disruption
(which Kinadon's failed conspiracy had laid bare) by sending abroad

' activities
to rich and distant lands those most likely to spearhead such
in the future.

Also Lysander and his partisans undoubtedly thought to

recover their lost fortunes abroad and fallen status at home.

As to

Agesilaos' purposes, one might surmise that much the foregoing was at
work, but he also seems to have entertained personal designs on an
Homeric scale.

1

Hhile Pharax and the Spartan legates were preoccupied in

Egypt, Rhodes and Karia, it was not by accident that Agesilaos had the
allied fleet assemble at Geraistos in the southernmost tip of Euboia.
wnile most of the army was preparing to take passage to Ephesos (the
Spartan headquarters in Asia), Agesilaos intended to perform sacrifices
at Aulis in imitation of Agamemnon.
With most of the ships lying at anchor in Geraistos, the king

lcartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 277.
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sailed up the strait and crossed over to the mainland at Aulis. 2

The

night before performing the sacrifice, a dream came to him, advising
that he make the same offering to the goddess that Agememnon made before
he set sal'1 . 3

Agesilaos reported the dream to his friends and decided

to offer a deer instead of his daughter, because he did not wish to
I

imitate his Nycenean predecessor's cruelty. 4
On the following day, one of the most crucial events in Agesilaos'
life took place.

It would have far-reaching consequences for his

foreign policy throughout his reign.

He decided that his own seer

would sacrifice the stag at the altar of Artemis.
been traditionally reserved for the Boiotians.

This privilege had-

Upon hearing of this

breach of convention, the ouictarchs sent cavalry to prevent Agesilaos
from acting in a manner contrary to local custom.

These riders tore

the still smouldering thigh pieces from the altar and cast them aside.
This officially sanctioned deed, which to Agesilaos' mind set his whole
enterprise on an ill-omened footing, transformed his attitude to the
Boiotians from distaste to hatred. 5

2

Geraistos on the south coast of Euboia was likely the site where
a storm destroyed a squadron of Xerxes' fleet. See The Blue Guide to
Greece, 379 and Herodotus 8.13. Xenophon (Hell. 3.4.3-4~ausanias
(3.9.3-4) and Plutarch (Ages. 6.4-5) recount the detour to Aulis.
3Plutarch's inclusion of the dream has a dramatic flavor reminiscent of Xerxes' dream (Herodotus 7.12-18) before the expedition to Greece.
4Plut. Ages. 6.8.
5

Xen. Hell. 3.3.4; Pausanias 3.9.3-4; Plut. Ages 6-10. See also
Grote Vol. 7, 424; Heyer, Vol. 5, 196; Hertzberg, 41-42, Cartledge,
267-77. Since at least 404, ill will marked the Boiotians' relationship with Agesilaos' older brother Agis. The Boiotians simply
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Arrival in Ephesos, Negotiations, and the Rebuff to Lvsander
Tissaphernes, the satrap of Karia and Lydia tvho had negotiated
a truce with Derkylidas several months prior to Agesilaos' arrival did
not relish the prospect of an additional 8,000 hostile Greeks in his
realm.

Before Agesilaos could further augment his forces by local

recruitment, the satrap tried to stall for time by demanding why
Agesilaos had come to Asia.

The king replied that he wished the Greeks

in Asia to be as free as those in Europe.

Tissaphernes averred that

this could be so as soon as he had notified the Great King, if the
Spartans would depart.

He then proposed a three months' truce to allow

time for Artaxerxes' response during which interval both sides would
swear not to harm each other.

Tissaphernes took the oaths in the pres-

ence of Derkylidas, Herippidas and Megillos tvho st..rore for Agesilaos.

6

appropriated most of the booty from Attika after the disbanding of the
allied occupation of Dekeleia. In 403, they ignored a Spartan decree
and openly aided Thrasyboulos in his attack on the tyranny of the
thirty. They had refused by 401 to participate in Agis' action against
the Eleians and finally in 396, they spurned the embassy of Agesilaos'
father-in-law Aristomelidas to join in the expedition to Asia.
The Thebans, however, were not alone in refusing to join
Agesilaos' crusade in Asia Minor. The Athenians had also demurred
ostensibly on grounds of weakness, but Konon's overt advocacy of the
Persian cause figured in their reluctance. Some Athenians dreamed of
restoring their vanished ~Pxn and most would have welcomed revenge for
Lysander's victory at Aigospotamoi (405) and the Peiraeus (404). The
Korinthians actually responded at first with enthusiasm to the Spartan
summons, but offered regrets when their temple of Olympian Zeus burned
down. It is tvorth noting that these three states and Argos formed a
coalition to make war on the Peloponnesians only two years later (see
Hamilton, 183-85). Thus the Spartans' campaign involved only the
Peloponnesian allies and the Ionian and Aiolic poleis of Asia. Nevertheless it was clearly Agesilaos' aim to continue restoring Sparta's
tarnished image abroad by expelling the Persians from the Greek world
altogether.
6 Xen. Hell. 3.4.5-6.
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Scarcely had the oaths been sworn before Tissaphernes perjured
himself by gathering and training in the

~1aiandros

which he had earlier requested of Artaxerxes.

plain a large army

Agesilaos knew of the

continued Persian build-up, but he chose to abide by his pledge not to
harm the satrap's realm, since the allies too \vere gathering additional
support to counter Tissaphernes' treachery.

Mistrust of the satrap

produced a willingness to cooperate with Agesilaos even on the part of
barbarians, which implies that efforts were under \·JaY to swell the
number of troops in the allied army.
soldiers.

These efforts netted another 4,000

The total number of allied troops must have exceeded 20,000,

since Lysander's followers, other Asian Greeks and even barbarians were
drawn to the king's entourage. 7
\v'hile the truce was in force, Lysander began in earnest to
attempt the restoration of his clients and the recovery of his own
fallen status.

He began to receive legations from his friends in such

ostentatious fashion as to overshadm.r Agesilaos and make him seem no
more than a figurehead.

Because of this slight to his dignity (which

he also believed could undermine his authority as strategos), the king
began turning away Lysander's friends with their petitions unfulfilled.
Similarly, he adjudicated unfavorably all matters pertaining to them.
His purpose in openly thwarting these people, of course, was to assert
his own authority.

Moreover, the thirty Spartiate advisors had urged

..,

'Xen. Hell. 3.4.11, Ages. 1.10-11;
2.1.8; Died. 14.79.2. See also Schaefer,
Staatsvertrage l• 164-66; Lins, Kritische
des Agesilaos in Kleinasien, Halle, 1914,

Plut. Ages. 9.1; Polyainos
RE Suppl. 7, 1593; Bengtson,
Betrachtung der Feldzuge
16; Meyer, Vol. 5, 199.
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such steps

because they resented serving as aids to Lysander rather

than counsellors to the king.8
The former navarch eventually divined the reason for Agesilaos'
behavior.

He expressed his shame to the king at being treated in so

unseemly a fashion by someone he had considered a friend.

Agesilaos

replied that only those who sought to appear more important than the
king were so treated.

To drive this point home, Agesilaos made

Lysander his steward and told the clients to address their petitions
to the king's meat carver.

This action was characteristic for a man

who had built his power base among the ephors and the common people.
Because of the excessive adulation bestowed upon Lysander, it was necessary for the king to demonstrate clearly to all that any power held by
one man must derive from legitimate and duly constituted authorities.
Agesilaos would permit no man, not even Lysander, to stand above the
.

ep h ors an d t h e k 1ngs.
Lysander then

9
reali~ed

estimating his old friend.

the extent of the error he made in under-

He could no longer deceive himself that

Agesilaos would be his tool or that he would control the allied efforts
as he had when he served as secretary to the navarch Arakos in 405.

10

8xen. Hell. 3.4.7-10; Plut. Ages. 7-8, 1J.s. 24. Beloch 3.1, p. 41;
Meyer, Vol. 5, 197-98; and Grote, Vol. 7, 4~5-2~ note that Lysander's
arrogance may have been bolstered by the fact that the Ephesians had
erected a statue to him in the temple of Artemis (Paus. 6.3.6).
9Plut. Ages. 8.1. For the importance of Agesilaos' insight into
the nature of power and leadership ability, see ch. two, and Meyer,
Vol. 5, 197, who observes that no Spartan king in a century had been
held.in such high esteem.

10Xen. Hell. 2.1.7.
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He subsequently apologized for his conduct and volunteered to serve the
king and the Greek cause in Daskyleion, the satrapy of Pharnabazos.

He

set off for the Propontis where he brought about the defection of
Spithridates, his family, and 200 horsemen.

He obtained quarters for

the Persian officer's family and the horsemen in Kyzikos, but brought
the man himself and his son to visit Agesilaos in Ephesos.

The king

was pleased with Lysander's accomplishment, but put him to no further
use.

Thus at the end of the expedition's first year, Lysander went

back to Sparta in relative dishonor.

He deeply resented the sway of

the two kings and was frustrated at his failure to reinstate the

'

dekarchs in Asia Minor. 11
Rupture of the Truce and the Campaign of 396
In midsummer, when Tissaphernes was convinced that his army was
sufficiently ready and had received the promised reinforcements from
the Great King, he delivered an ultimatum to Agesilaos, threatening
to declare war unless the allied arnij immediately withdrew fran Asia.
Although Agesilaos' advisors were disturbed by what they perceived as
a sizeable Persian advantage, the king not only rejected the satrap's
~

ultimatum, but did so joyously (paAa

A

A

~

¢atop~ T~ rrpocrwrr~)

because

he believed that Tissaphernes' perfidy had alienated the gods from the
Persian cause and made them allies of the Greeks.

A less pious

explanation would include Tissaphernes' timidity in the face of Greek

11
Plut. Lys. 24.2; Lins, 17, observes that dispatching Lysander
to the Propontis produced Agesilaos' first real success.
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hoplites (see ch. 2), the presence of the allied fleet off the coast, a
recent treaty with Egypt which guaranteed a supply of grain, the difficultY of controlling a large army in a city, and finally Agesilaos' own
eagerness and ambition.

The allies' only disadvantage was that they were

lacking horsemen, while Tissaphernes' great strength, of course, lay in
the renowned Persian cavalry. 1 2
After sending the Persian legates back with his response, Agesilaos ordered the Greek cities south of Ephesos to set up market places for
his troops.

Greek cities to the north in Ionia and Aiolis were to send

horsemen to Ephesos.

Tissaphernes knew that the allies lacked horsemen

and that Karia, his principal residence, was unsuitable for cavalry operations.

He therefore ordered his infantry to withdraw south of the

Maiandros to defend Karia, while he massed his cavalry in the Maiandros
plain, where he expected them to trample the Greek footsoldiers.

Agesi-

laos, of course, had no intention of attacking Karia, even though it was
Tissaphernes' home province.

Instead, he gave orders to march up the

coast to Daskyleion (Pharnabazos' residence), intending to gather horsemen and supplies along the way.

Also with Spithridates' defection he had

acquired a most reliable guide to the Hellespontine area.

Thus the Spar-

tan king adeptly requited the satrap's strategem with one of his own.
Because of their uneasy cooperation Tissaphernes did little or
nothing to relieve his ally's plight.

Moreover, Persians in the Pro-

pontis, not expecting the Greeks to venture so far north, were caught

12 xen. Hell. 3.4.11, Ages. 1.13; Lins, 17-1~ and Kromayer,
Antike Schlachtfelder, Vol. 4, 263-64, discuss the strategic situation
of both sides.
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off guard by Agesilaos' advance.

As a result, the allied army,

plundering at will, accumulated a great deal of booty.

Many cities

defected to the allied side, while one perhaps succumbed to a ruse. 13
A sudden sortie of Persian cavalry near Daskyleion routed the Greek
riders and only the hoplites' appearance caused the Persians to retreat.
After this skirmish, Agesilaos had the army march back to Ephesos for
t~c

winter.

Because of the obvious superiority of the Persian cavalry,

Agesilaos issued a proclamation to all Greek cities in the hope of
offsetting the Persians' advantage by the following spring.
that every rich man was to supply a horse and rider.
self wish to serve, he could hire someone else.

He declared

If he did not him-

By the next spring

Agesilaos had greatly augmented his cavalry because of this proclamation.14
Naval Matters:

Konen, Pharax and the Rhodian Revolt

After Pharax had lifted his siege of Kaunas and the blockade of

l3According to Frontinus (3.11.2) and Polyainos (2.1.6),
Agesilaos induced the Phokaians' surrender by ordering a withdrawal at
which their half-hearted resistance collapsed. When the Greek army
reappeared, the townsmen surrendered. The dating of this ruse is not
secure, as Beloch, Vol. 2, 14~ and Meyer, Vol. 5, 198, point out. It may
belong to the campaign of 364 B.C., when Agesilaos returned to Asia after
a thirty year's absence. Diodorus mentions only that Agesilaos with Kyme
as his base plundered extensively in the Kaystros plain after the truce
expired.
14

Xen. Hell. 3.4.11-15, Ages. 1.13-19; Plut. Ages. 9, C. Nepos
(Ages. 3.1-2) refers briefly to Agesilaos' deception of Tissaphernes and
the lucrative campaign of 396 in the Propontis. Plutarch (9.4) asserts
that the king cited the precedent set by Agamemnon (Iliad 23.296-99),
who had done well to accept a good mare and free a cowardly rich man
from service.
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Konen at Karian Sasanda, he set sail to Sicily with 30 ships.

The

Spartans sent him in response to Dionysios I's request that all Greek
£oleis aid him in repelling a Carthaginian invasion.

15

After the Lakedaimonians departed, Konon lost little time in
doubling the size of his fleet to eighty ships.

By vigorous solicita-

tion in the Knidian Chersonese, he put to good use the money procured
for him by Pharnabazos in 398/7.

The exiled Athenian navarch then

achieved the first real success in his attempt to avenge Athens'
disastrous defeat at Aigospotamoi in 405.

By seizing a beachhead at

Loryma, Konon induced the Rhodians to defect from Sparta's Aegean

, ,

apxn , a move for which there was great public sympathy.
then intercepted the huge
promised to the Spartans.

shipm~nt

The Rhodians

of grain which Nepherites had

The Egyptian vessels, carrying the grain and

unaware of what had happened on the island, put into the harbor and were
promptly seized.

16

The coup at Rhodes precipitated the expulsion of

the Spartan garrison and caused the loss of five or six hundred thousand
measures of grain.

In addition, the Rhodians welcomed Konon and extended

their harbor to him as a base from which he was able to enlist the

15niod. 14.62.1; Polyainos 2.11.1; Frontinus 1.4.12. Ehrenberg
RE Vol. 19.2, 1816-17, and Beloch 3.1, 58 and 3.2, 372, plausibly
identify Pharax who blockaded Konon in 396 with the Pharakidas named
by Diodous and Polyainos. Meyer, Vol. 5, 106, believes nonetheless
that we may be dealing with two different men.
16

niod. 14.79.6-8; Justin 6.2; Paus. 6.7.26, Grote. Vol. 7, 436,
n.3, observes that Rhodes had long been a way-station for Egyptian grain
bound for Greece (see Herodotus 2.182 and Demosthenes 56.9-10). See
also Bruce, "The Democratic Revolution at Rhodes," ..£Q.,ll (1961), 166-70.
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services of an additional ninety triremes.

The size of the Persian fleet

now stood at 170 triremes to the Peloponnesians' 90.
tion from the Spartan alliance

The Rhodian defec-

and the seizure of the grain caused a

major shift in Spartan naval policy a few months later in the spring
(395).

The loss of the grain also profoundly affected the conduct of

Agesilaos' campaign. 17
Preparations for the Campaign of 395
During the winter and early spring (396/95), Agesilaos again
clearly demonstrated his flair for leadership.

He ordered a series of

athletic contests in the great Ephesian agora.

The purpose of these

competitions was to bolster morale and hone the martial skills of the
Ionian and Aiolic recruits.

There was an Homeric echo in the king's

purpose--the new Agamemnon staging games for the troops--more plausibly,
though, he sensed a need to develop camaraderie and skill, especially
among the Asian Greeks in his army.

As Derkylidas in 397, he

experienced misgivings about the competence of his Ionian and Aiolic
soldiers. 18

Even the more experienced and soldierly troops may have

required some training and diversion in view of the rich plunder of the
autumn campaign and the inevitable allurements of a large coastal city.
Agesilaos also offered prizes to the artisans who made the best weapons

17 see Grote, Vol. 7, 436-39; Beloch 3.1, 42-44; and Meyer Vol.
5, 201. A brief notice of the Rhodian revolt appears in Isokrates
(Phil. 63). The orator ascribes Konon's victory at Knidos in 394 to
the revolution at Rhodes. See also ch. 5.
18

Xen. Hell. 3.2.17-18.
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and tools.

As a final device to promote morale, he displayed to his

men the naked bodies of prisoners whom the camp vendors had been unable
to sell.

His purpose was to show to the Greeks what sort of adversaries

they were likely to encounter.

He selected prisoners whose flabbiness

and whiteness of skin betrayed a lack of the soldierly toughness and
stamina which stern from hard training and long exposure to the elements.
Buyers, he noted, had been found for the clothes and equipment of these
prisoners, but not for the men themselves, who were ridiculed for their
softness and effeminacy as worthless.

19

Agesilaos' humiliation of the Asian captives was a brillant
method of inspiring confidence in his own men.

20

He did take care,

though, that no one, especially the women and children, went hungry or
was abandoned by the vendors as unsaleable. 21

He also evinced a flair

for diplomacy by eliciting the aid of barbarian deserters.· He promised
them just treatment in exchange for information.

He also spared

districts which came over to the allies, whether forcibly or voluntarily.

19

Xen. Hell. 3.4.19, Ages. 1.28; Plut. Ages. 9.5.

20 Grote, Vol. 7, 431-32, contends rather oddly that the display
of the naked prisoners was not meant to insult them, but rather to
encourage the Greek soldiers. Yet because he quotes Herodotus
'I
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difficult to imagine that the prisoners were not humiliated by this
treatment.
21Grote, Vol. 7, 430, n.l, notes that there was a larger market
for women to serve in harems and as religious prostitutes in Asian cities.
Moreover, there would naturally arise a lucrative trade in eunuchs to
attend such women. See Herodotus 5.6, 8.105; Dio Chrysostom. 21.4-6;
and Xen. Kyropaid.7.5.61-65.

82

He wanted to win these areas over by good will to assure adequate
provisioning for his troops.

Finally, the king clearly showed his

respect for people's religious sensibilities by carefully honoring all
sacred precints, Greek and barbarian.

22

Before the events of 395 began to unfold, Lysander and the thirty
Spartiate advisors set sail for home upon expiration of their one-year
tenure.

Herippidas and

!:~.:i.rty

new counsellors replaced them.

There

followed a reorganization of command in which Agesilaos assigned
Xenokles and another officer to lead the cavalry recruited during the
winter.

He also appointed one Skythes to lead the neodamodeis, and

Herippidas assumed command of the veterans of Kyros.
took charge of the Greek troops from Ionia and Aiolis.

Finally, Mygdon
With these

developments the stage was set for the second and final year of the
.
As1an

.
23
expe d"l.tl.on.

The Campaign of 395 B.C.
The Greeks' activity for this year falls into two parts.

The first

is the spring campaign in Lydia which ends shortly after the battle of
Sardis.

The second finds Agesilaos and the allies engaged in a series of

wide-ranging incursions into the interior of Asia Minor and the satrapy
of Pharnabazos.

24

This venture followed quickly upon

Tissaphernes'

demise and death in late summer.

22 xen. Ages. 5.7, 11.1; Plut. Ages. 14, Apo. Lak. 213c.
23xen. Hell. 3.4.20.
24 Agesilaos had led his army as far north as Daskyleion in 396
(Xen. Hell. 3.4.11-15).
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For the Lydian operations the sources are as follows:
from Ephesos to the Hermes valley:
p. 11.1-4;

Diod.

the march

Xen. Hell. 3.4.21-22; Ages. 1-28-30;

14.80.1-2; Plut. Ages. 10.1; Paus. 3.9.5; Polyainos

2.1.9; Frontinus 1.8.12; Nepos Ages. 3.4-5; the battle of Sardis:
~·

Xen.

3.4.22-24, Ages. 1.30-32; P. 11.5-6; Diod. 14.80.2-4; Plut. Ages.

10.3-4; Paus. 3.9.6; Nepos Ages. 3.6; the

de~cent

along the Kogamos to

the Maiandros and the return to Ephesos:P. 12.1-4, Died. i4.~0.5. 25
When Agesilaos was sure that his new officers and recruits were
sufficiently prepared, he announced that the Greeks would march

Tnv
'

He set out from Ephesos
along the Kaystros river, veered north and led his troops through the
Karabel Pass.

This narrow defile lies near the western end of the

rugged Tmolos ridge whose westernmost peak is Lydian Olympos.

27

With

25

The great differences between Xenophon's narrative (which is the
source for Plutarch, Frontinus and Polyainos) and that of P Oxyrhynchios
(the source for Ephoros/Diodorus) have been discussed in ch. one.
Pausanias' description of this phase, though brief, clearly derives from
Xenophon. Nepos' account which is longer than Pausanias' also follows
the tradition of Xenophon. Isokrates 4.153 alludes briefly to Spartan
greed and the Persians' perfidy even to one another at this time.
26xenophon (Hell. 2.4.20) believes that this vaguely worded
statement was sufficient to deceive Tissaphernes about the Greeks' intent.
27see Oberhummer, RE 18.1, 315: Kromayer, Schlachtenatlas,
Griech. Abt., chart 4, map 8, and Antike Schlachtfelder, Vol. 4, 276.
Ramsay, The Historical Geography of Asia Minor, 30, 60-62, points out
that Herodotus (2.106, 5.54) erroneously ascribed a Hittite stele in
the Karabel t~ the Pharaoh Sesostris. This path is in fact the southern
part of the Royal Road from the seacoast to Sardis.
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the peak on their left, the Greeks descended into the plain south of
Mt. Sipylos to await Tissaphernes' cavalry.

28

The Persian horsemen

appeared on the fourth day and killed some of the Greeks who were
scattered over the plain.

>

Agesilaos then formed his men up £V

better to resist Persian harassment.
only local Lydian defense forces (the
to monitor and impede the Greeks.

I

TIA1V81w
\

Before the Persians' arrival
yu~vnTa1

of P.) had been present

As more of Tissaphernes' sizeable

cavalry force crossed the Tmolos, somewhere near Thybarna, Agesilaos
ordered his army to march east toward Sardis at sunrise on the next
day. 29

During the night, however, he secretly detached a force of 900

hoplites and 500 peltasts under his cavalry officer Xenokles with
orders to march ahead and set up an ambush.

With the dawn Agesilaos led

28 Diod. 14.80.1; see Burchner, RE 3A.l, 276-77. Diodorus records
that Tissaphernes had amassed 10,000 horsemen and 50,000 footsoldiers.
P. 11.5 places these totals at 15,000 and 10,000 respectively. Xenophon
mentions no numbers, but says that the infantry were deployed south of
the Maiandros and the cavalry (for quick pursuit) to the north of the
river. Diodorus perhaps transposed the figures cited by P. and augmented
that of the infantry. Since Ephoros was Diodorus' source, perhaps
Pausanias 3.9.6 also reflects the Ephoran tradition when he writes that
the Persian force was the largest assembled since Xerxes' invasion of
Greece eighty-five years earlier. During these operations, some part of
the Persian force remained behind to defend the satrapal residence in
Daria. Dugas, "La Campagne d 'Agesilas en Asie Mineure," BCH, 34 (1910 ),
62-65, Bruce, An Historical Commentary~ the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia,
Cambridge 1967, 153, have conjectured that some of the differences in
the versions of P/Diodorus and Xenophon can be explained by assuming
that Xenophon remained in Ephesos during the Lydian phase of this year's
campaign. Anderson, "The Battle of Sardis in 395 B.C." Cal. Stud. in
Class. Ant., 7 (1974~ 32, concedes that this is possible.--cornelius-,"Die Schlacht bei Sardis," Klio,26 (1932)> 29-31 believes that Xenophon,
after surrendering command of the Kyreians to Herippidas, accompanied
the Greeks, but was not privy to Agesilaos and his thirty new advisors.
29xen. Hell. 3.4.21 states that the Persians first appear four
days after the Greeks had left Ephesos. See Meyer, Theopomps Hellenika ,.
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the bulk of the army eastward, while the Persians and Lydians resumed
their harassment of his flanks and rear.

When both Greeks and barbarians

had passed, Xenokles deemed that the time was right and signaled his men
to attack.

The concealed Greeks' sudden onslaught threw the enemy into

confusion, whereupon Agesilaos wheeled the main column about to trap the
barbarians between himself and Xenokles.
over the Hermos

plain~

The enemy fled in all directions

h0'•7ever, and most, including Tissaphernes, escaped.

The Greeks pursued to the west as far as the Persian camp and killed some
600 of the fleeing army.

They overran the small garrison guarding the

camp and captured a great deal of booty including the personal possessions of the satrap (see map on following page.)30
Xenophon's version of the march and battle differs in some important particulars from those of P. and Diodorus.

In his version, the

Greeks encounter no resistance in the Hermos plain between Mt. Sipylos
and Sardis, but march unimpeded to the outskirts of the city.

The

Persian cavalry rush. to the city's defense, crossing the low-lying Messogis ridge, the Kaystros plain, and the Tmolos by the Hypaipa (Odemis)

13. Later authors also ~~ote that Tissaphernes was deceived by Agesilaos'
vague statement (e.g. Plut. Ages. 10.1-2; 3.9.5; Nepos Ages. 3.4-5;
Frontinus 1.8.12; and Polyainos 2.1.9) into thinking that the Greeks'
objective was Karia, not Lydia. It is unlikely that Tissaphernes was
deceived at all, however, as the strategic situation would dictate that
he protect Karia while the naval build-up under Konon and Pharnabazos
was in progress.
30

P. 11.1-6, Diod. 14.80.1.3-4. Because the text of P. describing the Greeks' march is mutilated, particulars of the antagonists'
crossing of the Tmolos derive from Diodorus whose account of the march
and battle is very similar to that of P. Diodorus gives the number
of Xenokles' men as 1,400, which led Dugas, 67, and Bruce, 79 torestore P. to bring him into accord with Diodorus. Diodorus has
.. --._
Agesilaos initiate the ambush, not Xenokles (see Bruce, 79) and puts
'·.,
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This map is adapted from Kromayer and Veith's Schlachtenatlas zur antike Kriegsgeschichte, Munich, 1922, griech. Abt., Chart 4,
map 8.
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route through the Goldjuk pass at 1065 meters.

They descended directly

into Sardis where Tissaphernes remained after entrusting conduct of the
battle to a subordinate (the ~YE~~v

of Xen. Ages. 1.30).

This

officer told the commander of the baggage train to camp west of the
Paktolos to await the arrival of Agesilaos and the Greeks.
subordinate ordered horsemen to attack
vanguard was scattered for pillage.

This second

when he saw that the Greek

Many Greeks died in this attack,

but Agesilaos signalled his cavalry to come to the foragers' rescue
which induced the Persians to assume battle formation.

In the absence

of the Persian infantry, Agesilaos believed that the enemy was vulnerable
and after favorable

sacrifice~,

he ordered a full assault.

The

Persians resisted the Greek cavalry, but gave way before the light and
heavy infantry.

They fled in disarray across the Paktolos, where many

were killed, and withdrew into Sardis.

The Greeks pursuing to the east

captured the Persian camp, seventy talents worth of booty and even some
camels which Agesilaos eventually took back to Greece. 31

the barbarian dead at 6,000 instead of 600. Bruce, 83-84, observes,
however, that rhetorical exaggeration in Ephoros (Diodorus' source)
is not at all uncommon. Because P. is the source for Ephoros, his
account should take precedence.
31

4 2 2-25, Ages. 1.30-32. Delbruck,
••
" Ant1ke_
.
Xen. Hel 1 • 3 ••
Kavallerie," Klio, 10 (1910), 335-40;Kaupert in Kromayer's Antike
Schlachtfelder, Vol. 4, 262; and Anderson, 27-30, all argue for a
rejection of P. and Diodorus as misinformed. Dugas, 58-95; Meyer,
Theopomps Hellenika, 13-15; Delib~que, Essai sur la vie de Xenophon,
Paris, 1957, 141-42; and Bruce, l-22,all reject Xenophon and accept P. 's
version. Breitenbach, RE Suppl. 12.1, 393-95, leaves the question open,
but inclines slightly toXenophon. Busolt, "Der Neue Historiker und
Xenophon," Hermes 1 43 (1908), 262-65; Lins, Kritische Betrachtuf, 21;
and Anderson, 36, note the unlikelihood of the Greeks marching v
~Atve{~ through the Karabel. Delbruck, 337-38, thinks it not likely

·- ... -
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Xenophon is likely correct in stating that the first Persian
horsemen did not appear until the fourth day of the Greek march from
Ephesos.

P. and Diodorus are right in ascribing Persian resistance to

Agesilaos in the Hermes plain well to the west of Sardis, however, and
their chronology allows an extra two or three days before the decisive
encounter.

Tissaphernes did indeed lead his men, as P. and Diodorus

write, but he led them over the Ovadjik pass at 841 meters to the Hermes
plain, not over the Goldjuk into Sardis (see map on p. 85 a). His

c
/
subordinate, the nYEllWV , took part of the cavalry and perhaps some
infantry to reinforce Sardis and await the Greeks just west of the
Paktolos.

The purpose of Tissaphernes' strategem, of course, was to trap

the Greeks iu a pincer, but Agesilaos, upon receiving reports of a
second group of Persian cavalry near the city, turned the tables on the
satrap and caught him in a pincer movement by dint of Xenokles' ambush.
Tissaphernes' camp was the one captured by the Greeks and the remnants
of his men, as did the Persians near the Paktolos, withdrew for safety
into Sardis without offering further resistance. 32

that they could have done so in the Hermes plain either, because of the
numbers of the Persian cavalry. Yet if the Persian cavalry made a twopronged attack to trap the Greeks in a pincer, Delbruck's objection is
answered, because they would have been greatly inferior numerically to
the Greeks in the Hermes plain between Mt. Sipylos and Sardis. Xenophon
mistook the ~YEll~, who in fact remained in Sardis during the battle,
for Tissaphernes •.
32 P. 12.1, Diod. 14.80.5. The initial resistance that the Greeks
encountered near Mt. ,Sipylos came from Lydian YUllVnTat
who were
later joined by Tissaphernes' cavalry. The satrap would not leave
Sardis itself unprotected, since a Greek army had put the city to the
torch once before in 498 B.C. (Herodotus 5.99-101; Plut. Mor. 86lb-c).
Anderson, 43, refers to "local defense forces" monitoring the Greeks progress. Tissaphernes may have decided to split his cavalry into three
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For some three days after the battle, the Greeks pillaged the
area around the city after setting up a trophy and returning the Persian
and Lydian dead under a truce. 33

Agesilaos then led the Greek army

southeast along the Hermos and Kogamos rivers 34 until he reached the
headwaters of the Maiandros across from Kelainai.

Because the Persians

were chagrined at the Greeks' success and in awe of Agesilaos, they
followed the Greek army, but only at a discreet distance.3 5
was thus able to dissolve the

/

TIAlV8lOV

Agesilaos

and permit his troops to forage

at will.

roughly eq~al parts, one to ride with him over the Ovadjik, one to go
with the nYE~WV
into Sardis through the Goldjuk (the route taken by
the Greeks in 498), and one to remain in the Maiandros valley in defense
of Karia. If P. is correct in assigning 15,000 riders to the satrap,
each of these parts could have amounted to about 5,000 men. Delbruck,
338, believes that the numbers cited by P. and Diodorus are considerably
exaggerated. In any case, with Lydian light infantry and Persian
cavalry in pursuit, Agesilaos' 14,000 Greeks could easily have marched
tv ITAlve{~ through the Hermos plain after the first appearance of
Tissaphernes' cavalry. Some of the Greeks would naturally remain behind
to defend Ephesos; see Anderson, 31. (If Xenokles' contingent of 1,400
ambushers amounted to a tenth of those with the king, roughly 6,000
Greeks would have stayed behind to defend Ephesos.) Delbruck's contention that the ITAtve(ov formation was unsafe unless the enemy's. pursuit
was desultory or numerically weak would not apply, if the Greeks outnumbered the barbarians in the Hermes plain by almost three to one.
33p. 12.1; Died. 14.802. Dugas, 61; Bruce, 79 and Anderson, 39,
have noted that Diodorus' description of this pillage should have
occurred after his account of the battle, not before it.
34The Hermos' modern name is Gediz (BITrchner, RE 8.1, 903-04),
that of the Paktolos is Sartiay (Keil, RE 18.2, 2439-40) and the Kogamos
is now called Alaschelir Tschai (Burchner, RE 11.1, 1034).
35 P. 12.1-2; Diodorus 14.80.5. Kelainai in later antiquity was
renamed Apameia; its modern name is Dinar (Ruge, RE 11.1, 133-34).
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After his sacrifices at the Maiandros proved unfavorable,
Agesilaos decided not to cross the river to march on Kelainai; instead
he ordered the army to follow the river's course along its north bank
back to Ephesos.

The bulk of Tissaphernes' infantry and a part of his

cavalry, of course, had remained south of the river to defend Karia.

36

The Fall of Tissaphernes and Truce with His Successor
Shortly after the Greek army withdrew from the headwaters of the
Maiandros, Tissaphernes succumbed to a fatal combination of court
intrigue and inability to rid Asia Minor of the Greeks.

The immediate

cause of his fall was perhaps his defeat at Sardis, 37 but the Great
King's ire and apprehension had been simmering for some time.

After Kyros'

failed rebellion, Artaxerxes and his mother Parysatis (who preferred her
younger son ) were

'1 e d • 38

reconc~

Although the satrap ranked high in

Artaxerxes' esteem and took over Kyros' districts of Karia and Lydia,
Parysatis hated him for denouncing Kyros and helping to supress the

36

P. 12.3-4. P. (11.3), Diodorus (14.80.1), and Xenophon
(Hell. 3. 4. 21 , Ages. 1.29) all refer to Tissaphernes' forces in the
Maiandros plain.
37xen. Hell. 3.4.25, Ages. 1.35; Plut. Ages. 10, Artax, 23; Paus.
3.9. 7. In a recent article, Westlake, "Decline and Fall of Tissaphernes,"
Historia,30 (1981~ 267-68) writes that Tissaphernes sent a subordinate
to harass the Greeks in the Hermos plain, while he proceeded to Sardis.
Westlake, 272, thinks news of the d~acle near Sardis did not reach
Sousa before Tithraustes set out. Thus Tissaphernes' fate in this view
had already been sealed.
38·niod. 14.80.6; Xen. Anab. l.l.4.
had a hand in Kyros' defe-'.:lt.

Tissaphernes, of course,
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revolt.

She quickly took advantage of his failures against Thibron

and Derkylidas to turn the Great King against him.
strove to undermine his rival's influence at court.

Pharnabazos also
39

Thus when Agesilaos routed the redoubtable Persian cavalry west
of Sardis and penetrated Phrygia almost to Kelainai, the King of Kings
finally acted.

Since only Pharnabazos in cooperation with Konen had

been effective against the Spartans, and Ariaios, the Phrygian satrap,
was now at risk, Artaxerxes moved to replace the inept Tissaphernes.
He therefore dispatched Tithraustes, his chiliarch or "grand vizier,"
to Kolossai, the Phrygian capital.

After Tithraustes and Ariaios had

arrested Tissaphernes and executed him in his bath, the head of the
ill-starred satrap was sent to Sousa.

l.J

Tithraustes quickly took charge of Karia and Lydia and sought
to reach an agreement with Agesilaos to prevent the Greeks from wreaking
further havoc in the late Tissaphernes' domain.

He proposed to leave

Greek Asia autonomous, though still tributary to Sousa, if the Spartans
would disband their army and return home.

Agesilaos refused, maintaining

that he could not act on such a sweeping proposal without consulting the
authorities in Sparta.

Because many Greeks were fond of Tithraustes

and overjoyed at the execution of Tissaphernes, Agesilaos agreed to a
six-months' truce in which he would spare Lydia and Karia.

He was now

free to operate in the mountainous interior of Anatolia and the
Propontis which were the bailiwick of Pharnabazos.

Tithraustes also

39 Justin 6.1.3~6.
40niod. 14.80.6; for Kolossai (modern Honaz), see Ruge, RE 11.1,
1119-20. Schaefer, RE Suppl. 7, 1598-99, offers an excellent discussion
of the end of Tissaphernes' career.
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agreed to give Agesilaos thirty talents for provisions and pay, although
at the same time he very cleverly disbursed money to Timokrates of
Rhodes for the purpose of bribery on the Greek mainland.

41

The Autumn Campaign in Phrygia and the Propontis
With the conclusion of these terms and the advent of summer,
Agesilaos assembled his army north of Kyme.
through Mysia to the Anatolian interior
arrived from the ephors.

He was preparing to march
/

when a dispatch ( crKUTaAn )

Its contents were of momentous impact, for

Agesilaos was placed in command of the fleet with discretion to choose
his own navarch.

This decision was unique in Spartan history, for no

one had ever held supreme command both by land and sea.
and

/

YEPOVTES

42

The ephors

had perceived Tithraustes' purpose in sending Timokrates

to Greece and were aware that only a concerted, two-part effort could
thwart the Persians' design to wrest control of the Aegean away from
the Lakedaimonians.

Timokrates' promise of money from Sousa to under-

write an anti-Spartan coalition in Greece and Konon's activity in
Rhodes and Kypros were the gravest threat to Sparta's hegemony since
the surrender of Athens.

~Vhile

Tissaphernes and Pharnabazos had failed

utterly to dislodge the Spartans from Asia on land, Konon and
Timokrates were preparing to do so by naval action and by fomenting war
in Greece.

41

X;n. Hell. 2.4.26; Plut. Ages. 10.5, Artax. 23; Bengtson,
Staatsvertrage 2, 167-68. Isokrates 4.153 states that the truce was to
last for eight months. The results of Timokrates' activities in Greece
will be discussed in ch. 5.

42 xen. Hell. 2.4.27-29; Plut. Ages. 10.5-6.
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In his new capacity as chief of naval operations, Agesilaos
decided to postpone his march to Mysia in order to augment the fleet. 43
Because the Rhodian revolt 4 4 had deprived the Spartans of the grain and
naval equipment promised by Nepherites, the time to counter Konen's
strengthening of the Persian fleet had arrived.

Agesilaos, therefore,

ordered that 120 triremes be made ready for service.

He suggested that

cities rravide some and wealthy individuals seeking to curry favor outfit others.

With the coming of autumn some weeks later he was at

last ready to begin his campaign in the interior.

Before setting out

he appointed his brother-in-law Peisandros navarch.4 5
The autumn expedition consisted of three phases. 4 6

The first

43 Lins, Kritische Betrachtung, 38-39, suggests that the battle
of Sardis occurred in early May. By July, Agesilaos would have returned
from the Maiandros headwaters to conclude the truce with Tithraustes.
His march to the plain north of Kyme and receipt of the OKU~~An could
date to August. By allowing a few weeks for overseeing the construction
of the fleet, one surmises that Xenophon's phrase ~~a ~ETO~~p~ (Hell.
4.1.1) for the opening of the Mysian campaign is likely to be correct.
44 Diod. 14.79.4-7 and Justin 6.2.1-3 (spring 395).
45 xen. Hell. 2.4.29; Plut. Ages. 10.6. Plutarch writes that
this decision was an error, because more experienced men (such as
Libys, Pharax and even Lysander) were available. This seems, however,
to be little more than tendentious hindsight. He writes that Agesilaos,
according to Theopompos (Fr.Gr.n. 115.321), was commonly agreed to be
the greatest man alive at that time. Meyer, Vol. 5, 197, notes that
Agesilaos was the most highly regarded Spartan king in nearly a century
as shown by his supreme command on land and sea. Since 90 triremes
were in service, another thirty were needed. See also ch. 5.
46nugas, 77, believes that P. omitted Agesilaos' extraordinary
command and Peisandros' appointment as navarch because he was more concerned with troop movements. Nevertheless, the omission of this detail
is significant especially in light of what P. (22.4-5) writes of
Agesilaos' intentions for the next year.
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was the march from the plain of Kyme to the Paphlagonian border near
the Halys River.

The second phase comprised the treaty with the

Paphlagonians and the return to Kios on the Propontis.

The final phase

was the march from Kios to the region of the two Mysian lakes just
before the onset of winter.

This region on the southern shores of the

Propontis was also known as Hellespontine Phrygia and was the satrapy
of Pharnabazos.

Agesilaos and the Greeks entered Pharnabazos' realm

after marching north to the eastern end of the Ida ridge.

Here the army

veered east, crossed the Thebe and Apia plains 47 and entered Mysia.
Agesilaos attempted to

wi~

the autonomous Mysian highlanders over to

the Greek side; those who agreed were spared the customary pillage,
those who refused were not.

His purpose in all this was to create a

series of barbarian buffer regions between the coastal Greeks and the
court at Sousa.
The first difficulty of the autumn march arose when the army
had reached the southern slopes of Mysian Olympos. 48

The only passage

east was a narrow defile and Agesilaos was compelled to negotiate a
safe conduct with the local mountaineers.

The natives, however,

treacherously attacked the Greeks' rear and killed about fifty soldiers
who were not in formation.

Agesilaos thereupon ordered a one-day halt

47

see Honigmann, RE 5A.2, 1595-99 for Thebe and Hirschfeld, RE
1.2, 2801 for Apia. Both-areas lie near modern Balikesir. While the
Greeks were in Lydia, they adhered to the terms of the truce with
Tithraustes and avoided pillage. After leaving the Ka·!kos plain (modern
Bahir Tschai, Burchner, RE 10.2, 1501-02), they resumed pillage.
4

314.

~odern Ulu Dag at a height of 2493 meters, see Ruge, RE 18.1,
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to bury the dead while during the night, he had Derkylidas set up an
ambush.

At dawn the rest of the army moved forward which deceived the

barbarians into thinking that Agesilaos was departing in dismay at the
previous day's defeat; but Derkylidas' ambushers suddenly fell upon the
barbarian leaders who had thought once again to attack the Greek rear.
Agesilaos ordered the main body of troops to wheel about in support cf
the ambushers and this time 130 barbarians died in close fighting.
That evening the Greeks returned to their earlier campsite to await a
legation from the villagers which arrived on the following day to gather
up the dead.

Agesilaos then took hostages from each of several villages

to assure the Mysians'

adhere~ce

to the terms of the original safe

conduct. 49
After leaving the slopes of Mysian Olympos, Agesilaos gave the
army a few days' rest before setting out to the south and east along the
Tembris river.

This was a part of Greater Phrygia which he had not

penetrated in 396, so he gave his men a free hand at pillage.

His guide

for this part of the march was Spithridates whom Lysander had detached
from Pharnabazos along with his son and 200 riders the previous summer. 50
After passing the winter in the Greek city of Kyzikos, these Persians
had joined Agesilaos' march south of Mysian Olympos.

49P. 21.1-3. Agesilaos demonstrated that the same ruse which had
embarrassed Tissaphernes in the Hermes plain could also prove effective
against mountaineers in rugged high country.
50 spithridates vindicated Lysander's judgment and proved quite
useful to the Greek cause. He had served under Pharnabazos against the
Kyreians after Kunaxa, but took grave offense at the satrap who deceived
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Spithridates guided the Greeks along the Tembris 51 to Leonton
Kephalai, 52 because the city was on the Royal Road.

From there they

could follow the Royal Road to the Halys and Paphlagonia.

Agesilaos

was especially pleased that Spithridates joined him because of an amorous
infatuation with the Persian's handsome young son Megabates. 53

When the

Greeks arrived at Leonton Kephalai, they attempted without success to
reuuce the city by siege.

After laying waste the area around the heavily

fortified town for a few days, the army proceeded northeast along the
Royal Road (from Sardis to Sinope) to Gordian which lay on the Sangarios
River. 54

The soldiers were able to collect a great deal of booty and

supplies from the territory, but the city's natural and man-made defenses
proved too strong despite many attempts to take it by storm.

Rhathanes.55

him into believing that he would marry his daughter. Pharnabazos' real
purpose was to make the girl his concubine, since he had long wished to
marry only a daughter of Artaxerxes (Xen. Ages. 3.3). Another reason
for his defection naturally concerned his own ambitions to which
Pharnabazos was insensitive (Xen. Hell. 3.4.10; Plut. Ages. 11.2, Lys.
24). See Kahrstedt, RE 3A.2, 1815-16.
51 The Tembris (modern Pursah) is a tributary of the Sangarios.
Its headwaters are near Leonton Kephalai. See Ruge, RE 5A.l, 433.
52 Modern Afyon Karahissar (Black Opium Castle), see Ruge, RE 12.2,
2052; Dugas, 81, Lins, 42-43. Meyer, Theopomps Hellenika, 25, n.l, doubts
that Afyon is the site and places it instead further north. Because
.
\ "
,
,
"'
,.
App~an
(Mithr. 19). says To -rns ¢puytas O)(UPWTCLTOV xwptov and the
Royal Roads from Sousa to Sardis and Sardis to Sinope converge here, Afyon
is the preferred identification.
53p. 21.4; Xen. Ages. 5.4-6 lauds his hero's restraint in not
yielding to passion, as does Plut. Ages. 11.2, 5-6.
5 4The Sangarios is one of the longest and most important rivers
in Anatolia. It has even retained the essence of its ancient name,
known today as the Sakarya (Ruge, RE 14.1, 535-40). Gordian has been
identified with modern Germa (Ruge:-RE 7.2, 1590).
55 P. 21.5-6.

Rhathanes (or Rhathines) is also mentioned in
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coordinated the Persian resistance and after six days Spithridates
persuaded Agesilaos to march east to the Halys.

At the Halys, the army

turned north and marched along the river to the Paphlagonian border.
Here at the Phrygian-Paphlagonian boundary, Agesilaos sent Spithridates
to

.

. h a pap hl agon~an
.
. 56
c h"1e f ta1n.

negot~ate w~t

Spithridates returned

with the chieftain and in exchange for a promise of 1,000 horsemen and
2,000 foot soJrliPrs, Agesilaos offered his new ally the hand of
Spithridates' daughter in marriage.

57

He then led the army directly

east to the Sangarios, where the forces promised by his new ally joined
him.
Kios

Following the river's north bank, the Greeks marched to the city of
58

on the Mysian-Bithynian border.

Here the Greeks and their allies

tarried for ten days to engage in looting and pillage, although, as
Leonton Kephalai and Gordion, the city itself proved invulnerable to
assault.

Agesilaos next led the army on a punitive expedition to the

northern slopes of Mysian Olympos in requital for the highlanders'

}nab. 6.5.7, Kyropaid. 8.3.32, and Hell. 3.4.13 by Xenophon. Also
Isokrates(4.144)notes that Agesilaos reached the Halys River (modern
Kizil Irmak, longest river in Asia Minor), Ruge, RE 7.2, 2286-87.
56 P. (22.l)names the Paphlagonian Gyes. Xenophon (Hell. 4.1.3 and
Ages. 3.4) calls him Otys and Kotys respectively and writes that he was a
king. Plutarch (Ages. ll.l)also calls him Kotys. Lenschau, RE 18B.l,
188~ notes that it is impossible to recover this man's real name.
See
also Dugas, 83-84.
5 7P. 22.2; Xen. Hell. 4.1.3. This girl, whom Kallias transported
by ship to her new home, was reputedly quite beautiful and likely the one
whom Pharnabazos had insulted which precipitated Spithridates' defection.
Agesilaos thus created a dynastic marriage between two rebellious subjects
of the Great King.
58Modern Gemlik on the southeast shore of the Propontis (Ruge, RE
11.1, 486-88). According toP. 22.2, Agesilaos led the army back to the
Propontis because he believed it would be less strenuous for the troops
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treachery some months before.

59

The army finally arrived at its last objective for the campaign
of 395, the region of the Mysian lakes and Daskylion where Pharnabazos
reputedly kept his treasury.
far north from Ephesos,
no lasting result.

60

In 396, the Greeks had penetrated this

but retreated to their winter quarters with

On this occasi.on marching from the east, Agesilaos

intended to conduct extensive operations in the
possible, to seize the satrap's treasury.

~egion

and, if

His first object was Miletou

Teichos, 61 but once again Lakedaimonian siegecraft proved inadequate
to the task and the army, having crossed the Rkyndakos River 62 withdrew
to the shores of the Daskylitis lake.

63

The region of the Mysian lakes

and Daskylion contained many prosperous villages, a series of game
preserves and the Makestos, an excellent river for fishing.

who faced a lack of food with approach of winter.
Lins, 43; and Meyer, Theopomps Hellenika, 26-27.

It was here

See Dugas, 85-86;

59p, 22.3; for the earlier episode, see P. 21.2-3.
60Xen. Hell. 3.4.13, Ages. 1.23.
61Modern Kirmasti (or Kemalpasa), south of the eastern lake known
in antiquity as the Apolloniatis, now the Apolyont (Ruge, RE 15.2, 1659).
62p, 22.3. Munro, "Dascylium," JHS,32 (1910), 57-67, identifies
this lake with the modern Lake Manyos, as does Ruge, RE 4.2, 2220-21. At
a depth of 60 meters, this lake was easily navigable by Pankalos'
triremes (see next page). Munro, however, believes the satrapal residency
and treasury were one and the same, whereas Ruge and Dugas much more
plausibly locate the residence on the coast. The Daskylion treasury
(whose bullion was minted at Kyzikos some 26 km to the northwest) probably
lay at Top Hisar near the modern town of Conlu; the satrap, who was an
accomplished naval man, had his residence on the coast near modern Tiulye.
63 The Rhyndakos in the region of the Mysian lakes is known today
as the Kirmasti or Kemalpasa. At its source, however, it is called the
Adunas Tschai (Burchne~ RE l.A.l, 1286-87).
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that Agesilaos decided to pass the winter.

64

He sent for Pankalos, a

subordinate of Cheirikrates who was navarch of the Hellespontine
region.

Pankalos arrived with five triremes, sailed up the river to

the Daskylitis lake and laded all the booty which the Greeks had
accumulated since setting out from Ephesos in the spring.

Leaving the

lake, Pankalos sailed down river to the Propontis and deposited the
plunder near Kyzikos so that Agesilaos would be able to pay his men for
the next year's campaign. 65

Agesilaos then dismissed his Mysian

soldiers, but told them to return in the spring.

The Greeks spent most

of the winter conducting raids and pillage in the My~ian Lake region. 66
On one occasion a Greek foraging party was scattered over a level area
when Pharnabazos suddenly appeared with two scythe-bearing chariots and
400 horsemen.

He fell upon the 700 or so scattered Greeks and killed

or captured about 100.

Spithridates some four days later learned that

the satrap was in the village of Kaue about 30 km. away.

He informed

Herippidas who in turn asked Agesilaos for 2,000 hoplites, a similar

64 Xen. Hell. 4.1.15-16. The Makestos today is called the Simav
Tschai, Ruge (RE 14.1, 773). As Munro, 63, observed,Agesilaos led the
Greeks upstream-and to the west in search of Pharnabazos' bullion stores,
not downstream along the Propontis to the satrapal residence as Dugas, 87
believed. Ruge, RE 4.2, 2220-21, points out there were no less than five
sites called Daskylion in western Asia Minor.
65p. 22.4. Kyzikos was an autonomous Greek city which enjoyed
amicable relations with Pharnabazos whose bullion the Kyzikenes regularly
minted. The Daskylitis lake at a depth of 60 meters and the Makestos
river were fully navigable by trireme. Munro, 58-5~ rightly dismisses
the notion of a vanishing marshpond as the ancient Daskylitis for precisely this reason. See Ruge, RE 12.1, 231-33 and Kraay, 370, No. 718.
66p. 22.4; Xen. Hell. 4.1.16.
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number of peltasts and as many of the Greek, Paphlagonian and
Spithridates' Persian horsemen as he could persuade to accompany him.
His purpose was "to do something glorious."

Unfortunately less than

half the contingent he requested showed up, even though his sacrifices
proved favorable.

In order not to become a laughing stock for the thirty

advisors and the king, Herippidas set out with his diminished force and
overra~

rharnabazos' camp.

He captured a great deal of booty and many

of the satrap's pack animals after killing most of the Mysian guards.
Pharnabazos and the other Persians, however, escaped.

The Greeks'

success was nonetheless marred by a dispute which arose over the distribution of this booty.
himsel~

Herippidas insisted on taking charge of all of it

refusing to allow the barbarians in his force to keep anything.

When Spithridates and the Paphlagonians tried to take their share,
Herippidas surrounded them with hoplites and forced them to turn over
everything to him.

His motive was to sell the booty to the merchants and

thereby enrich himself.

Because of the grave insult to his honor and

the plain injustice of Herippidas' decision, Spithridates fled during the
night with his own troops and the Paphlagonians to Sardis where he joined

.
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t h e re b e 11 ~ous
satrap Ar1a
After the loss of Agesilaos' Persian and Paphlagonian contingent
to Ariaios, Pharnabazos sought to come to terms with the Greeks.

For most

67 Xen. Hell. 4.1.17-28,. Plut. ~es. 11.3-6. Xenophon and
Plutarch both write that nothing so bitterly angered Agesilaos during
the entire Asian campaign as the loss of this Persian officer and his
men. Moreover, the strategic mishap was enhanced by a personal loss, that
of Spithridates' son Megabates, of whom Agesilaos was enamored. Xenophon
(Ages. 5.4) and Pl~tarch (Mor. 209d) write of the king's self-restraint on
one occasion (before Herippidas' gaff) in resisting the urge to embrace and
kiss the handsome youth.
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of the late autumn and winter of 395/94, the presence of the hostile
Greek army had compelled the satrap to keep constantly on the move.

He,

therefore, believed that with this first reversal, Agesilaos might be
willing to talk.

Apollophanes of Kyzikos, a man trusted by both sides,

arranged a conference.
spoke first.
with Athens

68

As the elder of the two principals, Pharnabazos

After recalling his services to the Greeks during the war
he complained about the

uns~emly

devastation being done

by his former friends to his father's lands and possessions.

The thirty

advisors were ashamed and kept silent, but Agesilaos himself finally
spoke.

He pointed out that even Greek cities which were once allied

had made war on one another and he offered to accept Pharnabazos as
an ally, if he, like Ariaios, were to revolt from the Greek King.
The satrap's response was that he would do so

if Artaxerxes were to

replace him as supreme commander in his own satrapy.

69

If, however,

the Great King retained him in a position of honor, he would be obliged
to resist Agesilaos in whatever way possible.

At this Agesilaos shook

the satrap's hand, expressing his regret that he could not have such

68 see Thucydides 8.18, 8.37, 8.58 and Justin 5.1.7 (412-411
B.C.); also Gomme et al.,' Vol. 5, 40-42, 79-82, 138-46; Bengtson,
Staatsvertr~ge £, 139-143.
Pharnabazos, some two years after the conclusion of the alliance, made a truce with the Athenians and offered an
Athenian legation safe conduct to Sousa. See Xen. Hell. 1.2.8, 11; Plut.
Alkibiades 31.1; and Diodorus 13.66.3; also Bengtson:-8taatsvertrage £,
147-48.
69 Pharnabazos, of course, was fully aware of Timokrates' mission
to Greece and its intent to create an anti-Spartan alliance. Thus the
likelihood of any further warfare under Agesilaos' leadership in Asia
Minor was greatly reduced; see ch. 5.
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a man as an ally and a friend.

Moreover, he agreed to withdraw from

Pharnabazos' territory and, if continued warfare were necessary, he
. d
prom~se

70
.
.
to spare t h e satrap ' s 1 an d f rom f urt h er ~nvas~on.

Agesilaos

then withdrew his army after exchanging gifts with Pharnabazos' son. 71
He encamped in the plain of the Thebe near the temple of Astyrene
Artemis and continued to augment his forces for the spring campaign.
Because of the formation of the anti-Spartan coalition in Greece, the
ephors sent a herald named Epikydidas with a

crKUT~An summoning him

back to Greece "to defend the fatherland." 72
What Agesilaos intentions were for the coming year, had he remained in Asia are fairly clear.

With his brother-in-law Peisandros

in charge of the fleet at a strength of 120 ships, he planned to coordinate naval and military strategy.

Peisandros would sail down the

GOast to harass Konon by retrieving Rhodes and forcing him to withdraw to
Kypros.

At the same time Agesilaos would lead the army through Kappadokia

and the Kilikian Gates 73 to the Tauric coast just .north of Kypros where

70

Xen. Hell. 4.1.29-38, Ages. 3.5; Plut. Ages. 12.1-9.

7lxen. Hell. 4.1.39-40; Plut. Ages. 12.1-5. Many years later
Agesilaos aided this young Persian when he had been unjustly exiled by
his brothers: Plut. Ages. 13.6-7, Mor. 19lb, 209e, 807£.
72xen. Hell. 4.1.41-4.2.2, Ages. 1.36; Died. 14.83.1; Paus.
3.9.12; Nepos Ages. 4.1; Justin 6.2.17. For Astyra (just s.e. of
Abydos), see Jessen RE 2.2, 1878.
73

The Kilikian Gates are a pass in the Tauros mountains at an
elevation of 1100 meters. The modern name of this site is Gu1ek
Boghaz; Ruge RE 11.1, 389-90.

102

the Great King's fleet was under construction.

The Spartans by advancing

over land and sea might have recovered Rhodes, thwarted Kanan in Kypros
and seriously crippled Persian naval operations in the Mediterranean by
burning the Kypriote base.

Since Ariaios, the Phrygian satrap in Sardis,

was already in revolt from Artaxerxes and the Spartans were allied to
the Pharoah Nepherites, a two-pronged attack was certainly feasible.

74

The chiliarch Tithraustes and Agesilaos' would-be ally Pharnabazos with
the collusion of Kanan and Timokrates of Rhodes, however, had already
undermined any such project by the spring of that year.

Much to his

chagrin and disappointment, Agesilaos was, therefore, compelled to
abandon any

design~for

further achievement in Asia.

74P. (22.4)and Nepos (Conan 2.3) are quite specific about Agesilaos'
intentions. P. even gives an estimate of the distances involved, saying
that a N-S march to the seacoast of Phoinikia from Gordian through
Kappadokia and the Kilikian gates is similar in length to an east-west
one from Sinope to Gordian. Although the name of the latter city is
missing from P. because the papyrus breaks off, it is quite clear that
the Royal Road from the Black Sea to the Aegean coast is what P. had
in mind. Xenophon (Ages.l.36) and Plutarch (Ages.l5.l)rather wildly suggest that Agesilaos' purpose was to march on Ekbatana and Sousa to overthrow the Persian empire; see also Diod. 15.31.3. Dugas,89, and Bruce, 16,
remark that P. has given a much more realistic assessment of the king's
strategy for 394. Neither Agesilaos nor Peisandros could have anticipated
the dramatic increase in Konon's fleet strength to 170 ships which made
possible the Rhodian revolt, but Agesilaos' program to build 30 ships would
have restored the Peloponnesian fleet to its earlier strength. Even at
a disadvantage of fifty ships, a naval campaign against Konon was, therefore, quite feasible, if well co-ordinated with vigorous activity on land.

CHAPTER V
AGESILAOS' RETURN FROM ASIA AND THE FIRST PART
---- ---- --- -----OF THE KORINTHIAN WAR, 395-392 ~·f·
Although Agesilaos' campaign into the Anatolian interior had
resulted in no permanent occupation, he had brilliantly succeeded in
creating a basis for widening the already latent disaffection with
Sousa.

Moreover, his relentless pillage had greatly swelled Spartan

coffers while Spartan prestige in Asia soared after slipping badly
during the tenure of Lysander's dekarchs.

He had shown that the

Persians were venal, disloyal and militarily inept even with the
advantage of their formidable cavalry. 1
While the Persians' soldierly reputation and the loyalty of
many of the Great King's subjects were deeply suspect in Asia Minor,
Pharnabazos and Konen had greatly advanced the Great King's position
at sea.

Too, the chiliarch Tithraustes, by temporizing with

Agesilaos and buying him off for thirty talents,was able to send
Timokrates to Greece once again with another fifty talents to cement the
anti-Spartan coalition. 2

Pharnabazos had sent Timokrates in the fall

1 Pharnabazos must be exempted from the charge of disloyalty as
he remained the faithful servant of the Great King throughout his long
career. See Lenschau, ~E 19.2, 1847; Olmstead, History of the Persian
Empire, 387; Isokrates ~.142-40 explicitly cites the Persians' incompetence to deal with the Greek invaders in this period.
2

Xen. Hell. 3.5.1; Pausanias (3.3.9) erroneously attributes the
outbreak of the-war to this second mission in 395. As Meyer, Vol. 5, 228;
Beloch, Vol. 3.1, 67, n.l; Bruce, 59, Hamilton, ~arta's Bitter Victories,
182-83; and Lenschau, Phil. Woch.,47 (1933), 1326-27, have observed,
the war was already in progr~ Plutarch (Artax. 20.4, Lys. 27.1,
103
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of 396 3 to exploit the growing resentment against Sparta by dispersing SO
talents with a promise of further support to the leaders of anti-Spartan
factions in various mainland poleis. 4

After Tissaphernes' demise in the

summer of 395 and the truce with Agesilaos, Tithraustes decided to engage the services of the Rhodian agent P-rovocateur.

He sent Timokrates

to Greece with another fifty talents and a promise of continued Persian
support in the fledgling confederacy's struggle against the Spartan
alliance.

This mission came at a crucial moment and showed that despite

Persian military weakness, the empire was well served by the diplomatic
brilliance of her northwestern satraps, the great skill of her
Phoinikian and Greek sailors and the vast wealth of the imperial
treasury. 5

and Ages. 15.6)recounts Agesilaos' witticism that Persian archers were
driving him from Asia, an allusion to Tithraustes' coins brought by
Timokrates to the anti-Spartan Greeks in Europe. See p. 115, n. 34.
3

P. 7.2. Polyainos (1.48.3) does not mention Timokrates
by name. Bruce, 59, sees a conflation of P. and Xenophon in Polyainos
and prefers to date the first mission to 397. Hamilton, 188, thinks
that 396 is more likely since Tissaphernes' treachery and Agesilaos'
surprise attack in Daskylion could well have moved Pharnabazos to rid
himself of the Spartans obliquely. If so, this would be the satrap's
first meeting with Konon since he went to Sousa in 398 to begin the
naval project. Tissaphernes and Pharnabazos' relief of Konon, whom
Pharax had blockaded at Kaunas in 397, however, remains a possible
date for the first mission.
4These leaders were Kylon and Sodamas in Argos, Timolaos and
Polyanthes in Korinth, Ismenias and Androkleidas in Thebes and Kephalos
and Epikrates in Athens. Since the latter two were not in power, Xenophon avers that the Athenians officially rebuffed Timokrates. Kephalos
and Epikrates, however, undoubtedly accepted Timokrates' Persian
largess on an unofficial basis. P. 2.2; Xen. Hell. 3.5.2, Paus. 3.9.8.
5 olmstead, 287-88. For the likelihood of two separate missions
to Greece, see Barbieri, Conone, Rome, 1955, 90; Bruce, 60; and
Hamilton, 211.
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The Phokis-Lokris Dispute and the Outbreak of the
Korinthian War, 395 B.C.
After the second mission of Timokrates, the leaders of the
pro-Athenian faction in Thebes decided that the time had come to
galvanize all Greece into an armed struggle against the Spartan
alliance.

Thebes was torn by factional rivalry at this time

6

and

Ismenias' group believed that resistance to Sparta was not only feasible
but necessary for their own political survival.

Ismenias and

Androkleidas, who along with Argive, Athenian and Korinthian leaders
had benefitted from Timokrates' visits, believed that Theban
Lakonophiles were plotting to
faction.

el~minate

the city's pro-Athenian

They knew that not even the other Boiotarchs would be willing

to attack Sparta openly,

7

because the Lakedaimonians "ruled Greece"
It would, therefore, be necessary to devise

a suitable ruse.

They persuaded a group of Phokians to attack Ozolian

Lokris over a disputed area on the western ridges of the Parnassos
massif.

In the past, much wrangling had arisen over grazing rights

and each side on occasion had plundered the other's sheep.

In every

case, however, the matter had been submitted to arbitration. 8

This time

Ismenias and Androkleidas' men persuaded the Phokians to respond to such
a raid by a full-scale invasion.

The Lokrians, whose land was cut and

burned, sent a legation to Thebes requesting military aid.

6p. 16.1, 17 .1.
7P. 18.2; Xen. Hell. 3.5.3.
8P. 18.3.

Since the

106
Lokrians and Boiotians had long been friends, Ismenias and Androkleidas
were able to persuade the Boiotarchs to come to the Lokrians' aid. 9
When the Phokians learned of this decision, they withdrew from West
Lokris and sent to Sparta a request that the Lakedaimonians interdict
the Boiotians from invading Phokis.

Though mistrusting the Phokians'

story, the Lakedaimonians nonetheless sent legates to Thebes who forbade any

hostilitie~

tration in Sparta.

and insisted that all disputes be submitted to arbiIsmenias' faction, however, incited the Boiotians to

reject the Spartans' demand and mount the attack on Phokis. 10
When the ephors called out the ban, they sent Lysander ahead
to await the full allied levy under King Pausanias.

Militarily, of

course, the Spartans' intent was to entrap the Thebans and Lokrians in
a classic pincer movement.

9

Lysander also achieved diplomatic success

P. 18.3-4.

10P. 18.4. The essence of Jsmenias' plan was the deceit to
provoke the Lokrian request for Boiotian aid. Xenophon (Hell. 3.5.3-5)
writes that Theban leaders induced the Lokrians to charge-rent to the
Phokians for use of the disputed land. This was to cause a Phokian
invasion which would move the Lokrians to request Boiotian help. At
this request for_help, Androkleidas persuaded the Boiotians to invade
Phokis, a long time ally of Sparta, which would convince the Spartans
that the treaty had been violated. Xenophon erroneously makes the
eastern, not western, Lokrians the object of Boiotian aid while making
no reference to any Spartan attempt at a diplomatic resolution.
Plutarch (Lys. 27.2-3) blames the Thebans for attacking Phokis and
Lysander for desiring vengeance. Diodorus(l4.80.1-3)also attributes the
war's outbreak to the Boiotian invasion of Phokis. The diplomatic
mission from Lakedaimon mentioned in P. indicates that Pausanias was at
first reluctant to open up a second Spartan war effort against the
Greeks while Agesilaos was still in Asia. The rebuff of this embassy
and the Boiotians' invasion of Phokis, as Plutarch makes quite clear,
induced Lysander to create a major shift in Spartan policy. Xenophon's
erroneous ascription of disputed land to the eastern ~okrians, his
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in that he detached Orchomenos from the Boiotian league
cruiting

a

.

Leba d e~a.

11

after re-

force of Phokians, Oit.ians, Herakliotes and Halians near

12

Just as in 396, when he detached Spithridates from

Pharnabazos, Lysander proved himself a gifted diplomat and had now
recovered much of the influence he lost after being disgraced by
'1 aos. 13

Ages~

The Boiotians' response to the Spartan initiative was to send
a legation to Athens.

In their speech to the Athenian assembly, the

legates noted that the only way for the Athenians to regain some measure
of their former influence 'tvould be to go to war against the Spartan
alliance.

They mentioned the great discontent with Sparta in Argos and

omission of any reference to Spartan diplomacy or Ismenias' brilliant
ruse make it likely that P's explanation should be preferred. See
Oldfather, RE 13.1, 1200-01. Hamilton, 193-95, who repeats Xenophon's
error about 't-lhich Lokrians were involved in the dispute, believes that
Xenophon derived his information from a biased Spartan source whose
purpose was to cloak the Thebans' emb~rrassing rejection of Pausanias'
diplomacy. Thus it is likely that before this rejection and the actual
invasion of Phokis, most Spartans were unwilling to go to war against
the Boiotian league despite Xenophon's assertion (Hell. 3.5.5). These
purported grievances were probably more irking to the Lysandrians than
anyone else.
11

Andokides (3. 2.0) cites this loss as the reason for the
war. Surely it was an annoyance to the Boiotians, but it was not
the casus belli. It did, however, prompt their embassy to Athens.
12 P ausan~as
. ' d escr~pt
. i on (3 .9.9 ) TOV
\ OtTOV
"
,
~
indicates
aK~a~OVTa
that May 395 was the precise date of the Spartan mobilization ( cj>poupctv
~fvEtV ). See also Xen. Hell. 3.5.6 and Plut. Lys. 28.
13Plut. Ages. 20.2 and Lys. 28.
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Korinth and the willingness of these states with Persian support to join
an anti-Spartan coalition.

Finally, the Boiotians insisted that many

Eoleis would welcome Athenian aid against the oppressive Spartan harmosts and garrisons.

Thus sometime in July or August, the Athenians

voted to enter into an alliance with the Boiotian league. 14
At about this time, Pausanias assembled the full allied levy
at the Lakedaimonian frontier (Skiritis), obtained favorable sacrifices,
and marched to Plataia to await word from Lysander who was pillaging
near the town of Lebadeia.

Lysander sent a letter to Pausanias in

which he requested a rendezvous near Haliartos whose citizens he was
trying to win over with diplomacy.

The man carrying this letter, how-

ever, fell in with Theban scouts who reported back to the city.

There

an Athenian levy was placed in charge, while a Theban force marched to
the Haliartians' relief. Without waiting for Pausanias, Lysander moved
his line forward from the hill he had occupied outside the town.

As he

approached the gates, a force of Thebans and Haliartians suddenly rushed
out while the Theban relief force outside the walls rose up against
Lysander's rear.

In the ensuing struggle

the Spartans lost their

greatest naval commander, his personal priest and about 1,000 of their
allies.

The Theban losses amounted to 300 men who)in their anxiety to

dispel any suspicion of "lakonizing;' pursued the fleeing allies into

14xen. Hell. 3.5.7-17; P.(l8.l)notes that it was widely expected
that the Argives, Korinthians and Athenians would join the Boiotians
in a war against Sparta. See also Tod, Qlll, nos. 101-02, Bengtson,
Staatsvertr~ge 1, 168-70 with full notes and bibliography, Meyer, Vol.
5, 230; Beloch 3.2, 69; and Hamilton, 201.
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rugged terrain where the advantage reverted to the Peloponnesians. 15
Word reached Pausanias of Lysander's demise while the main army
was on the road between Plataia and Thespiai.

When the king arrived

at Haliartos, he conferred with his advisors and decided to recover
the fallen Spartans under a truce.

The Thebans would allow them to re-

cover the dead only on condition that they withdraw from Boiotia.
P~usanias

agreed and led the army back across the Isthmos.

When he re-

turned to Sparta, however, he found himself on trial for his life.

The

Lysandrians,who were stunned and outraged at their hero's death,accused
Pausanias of failing to arrive at Haliartos on the specified date, of
recovering the dead by truce instead of offering battle, and of allowing
the Athenian democrats in the Peiraeus to escape chastisement (a charge
of which he had

bee~

acquitted eight years before!).

Realizing that

his case was hopeless, he fled for sanctuary to the temple of Athena
Alea in Tegea where he eventually died in exile. 16
During that same summer (395), Tithraustes, after coming to
terms with Agesilaos, sent Timokrates to Greece with another fifty

15

Plut. Lys. 28.1-12. Xenophon who relied on a Spartan source
is clearly in error when he asserts that the rendezvous at Haliartos
had been arranged in Lakedaimon (Hell. 2.5.6). Similarly, he writes
that Lysander did not wait for Pausanias at Haliartos, but rather that
he approached and was either surprised by the Thebans near the town
walls or simply chose to resist their advances in expectation of defeating them (Hell. 3.5.17-21). Xenophon puts the Theban losses at over
200 with no mention of the number of allied fallen who fled at Lysander's
death. For a brief synopsis of Lysander's death, see also Diod. 14.81
and Paus. 3.5.3-5, 9.32.5.
16Xen. Hell. 3.5.17-25; Plut. Lys. 29.1-30.1; Diod. 14.81.2-3,
89.1-2; Paus. 3.5.6. See also Beloch, 3.1, 71 with notes.
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talents.

The Theban and Athenian success against Lysander and

Pausanias at Haliartos, Timokrates' second disbursal of Persian silver
and the long-smouldering resentment in Greece at Sparta's high-handed
oppression resulted in the creation of the anti-Spartan coalition at
Korinth in the autumn. 17

The envoys of these states quickly under-

took a diplomatic offensive to detach as many states beyond the
Isthmos from the Spartans as possible.

That autumn the anti-Spartan

coalition brought over to its side the Euboians, Chalkidikians, Medias
of Larissa (whom they aided militarily in his struggle with Lykophron
of Pherai~ 18 and the Ambrakiotes, Akarnanians, and Leukadians.
Ismenias with 2,000 soldiers and aid from his new ally Medias
captured Herakleia,expelled the Spartan garrison and repatriated the
town with its original inhabitants.

He then defeated a force of

Phokians commanded by a Spartan officer near the town of Naryx in
Lokris which in legend was the birth place of small Aias.
allied soldiers fell, while the coalition lost 500.
Athens

d~ring

One thousand

19

the winter and spring of 395i94 was also actively

17see Bengtson, Staatsvertrage
and Hamilton, 207.

l•

171-72, Tod, GHI, no. 102,

18niod. 14.82.1-6. Hamilton, 215, points out that the coalition needed an ally in Thessaly because the Spartans had a garrison at
Oite and Herakleia, while the Orchomeni.ans held Thermopylai for them.
Thus, if Agesilaos were to march home from Asia, he would encounter
significant resistance south of Mt. Olympos.
19niod. 14.82.6-10. Thus in late 395 the Spartans suffered
embarrassing, but not crippling military and diplonatic losses in central
Greece.
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recruiting new members for the coalition.
Eretria into the fold by treaty. 20

She brought Lokris and

By the spring of 394, a consider-

able number of hostile troops had gathered at Korinth and Sparta could
no longer ignore the growing military threat.

The ephors therefore

decided to move against the coalition and took two steps to this purpose.

They called out the ban and named Aristodemos commander, since

Pausanias' son Agesipolis was too young to assume military responsibilities.

Because a regent was chosen to lead the Peloponnesians, it was

clear that Sparta intended a full-scale effort.

The second measure

was to summon Agesilaos home from Asia. 21
Ancient and modern authors have advanced various explanations
for the outbreak of what was to be known as the Korinthian War.

In

antiquity some attributed the hostilities to Persian diplomacy. 22
Others have explicitly rejected this notion and insist instead that
deeply felt resentment against Sparta and factional politics created
the necessary conditions. 23

One author ascribed the war to the defection

of Orchomenos from the Boiotian league. 24

Modern scholars have seen

20 see Bengtson, Staatsvertr:ge 2, 170-71 and 176-77.
21xen. Hell. 4.2.1, 9; Diod. 14.83.1.
22 xen. Hell. 3.5.1-2; Plut. Ages. 15.8; Paus. 3.9.9.
23p, 7.2-3, 16.1, 17.1.
24Andok. 3.20.
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mere ill luck and accident as the cause, 25 fear of Spartan intervention in the internal affairs of the coalition states,
economic strictures on Athens and Korinth,
violent opposition to Lakedaimon.

27

26

and serious

all of which created

The best and most inclusive

explanation would discover the war's cause in the complex welter of
social, political and economic conditions stemming from the defeat of
Athens in 404 B.r..

28

In any case, it was the outbreak of this struggle

which ended forever Agesilaos' dreams of conquest and glory in Asia.
The March Back from Asia
After withdrawing from Pharnabazos' territory, Agesilaos began
to make plans for his spring offensive.

He made strenuous diplomatic

overtures to Greeks and barbarians to induce their defection from the
Great King and to accept his leadership.

He

al~o

toured extensively

during these weeks to restore stability to Greek cities in which bloody
factional strife (the legacy of Lysander's dekarchies) had undermined
civility and order.

He was able to achieve this without resorting to

violence, banishment or executions.

After composing the cities' in-

ternal strife and greatly swelling his own ranks with defectors, he

25 Bruce, "Internal Politics and the Outbreak of the Korinthian
War," Emerita, 28 (19601, 75-76.
2 6Per1man, "The Causes and Outbreak of the Corinthian War,"
14 (1964)' 66-68.

S

27Kagan, "The Economic Origins of the Corinthian War," Parola
del Passato,l6 (1961),321-41.
28Hamilton, 183-84.
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assembled his forces in the Thebe plain near the shrine of Astyrene
Artemis, an area about 30 km. southeast of Abydos.29

Sometime during

the winter, Agesilaos had made a dedication to the Ephesian Artemision
which had been extensively damaged by a fire.

This donation to help

rebuild the temple has yielded our only bit of physical evidence of
Agesilaos' presence in Asia during these two years. 30

That he would

set aside some of the booty to dedicate a column to the goddess was
important to his soldiers, Greek and non-Greek, as proof· of the king's
dedication to higher powers.3 1
With the arrival of Epikydidas in May of 394 to recall him
from Asia, Agesilaos suppressed his bitter disappointment
and submitted to the ephors' authority.

h~

informed the Greek and bar-

barian allies of the Spartans' decision, but promised net to forget them.
He said that as soon as matters in Europe were resolved, he would return
to accomplish whatever they might need.

At this, many of the allies burst

into tears and volunteered to accompany him back to Greece.

He then

29 xen. Hell. 4.1.41, Ages. 1.35-37; Plut. Ages. 15.1; for
Astyra, see Jessen, RE 2.2, 1878. The site is near modern Kinazli.
30The evidence is a column base in the British Museum whose
dedicatory inscription Borker, "Konig Agesilaos von Sparta und der
Artemis-Temple in Ephesos;• ZPT<" 37 (1980), 74-75, restores to rear'!
\)
/
)'
~--1:
Bc«n AEUS :AynatJ.aos a.VE8nKEV i\pTElH u 1 • Wesenberg, "Agesi l.aos .
im Artemision;• ZPE,41 (1981), 178-79, believes that the inscription was
intentionally mutilated after Sparta surrendered the Asian Greeks to
Artarxerxes in 387 (see ch. 6).
31

Xenophon (Ages. 5.7) and Plutarch (Ages. 14) describe
Agesilaos' careful attention to, and respect for, even barbarian
places of worship.
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appointed Euxenos harmost after assigning him 4,000 troops to safeguard
and garrison the cities.32
In order to determine which troops to take with him and which
to leave behind 'tvith Euxenos, as in the previous year, he instituted a
series of competitions.

He did this after observing that many of his

troops seemed more eager to remain in Asia than to cross over into
Europe.

He also wanted to be certain of the Ionian and Aiolic troops'

readiness, since so many of these men had volunteered to accompany him.
The final decision, he announced, would be made near Sestos after the
army had crossed the Hellespont.
follov:ing categories:

Contests would be held in each of the

one for the city sending_ the best contingent, one

each for the captain of the best equipped hoplites, peltasts, archers
and cavalry.

The winning captains of hoplites and cavalry would receive

beautifully 'tvrought sets of armor, while those in the other categories
would earn wreaths of gold.
to no less than four talents.

The value of the armor and wreaths amounted
When the army reached the area of Sestos,

Agesilaos chose the Lakedaimonians Menaskos, Orsippos and Herippidas and
one man from each allied city as judges.

After the distribution of

prizes, Agesilaos led his army along the same route as Xerxes had almost
a century before when the Persians had invaded Greece. 33

32

Xen. Hell. 4.2.3-5, Ages. 1.38; Plut.
Meyer, Vol. 5, 230 and Beloch, 3.1, 72. ·

Ages~

15.5.

See also

33 Xen. Hell. 4.2.5-8, Ages. 1.39; Plutarch (~. 15.5-8)
writes that Agesilaos gave the finest example of obedience to
legitimate authority ever seen by returning from Asia at the ephors'
summons. Hamilton, 219, believes that Epikydidas' description of
the outbreak of war in Greece further exacerbated Agesilaos' resentment of the Thebans.

115

While the army was breaking camp at Sestos, Agesilaos wryly
observed that 10,000 of the king's archers were driving him out of
Asia.

The reference was to the bribes disbursed by Timokrates to the

anti-Spartan leaders in Greece and the fact that many Persian coins
were stamped with the figure of a bow~an. 34

As the army passed through

Hellespontine Thrace, Agesilaos sent envoys ahead to ask but one
question:

would they permit the Greeks safe passage?

All tribes ehose

to receive the army in a friendly spirit except the Trallians.

35

This

people, to whom even Xerxes had paid a transit fee, asked for 100 talents
of silver and an equal number of women as the price of passage.
Agesilaos responded that they should come and take what they wanted,
prompting the Trallians to draw themselves into battle formation.
Agesilaos, however, routed and killed many of them with little or no
allied losses.

After this the allies encountered no further resistance

and arrived at Amphipolis. 36
While encamped near Amphipolis, Agesilaos received two legations.
The first came from the island of Thasos which lay some 80 km. to the
east.

The purpose of this mission was clearly flattery.

37

A second more

34

Plut. Ages. 15.6 and Mor. 2llb. The figure in the Moralia is
30,000 archers. Whichever is correct, it is clear that Epikydidas had
briefed Agesilaos well about Persian monetary initiatives in Europe. For
the type of coin in question, see Regling, RE 2A.2, 2316-22, and Kraay,
369,with notes and bibliography.
35

Plut. Ages. 16.1, Mor. 211C. For a discussion of the fiercely
independent, semi-civilized tribe, see Lenk, RE 6A.l, 407.
36xen. Hell. 4.3.1; Plut. Ages. 16.1-3.
37 See Jacoby, Fr.Gr.H. 2B.l, no. 115.22 under Theopompos
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serious legation under Derkylidas arrived from Sparta whose purpose was
to inform Agesilaos about the outcome of the battle of Nemea.

38

as preserved in Athenaios, Deipnosophistai 657b/c. The Thasians
hoping to win Agesilaos' favor brought cattle, sheep and some of their
exotic island dishes. The king, however, remarked that only beef and
mutton were fit for consumption by soldiers of Lakedaimon and distributed
the exotic items to the helots who were welcome, he said, to perish from
the food's ill effects. According to Plutarch (~.210d), the Thasians
offered to deify Agesilaos, claiming it was in their power to do so.
He dismissed them, however, sAyi~g that they should make themselves gods
first before offering to do so for others. This offer was meant to be
reminiscent of the Samian deification of Lysander (see ch. 2).
38The anti-Spartan coalition accelerated its activities when
it became clear that Sparta was mobilizing in the Peloponnesos
and had summoned Agesilaos home from Asia. Timolaos of Korinth urged
swift action to check the Spartans before they could assemble the full
allied levy, but the coalition, by squabbling over command positions
and phalanx depth, lost the opportunity to act on his advice. When the
allied army reached the Korinthia and fell to pillaging, the coalition
finally drew up its forces on the eastern slope of the dry Nemea river
bed. The two camps were separated by only 1.85 km. when the armies.
finally engaged. Xenophon (Hell.4.2.13-23) and Diodorus (14.83.1-2) are the
only ancient authors to preserve a record of this encounter. Diodorus'
version is very summary, providing only the numbers ranged on either
side of the river bed and the casualties. Xenophon's description is
much longer and lists the contingents by city. In his reckoning,
the Peloponnesians had 13,500 to the coalition's 21,500. Kromayer,
Antike Schlachtfelder 4, 595-96, suggests that Xenophon (who was
travelling with Agesilaos at this time) neglected to include almost
9,000 Achaian, Mantineian and Tegeate hoplites in spite of mentioning
that the Spartans had collected them en route. Diodorus similarly
appears to have ommitted the 6,000 Athenians. The actual figures,
therefore, were 21,500 coalition troops against the Peloponnesians'
23,500. In different sectors of the field different sides had the
advantage until the Spartans detached and routed the Athenians (who had
changed places with the timorous Thebans because the latter refused to
face the Spartans). At this the rest of the coalition line broke and
fled to Korinth whose pro-Spartan citizens locked them out and sent a
legation to Lakedaimon to sue for peace. Diodorus tells us that the
allies lost 1100 men to the coalition's 2800 and Xenophon notes that
the Spartans erected a trophy. Epigraphical evidence of Athenian
participation in the battle survives and is discussed by Tod, GHI, nos.
104/05. Pausanias (1.29.11) describes this stele which lists eleven
fallen cavalrymen of a 600-man contingent. TI1is is perhaps a listing of
only one tribe's fallen. In any case the battle was indecisive, although

117
Derkylidas reported that only eight Lakedaimonians had perished, while
a great many of the enemy had fallen.

Perhaps only eight Spartiates

fell, but a figure of 1100 seems more likely for the allied side.
Agesilaos then decided that it would be well to inform the Asian Greeks
He, there-

of this victory and remind them of his promise to return.
fore, sent Derkylidas back to the Hellespont (July 394). 39

Agesilaos then left Amphipolis and led the army into Makedonia
after sending envoys to King Airopos to ask for safe conduct.

Airopos,

suspecting that the Lakedaimonians were weak in cavalry, at first refused.

When Agesilaos ordered all animals to be mounted, thus creating

an impression of a much larger cavalry force than he actually had,
Airopos abandoned his bellicose posture and allowed the army to pass. 40
In Thessaly a somewhat different situation confronted the allies.
Here they could not merely request safe passage

becaus~

like the

Chalkidikians, most Thessalians had sided with the anti-Spartan

the Peloponnesians seem to have enjoyed a slight advantage. For a full
analysis of numbers, topography and interpretation of this encounter,
see Pritchett, "The Battle Near the Nemea River in 394 B.C.," Studies
in Ancient Greek Topography~ Part 2, 74-84; Cavaignac, "A propos de la
bataille du torrent du Nemee," REA,27 (1925),273-78; Anderson, Military
Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon, Berkeley, 1970, 141-50;
Kromayer, Schlachtenatlas, Griesch. Abt., maps 1 and 2, 29-30; and
finally Accame, Ricerche intorno alla Guerra Corinzia, Naples, 1951,65-87,
who discerns a potent anti-Theban bias in Xenophon's entire description
of this battle which occurred in July 394.
39xen. Hell. 4.3.2-3.

Derkylidas, Xenophon writes, was fond of

travel.
40Plut. Ages. 16.4; Polyainos 2.1.17; Paus. 3.9.12.
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coalition.

41

Medias now repaid the Boiotians for their help by

harassing the allied column when it had crossed into Thessaly east
of Olympos and had begun to march up the Peneios River toward Larissa.
Agesilaos, understanding the implications of his reception in Thessaly,
attempted to detach the Larisaians through diplomacy.

He sent Xenokles

and Skythes to the city, but the inhabitants arrested them.

Against

the indignant advice of his counsellors, Agesilaos decided not to besiege the city.

.

.

negot1at1on.

Rather, he chose to secure the envoys release by

42

Since entering Thessaly, Agesilaos had ordered the troops to
march

)

sv

/

nAa101~

with half the horsemen in front and half behind

the square to counter Thassalian harassment.

The Pharsalian Poly-

charmos began to press the allies so vigorously south of Larissa that
Agesilaos ordered all his cavalry to the rear except those forming his
own body guard.

This convinced Polycharmos and his men that it was not

the right moment to engage Agesilaos' hoplites, so the Thessalians
began an orderly withdrawal.

Agesilaos, however, suddenly decided to

attack his adversaries and ordered his mounted bodyguard to wheel about
and pass the word to the rearguard horsemen not to allow the Thessalians
a retreat.

The sudden rush of the allied horsemen took Polycharmos by

surprise.

Most of his men fled in confusion back toward Pharsalos and

Polycharmos with a few others, who chose to resist, fell fighting.

41Diod. 14.82.1-2; thus it is evident that Agesilaos could not
have followed precisely the same path as Xerxes had.

42 Plut. Ages. 16.5-6.
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Agesilaos took some horsemen captive and erected a trophy between
Mt. Pras and Mt. Narthakion 43 to celebrate his victory.

He was

especially pleased that the cavalry he had personally recruited and
trained were successful against a people who prided themselves on
horsemanship.

The next day he crossed the borders of Achaia Phthiotis

into eastern Lokris and the Spercheios valley near Mt. Oite, a
44
friendly re~=i~ory.
Here he was met by the ephor Diphridas who bade him enter
Boiotia at once.

Agesilaos had intended to augment further his forces

before marching southeast along the Kephisos into hostile territory, but
once again he obeyed the ephors' command.

Arriving with Diphridas were

fifty of the strongest and fittest young men from Lakedaimon to serve
as the king's personal bod¥guard and honor him for his services to the
state.

He then gave an order that two morai,one from the Korinthia

and one from Orchomenos1 join him, announced to his troops that the day
was at hand for which they had left Asia and set out.

He led the army

along the Kephisos past Chaironeia and Lebadeia to the outskirts of
Koroneia on the northern flanks of Mt. Helikon.

45

On 14 August 394 B.C. there occurred a partial solar eclipse and

43 xen. Hell. 4.3.3-9; Plut. Ages. 16.6-8. Mt. Narthakion lies
some 6-8 km. south of Pharsalos and its peak is 1011 meters high; see
Stahlin, RE 16.2, 1760-61. Mt. Pras is immediately to the east. Today
Mt. Narthakion is called Kassidhiaris.
44 Plut. Ages. 17.4; the Spercheios forms the southern boundary
of Thessaly. The army would have passed by Lamia, crossed the river
and encamped between the eastern flanks of Oite and the pass of ThermoPYlai.
45 xen. Hell. 4.3.10; Plut. Ages. 17.3-4.
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Agesilaos received word of the Peloponnesians' sweeping naval defeat near
Knidos and the death of his brother-in-law1 the navarch Peisandros.
Although shocked and in sorrow at the news, the king ordered those who
had brought the tidings to announce that Peisandros had died, but that
the Peloponnesian fleet had been victorious.
and offered the sacrifice for glad tidings.

He then put on a garland
He also sent portions of

the victims to the leaders of the several contingents of his army to
keep up their spirits.

46

Shortly after the sacrifice, the vanguard of

the coalition army arrived from the Isthmos.

Buoyed by their king's

good spirits, the Lakedaimonians gained the upper hand in a minor
.
. h . 47
s k ~rm~s

The Battle of Koroneia
With the arrival of the main coalition army from the Isthmos,
the two sides drew up into battle formation.

Having received orders to

enter Boiotia from Diphridas the ephor, Agesilaos' purpose was clearly
to inflict a decisive defeat on the coalition, neutralize and detach
Boiotia and trap the Argives, Athenians and Korinthians at the Isthmos
between two Peloponnesian armies.

With the loss of the hegemony's

naval component in the shoals and waters of the Knidian Chersonese,

46 xen. Hell. 4.3.13-14; Plut. Ages. 17.5; Polyainos 2.1.3. This
incident shows yet again that Agesilaos was gifted with superior leadership ability and, in his fifty-first year, possessed a thorough understanding of human nature.
47

Xen. Hell. 4.3.14.
. ... ,
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Agesilaos had double incentive to carry the day.

He had already told

his Asian Greek allies that the day of decision for which they had
marched from Asia was at hand.

48

a return to Asia Minor feasible.

A successful issue would have made
Second, the Peloponnesians were in

an excellent position to chastise severely the Thebans for having incited the war, an incentive which was paramount for every allied
soldier in the field.
Although Agesilaos had left 4,000 men in Asia, he had been able
to recruit others in his homeward march from Sestos.

Thus, the allied

army which was deployed in three components stood at a strength of some
20,000 men.

When they had left camp, Agesilaos with the Lakedaimonian

wing occupied the right side of the line as tradition dictated.

In

ttl~

center Herippidas commanded the Asian Greek soldiers and finally the
Phokians and Orchomenians were arranged on the allied left.

49

Opposed

to them were the Argives on the coalition left, the Lokrians (eastern
and westerw, Ainianians, Euboians, Korinthians and Athenians in the
middle and the Boiotians on the right.

50

The coalition line faced in a

northerly direction, while that of the allies looked south toward the

48 Plut. Ages. 17.2.
49 xen. Hell. 3.4.15; Ages. 2.9; Plut. Ages. 18.1-2; Diod. 14.84.1.
See also Kromayer/Veith, Schlachtenatlas, Griech Abt., 28, map 3 and
Pritchett, Studies in Ancient Greek Topography 2, 93-95.
5°The general terrain of the battle had the Kopaic marsh to the
east and Mt. Helikon to the south (and the town of Koroneia), the
Herkyna river to the west and the Kephisos to the north. Just to the
southeast of the battle lines lay the temple of Athena Itonia (today the
Chapel of the Metamorphosis). See Kromayer/Veith, ibid and Pritchett,
ibid.
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flanks of Mt. Helikon.

Since the coalition troops were the same who

had fought at Nemea a month before, they would have numbered about
20,000 also.

Once again, therefore, the two sides were evenly matched,

although the allies had more peltasts.

51

As at Nemea, the Thebans raised the war cry and attacked first,
this time charging into the Orchomenians and Phokians.

When Agesilaos

signalled the Lakedaimonian wing to advance, the Argives fled to
Mt. Helikon.

The center of both lines held, but when Agesilaos dis-

covered that the Thebans had broken through to the allied baggage train,
he wheeled his own men about to aid the routed Orchomenians and Phokians.
During this manoeuvre, the coalition center began to give way to
Herippidas' Asian Greeks and undertook a steady withdrawal to join the
Argives on the slopes of Helikon.

When the Thebans realized that their

Argive and other comrades were retreating, they regrouped for a charge
southward to rejoin their fellows.

Agesilaos, rather than opening his

line to let them pass, decided to meet their charge head on. 52

During

the course of this bitterly fought, hand-to-hand combat, Agesilaos himself sustained several wounds and had to be carried away to safety.

Had

it not been for the vigorous efforts of the fifty Spartan youths sent
with Diphridas to be his honor guard, Agesilaos would have lost his

51Xen. Hell. 4.3.15, Ages. 2.9.
52 Rather than letting the Boiotians pass and taking them in the
rear as they retreated, Xenophon (Hell. 4.3.19, Ages. 2.12) in a classic
understatement writes that Agesilaos displayed great courage by not
choosing the safest course. Jlutarch (Ages. 18.4) more realistically observes that the king was carried away·by passion and martial ardor. This
effort was perhaps necessary, however, if the Spartan plan to crush and
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Eventually most of the Boiotians escaped to Mt. Helikon to

join their comrades, but many others died in the Spartan onslaught.
As they lay wounded near the Spartan camp, Agesilaos forbade
the slaughter of eighty enemy soldiers who had taken refuge in the
nearby temple of Athena Itonia.

On the following day, in order to test

the enemy, he ordered his troops to wear garlands and erect a trophy.
The Boiotians made no mmre to offer battle, but instead sent envoys requesting a truce to recover the dead.

Agesilaos granted this request

and ordered his army to withdraw to the west.

The Spartans abandoned

hope of subduing Boiotia while the coalition forces retreated to occupy
the Isthmos.54

After the allies reached Delphi, where the Pythian

games were in progress, Agesilaos received medical attention for his
many wounds and dedicated 100 talents, a tenth of his Asian booty, to
Apollo.

He then ordered the polemarch Gylis to conduct pillage in

western Lokris.

This venture was indecisive, however, and Gylis with

seventeen other Spartiates lost his life.
When the games were over and Agesilaos had recovered
sufficiently to travel, he dismissed the various contingents of the
army and sailed home from the Krisaian Gulf.

Marching back through

Megaris and the Isthmos was, of course, out of the question, because

detach the Boiotians from the coalition were to work. If the largely unscathed Boiotians succeeded in rejoining ·their comrades on Mt. Helikon,
the Spartans would have lost their chance to put an early end to war.
Unfortunately for the Spartans, this is precisely what happened.
53 Xen. Hell. 4.3.18-19, Ages. 2.12; Plut. Ages. 18.3.
54see Pritchett, 95.
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the coalition had secured that area in force, thus blocking the allies'
path.

55

The bulk of the Peloponnesians probably crossed over from

Antirhion to Rhion at the western end of the Gulf of Korinth where the
channel separating the northern land mass from the Peloponnesos is
only about 2 km. wide.

56

From Koroneia to the Failed Peace of 392
Although the Thebans enjoyed the first success of the war at
Haliartos and were elated by their performance at Koroneia when their
comrades from other poleis had broken and run,

57

controlled the field at both Nemea and Koroneia.

the Spartan alliance
The encounters, how-

ever, were inconclusive and the chance to crush Boiotia had slipped
from the Spartans' grasp three times in as many months.

The Lake-

daimonians' three greatest commanders had failed to attain this crucial
military objective; Lysander had died, Pausanias was in exile and a
seriously wounded Agesilaos had been compelled to withdraw to the comparative safety of Phokis and disband his army.

Thus the Korinthiar. War,

as it came to be known, while mildly encouraging for the coalition, was

55 Xen. Hell. 4.3.17-4.4.1, Ages. 2.9-16; Plut. Ages. 18.5-19.3.
Summary accounts of the battle appear in Diod. 14.84.1-2; Paus. 9.6.4;
Nepos Ages. 4.5; Frontinus 2.6.6; Polyainos 2.1.3-4; and Justin 6.4.13.
Xenophon's account of this battle is particularly detailed and vivid because he participated in it as Plutarch (Ages. 18.1) tells us and
Xenophon himself (Anab. 5.3.6). Diogenes Laertius (2.6) also makes note
of Xenophon's trek back to Europe with Agesilaos.
56 see Bolte, RE lA.l, 844-45; Rhion is located just northeast
of modern Patrai.
57
Plutarch (Ages. 18.9) writes that they believed themselves undefeated, if not technically victorious in the battle.
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primarily a triumph for the diplomacy of Pharnabazos, Tithraustes and
Artaxerxes.

58

In order for the Persian grand strategy to succeed, it was not
enough that an anti-Spartan coalition come into being in Greece.
earlier,

59

As noted

in the early spring of 395 a democratic faction seized con-

trol of the government at Rhodes and expelled the Spartan garrison. 59
Soon afterwards the new government intercepted a huge Egyptian grain
fleet which put in to what the Egyptians believed was still a proSpartan port. 60

In addition to affecting Agesilaos' strategy in Asia

Minor, this coup provided Konen with another base of operations in the
Aegean. 61

In 396 Pharax, a Lakedaimonian navarch, had sailed with

thirty ships to aid Dionysios I of Syracuse in his struggle against
Carthage. 62

This reduced the Peloponnesian fleet in the Aegean from 120

58 xenophon (Hell. 4.4.1, 14) notes that after Koroneia the
land war bogged down into a series of skirmishes in the Korinthia.
The coalition's advantage was not solid, however,.as the Korinthian
oligarch's lockout of the soldiers fleeing from the Nemea riverbed
and subsequent overtures to Sparta for a separate peace clearly show
(Xen. Hell. 4.2.23 and Demosth. 20.52-53). Hamilton, 223,notes that
in spite of limited resources, the Athenians decided to rebuild their
long walls. See Tod, GHI, no. 107.
5 9see ch. 4.
60 P. 15.1-3; Died. 14.79.4-7; and Justin 6.2.1-3.
61 Hamilton, 227, and Bruce, "The Democratic Revolution at
Rhodes," CQ,ll (1961),166-170.
62 Diod. 14.63.4
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to 90 ships, which in turn moved Agesilaos, after his appointment as
supreme navarch63 in late summer of 395, to order the restoration of
the fleet to its original strength.

Konon, however, had more than

doubled the Persian fleet from eighty ships

64

to 170 with the addition

of eighty triremes from Sidon and ten from Kilikia (late winter 396/95,
just prior to the Rhodian revolt). 65

With the death of Tissaphernes,

Konon was forced to confront one of the most embarrassing problems of
that era for a commander.

Since his Persian supporters were in default

of their funding promises, he had fallen fifteen months in arrears of
pay for his sailors and marines. 66

He, therefore, sailed from Rhodes

to Kaunas in order,to confer with Tithraustes and Pharnabazos.
m~eting

After

with the satrap and chiliarch, the latter gave him 220 talents

from the personal fortune of the newly deceased Tissaphernes.

Tith-

raustes then left for Babylon after placing Ariaios and Pasiphernes in
charge of Lydia and Karia and sent Timokrates to Greece.

In the mean-

time, a revolt had broken out in Kaunas and spread as far as the base
in Rhodes before Konon was able to suppress it (summer 395).67

Rather

than risk the sporadic and half-hearted support of satraps and
chi1iarchs, 68 Konon decided to deal directly with the Great King after

63xen. 2.4.27-28; Plut. Ages. 10.9; Paus. 3.9.6; see also ch. 4.
64niod. 14.79.6.
65p. 9.1-2; Diod. 14.79.8.
66p. 19.2; Isok. 4.142.
67p. 20.1-6; Justin 6.2.11; see also Meyer, Vol. 5, 201-02
and Harnilton,228.
68p. 19.2.
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suppressing the revolt and disbursing the 220 talents to his men.
He, therefore, placed two Athenians in charge of the fleet at Rhodes,
sailed to Kilikia, travelled overland to Syrian Thapsakos and finally
sailed down the Euphrates to Babylon where he pled his case with
Artaxerxes. 69

By the winter of 395/94, Konen had secured Artaxerxes'

personal assurances of monetary support and had chosen Pharnabazos as
his collaborator to force a decisive enr0unter with the now numerically
inferior Spartan fleet under Agesilaos' brother-in-law, Peisandros. 70
For a month or two, no such encounter materialized.

Both

fleets conducted minor operations and made their final preparations.
Agesilaos had ordered that the Peloponnesian fleet be restored to its
original strength of 120 ships, but by early August, the fleet still
stood at only ninety ships.

The Lakedaimonians' base was Knidos,

while Pharnabazos, having learned of Peisandros' presence,was at
Loryma with ninety triremes.

Konen had joined him with a few ships,

while most of the Greek component of the Great King's fleet was moored
at Rhodes. 71

69Diod. 14.81.4-6; Justin 6.2.11-16; Nepos Conon 3.2-4.2. Both
Justin and Nepos preserve the amusing anecdote about Konen's refusal to
perform npocrK6vncrts which caused an exchange of letters through intermediaries in order to conduct business. One of these intermediaries was
Tithraustes who had just returned from Sardis (P. 19.3). Nepos mistakenly
attributes the death of Tissaphernes to Konen's pleading at Pharnabazos'
behest on this occasion; but as Westlake, "Decline and Fall of Tissaphernes," Historia, 30 (1981), 257-79, has shown, Tissaphernes' fate had been
sealed as much as a year before his demise.
70Agesilaos, of course, was conducting extensive forays and
pillage in Pharnabazos' satrapy at this time; see ch. 4.
71Diod. 14.83.4-5. Isokrates (4.142-44) writes that the
Persian fleet was barely able to defeat Peisandros' 100 ships and ~enophon -- --
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Peisandros finally decided to try the issue.

At the beginning

of August he set sail from Knidos with eighty-five ships.

His fleet

rounded the southern coast of the Knidian Chersonese (the western
"finger"), sailed through the straits between Loryma (on the tip of the
southern "finger") and Ialysos on the island of Rhodes and put in near
Physkos. 7 2

Konon then brought up the Greek component of the Persian

fleet from Rhodes to confront the adventurous and over-eager Peisandros.
He was quickly joined by Pharnabazos and the ninety ships from Loryma.
Now

greatly overmatched, Peisandros realized his only hope was to

break through the advancing Persian line of 170 ships.

He gallantly

led the advance on the right (western) wing, against Pharnabazos' ships
but his allies on the left panicked at the sight of Konon' s
fled shoreward.

Greeo:~s

and

Peisandros nonetheless pressed forward and thirty-

five Lakedaimonian ships managed to break through and return to
Knidos.

Fifty ships were either abandoned by their crews or sunk in

the Persian advance and Peisandros died fighting.

Some 500 crewmen

were captu~ed while the rest escaped on shore.73

(Hell. 4.3.11-12) writes that Peisandros' fleet was much smaller than the
Persian flotilla. Meyer, Vol. 5, 202, n.3, has written, hier ist
Klarheit nicht zu gewinnen, but Diodorus' figures are likely to be
reliable.
72Meyer, RE Suppl. 11, 1090-91: The modern name of the site
is Marmaris. See also Honigmann, RE 19.1, 569-70, for an excellent map
of the Rhodian Peraia of which Physkos was a member polis.
73xen. Hell. 4.3.11-12; Diod. 14.83.5-7. Brief notices of the
sea battle appear in Isok. 4.142; Justin 6.3; Nepos Conon 4.1-4;
Didymos 7.45; and Polyainos(1.48.5)who writes that in order to deceive
the Lakedaimonians about his precise place in the Persian line, Konen
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Immediately after their sweeping victory, Konon and Pharnabazos
undertook a diplomatic offensive throughout the Aegean.

Many of the

ioleis visited came over to their side and the Spartans lost nearly
their entire maritime realm.

The only region to reject these overtures

was the Hellespont where Derkylidas' vigorous leadership stiffened
resistance to the Persians at the crucial strait of Sestos and Abydos
despite Konen's blockade and Pharnabazos' pillage. 74

Some of the

poleis which came over to Konon and Pharnabazos were Kos, Nisyros, Teas,
Chios, Karpathos, Knidos, Chios, Mitylene, Erythrai and even Ephesos,
the Spartans' Asian headquarters for six years under Thibron,
Derkylidas and Agesilaos: 75
After securing the entire Aegean basin (with the exception of
the Hellespont) in the autumn of 394, Konon was instructed to carry the

ordered two identical flagships fitted out and another officer to dress
exactly as he had. Beloch, 3.1, 76, n.l,rightly dismisses this anecdote
as abgeschmakte. The reports given by Nepos and Justin are so summary
that Meyer (Vol. 5, 235, n.l and Theopomps Hellenika, 80) considers them
worthless. The versions of Xenophon and Diodorus are not contradictory,
therefore one can reconstruct the battle from them. Burchner,RE 11.1,
918 5 under Knidos mentions the Lion monument unearthed east southeast of
the city which had been erected to those who died in the sea battle.
74 xen. Hell. 4.8.3-6; Cawkwell, "A Note on the Heracles Coinage
Alliance of 394 B.C.," NC,l6 (1956), 69-75,and "TheiTN Coins Again,"
JH~83 (1963), 152-54, argues that a short-lived symmachy sprang up in
the Aegean after Knidos to assure independence from all outside domination, Spartan, Athenian or Persian. See also Hill, Greek Historical
~. 62-66, nos. 32-33,and Hamilton, 230-31.
Cawkwell,moreover, believes that most of the 40 Lakedaimonian ships which survived the
Knidian debacle simply "slipped away quietly," that is, defected to the
victorious Konon or sailed home. At least a few likely returned to the
Peloponnesos.
75xen. Hell. 4.8.3-6 and Diad. 14.84.3-4.
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naval war to Lakonia itself the following spring.

He accordingly set

sail with Pharnabazos for the Kyklades in early 393.

He occupied and

garrisoned Melos, using it as a base to ravage the Peloponnesian coast.
Later he took Kythera for a similar purpose.

There the satrap heartened

the coalition with a generous disbursal of funds.

This was a most

welcome gesture since the land war had settled into a series of raids
and skirmishes which 2ccomplished little apart from destruction of
croplands in the Korinthia.

As noted earlier, the Korinthians were in

fact divided as to the wisdom of continuing the war.

After the battle

of Nemea in July 394, a pro-Spartan faction in the city had locked out
the fleeing coalition troops and offered to negotiate a separate peace
with the Spartans.

At the prospect of repeated damage to their fields,

the martial ardor of even the most committed anti-Spartan Korinthians
must have cooled.

In the summer of 393, Qowever, they put Pharnabazos'

money to good use and outfitted a fleet.

Because the naval component

of the Peloponnesian forces had been sheared off near Knidos,76 the
Korinthians were able to regain control of the Gulf by autumn.

After

visiting the Isthmos, Konen persuaded Pharnabazos to relinquish control
of the fleet in exchange for a promise to fund it from revenues collected
around the Aegean.

He then sailed home to the Peiraeus to be honored

with Euagoras at the end of his twelve-year absence.

He quickly

76 The seriousness of this blow to Spartan strategy is well
attested in ancient literature, e.g. Andok. 3.22; Isok. 4.154, 9.56;
Diad. 14.84-4; Plut. Artax. 21; and Justin 6.4.1. See also Meyer,
Vol. 5, 235-36; Beloch, 3.1, 77-78 and Hamilton, 230-31. The most
obvious consequence of Peisandros' defeat and the disbanding of the
harmosts and garrisons was the loss of the tribute originally instituted by Lysander in 404 (see ch. 2).
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assumed responsibility for the rebuilding of Athens' long walls, using
his share of Pharnabazos' money to enlist his own crewmen, large
numbers of Athenians and even some Boiotians.

The walls were soon com-

pleted and were of uniformly excellent quality.

They had rectangular

towers at regular intervals and eventually came to be known as
"Kononian" because the navarch had supervised most of their reconstruction.77

Thus the year 393 drew to a close.

As uo-ceci above, the

Persians and the coalition seemed on the verge of achieving their purpose.

Their brilliant naval and diplomatic strategies had created a

stalemate on land and stripped the Peloponnesians of their maritime
fiefdom in the Aegean basin.

It is, therefore, not

.,..

surpris~ng

that the

Lakedaimonians in the spring of 392 should turn to diplomacy. 78
Antalkidas, Tiribazos and the Failed Peace of 392
When Agesilaos departed from Delphi in the late summer 394 after
depositing his one-hundred talent tithe, evidence surfaced in
Lakedaimon of an elaborate plot by Lysander to alter the Lykourgan
politeia.

Many of Lysander's followers resented Agesilaos and the

wounded king sought ways either to blunt their influence or reconcile
them.

In the course of an investigation of Lysander's personal effects,

77 xen. Hell. 4.8.6-12; Diodorus 14.84.3-85.3; Plut. Ages. 23.19;
Nepos Conon 4.5; and Isok. 5.64. See also Swoboda, RE 11.2, 1329.
For the statues in his and Euagoras' honor, see Isok-.-9.57 and Paus.
1.3.2.
78

Grote, Vol. 7, 522-24; Beloch, 3.2, 80-81; Meyer, Vol. 5,
245-46; and Hamilton, 232-33.
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a speech written for him by Kleon of Halikarnassos was discovered in
which abolition of the hereditary kingship was urged in favor of an
elective one.79

Agesilaos was angered at this revelation and wanted

to make it public, but the wisdom of the ephor Lakratidas prevailed
and the matter remained a secret. 80

This incident in the autuw~

of 394 is our last notice of Agesilaos until his campaign against the
Argives in the spring of 391. 81
As ncted above, the land war had bogged down in the Korinthia
where the Peloponnesians controlled Sikyon and the coalition had
occupied Lechaion.

In the winter of 393/92, the Spartan navarch

Podanemos had secured the southern shore of the Korinthian Gulf by
bottling up in Lechaion the Korinthian ships financed by Pharnabazos.

79Plut. Lys. 30.3-5, Ages. 20.2, Mor. 212c.
80Lakratidas supposedly advised Agesilaos that it would be
better to bury the speech than exhume Lysander. Several scholars
have recently taken this incident as evidence for a tripartite
political alignment in Sparta during these years. In addition to
Lysander's ~TatpE(a , they argue the existence of a faction loyal
to Agis' aims (and eventually to those of Agesilaos) and to Agesipolis,
the youthful son of the exiled Pausanias. See Rice, Why Sparta
Failed, Diss. Yale 1971; Hamilton, 241-43; Cawkwell, "Agesilaos and
Sparta," £Q.,26 (1976), 62-84; Seager, "The King's Peace and the Balance
of Power in Greece, 386-362 B.C.," Athenaeum,52 (1974), 36-63; and
ch. 2.
81Because of Knidos and Koroneia, some scholars have seen the
two-and-a-half year hiatus as evidence that Agesilaos was out of favor.
See Smith, "The Opposition to Agesilaos' Foreign Policy, 394-371 B.C."
Historia,2 (1954), 274, 278 and Hamilton, 243-44.
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The Peloponnesians, however, still controlled Phokis and Orchomenos
in western Boiotia.

Also, neither the Peloponnesians nor the coali-

tion had been able to achieve any real gains after Agesilaos' failure
at

Koroneia to detach Boiotia and isolate the Athenians, Argives and

wavering Korinthians near the Isthmos.82

In the spring of 392

the

war party in Korinth committed an atrocity at the festival of Artemis
Eukleia in

wh~-~h

120 pro-Spartan oligarchs were murdered and some 500

driven into exile.

The purpose of this coup was to eliminate the

growing opposition of some groups to continuing the war.

The Athenians,

Boiotians, Argives and democratic Korinthians feared that Lakonizing
aristocrats, whose lands were suffering the ravages of war, would make
peace with Sparta. 83

Some of the exiles who had fled to the Akrokorinth

were persuaded to return under amnesty, but the democratic faction was
already taking steps to create a sympolity with Argos. 84

Two young

leaders of the exiled group, Pasimelos and Alkimenes, soon grew disenchanted with the excesses of the democratic faction, some of whose
Argive allies had entered the city and were removing boundary stones.

82xen. Hell. 4.4.1-13; Diod. 14.86; and Aristeides 2.370.
also Meyer, Vol. 5, 242-43,with notes.
83xen. Hell. 4.4.1-6; Diod. 14.86.1.
only the more youthful had been able to flee.

See

Most of the older men died;

84rbid. Also, Grote, Vol. 7, 495-98; Beloch, 3.1, 79-80; Meyer,
Vol. 5, 243. Kagan, "Corinthian Politics and the Revolution of 392
B.C.," Historia,ll (1962), 447-57, believes that three factions were
vying for power, the democrats who favored war, oligarchs who favored
war and the landed aristocrats who wanted peace and a restoration of
their ancient prerogatives. The oligarchs prior to the coup controlled
the state in this view.
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These occupiers began referring to Korinth as "Argos" which Pasimelos,
Alkimenes and their supporters found particularly galling. 85

From

this group of young oligarchs and aristocrats would come the attempt
later that summer to hand over the city to Praxitas, the Spartan
harmost at Sikyon.
Although the allies gained a slight advantage by the opening
months of 392, clearly some Spartans felt a need to
as a solution to the alliance's quandary.

expl~4e

Jiplomacy

Because they had lost the

Aegean revenue with their naval debacle in 394 and were faced with
depletion of the 900 talents brought from Asia by Agesilaos, the ephors
sent Antalkidas to Sardis to treat with Tiribazos,the new satrap of
Lydia and Karia. 86
The original purpose of the mission was to conduct

b~lateral

discussions with the satrap and convince the Persians to withdraw
financial support from the coalition.

The Lakedaimonians were no longer

a factor in the Aegean, Antalkidas asserted, and were even willing to
relinquish their insistence on independence for the Greeks of Asia.

He

held that Athens' revived naval strength was the greatest threat to
Persian interests.

When the coalition received word of Antalkidas'

85 xen. Hell. 4.4.4-6 and Diod. 14.86.3, 92.1-2. Argives and
Korinthians were~share common citizenship, coinage and other
appurtenances of a single state. Hamilton, 268-70, believes that this
union was effected in two stages, the second in 389. Thus Xenophon's
description of it as complete in 392 is anticipatory.
86 Tiribazos, formerly the satrap of Armenia, replaced the
rebellious Ariaios after the latter had taken over for the executed
Tissaphernes. See Beloch 3.1, 81, n.l; Meyer, Vol. 5, 245-46; and
Schaefer, RE 6A.2, 1435.
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initiative, the Athenians invited the Argives, Boiotians and
Korinthians to join them in a visit to Sardis, since the interests of
all were clearly at stake.

Upon the arrival of the coalition's lega-

tion Antalkidas, who had won over Tiribazos to his side, cunningly
proposed that all islands and cities (except those in Asia, of course)
be autonomous.

This clause was intended to strike at the Argives who

had begun the annexation of Korinth, the Athenians who feared for
Skyros, Lemnos and Imbros on the route to their Euxine grain sources,
and the Boiotians at the head of whose league stood the Thebans.

The

dissolution of all three of these entities into their component poleis
would leave Sparta supeme in Greece.

Needless to say, the terms pro-

posed by Antalkidas were completely unacceptable to the coalition so
the conference broke up, achieving neither a

\

~

,

Kotvn Etpnvn nor a

bilateral alliance of Sparta and Persia.87
By the summer of 392, Antalkidas' failure and the arrival of
Strouthas in Sardis made it clear that further military and naval
exertions were necessary if Sparta were to achieve her purposes.
Accordingly the Spartans took Tiribazos' money and outfitted a small
fleet to secure the Korinthian Gulf against the ships in Lechaion which
Pharnabazos and Konen had paid for in the previous year.

87 Xen. Hell. 4.8.12-17. Tiribazos could not conclude a peace
without Artaxerxes' approval, so he secretly gave Antalkidas money to
raise a fleet and arrested Konen as an enemy of the Great King. When
Tiribazos travelled to the court, however, Artaxerxes,still bitterly
resenting the pillage of his lands by Thibron, Derkylidas and
especially Agesilaos, replaced him with Strouthas who then released
Konon and overtly favored Athens. Although Konen sailed for Kypros a
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Since Koroneia the Peloponnesians had no means of communication
by land with their allies in Phokis and Orchomenos.

When Pasimelos

and Alkimenes, leaders of the clandestine opposition in Korinth, secretly
offered to admit Praxitas, harmost of Sikyon, into the Korinthian port
of Lechaion, a splendid opportunity arose to strengthen the alliance's
hand.

Under cover of darkness, Praxitas led a detachment of troops to

the walls of the port where Pasimelos and Alkimenes opened the gates
for them.

In the ensuing struggle, the Peloponnesians were unable to

take Korinth itself, but they occupied and demolished a segment of the
long walls.

In the succeeding days, Praxitas' forces captured Sidous,

Krommyon and Epieikeia in the Megarid before he disbanded his army and
withdrew to Lakedaimon.88
To secure their access to central Greece across the straits at
Rhion, the Spartan navarch Podanemos (393/92) undertook an offensive to
counter the Korinthians' shipbuilding enterprise which Pharnabazos had
funded.

Because of the satrap's generosity, the Korinthians in their

new ships controlled the entire gulf between Rhion and Lechaion by the
spring of 392. 89

free man, he fell ill there and died by the spring of 391. See
Swoboda, RE 11.2, 1332-33. Ryder, Kaine Eirene, 30-31, believes that
Plato's Me;ex. (245a-b) and Didymos (7.20) show the Athenian reluctance
to cede Greek Asia to Artaxerxes also caused the effort at Sardis to
fail.
88 Xen. Hell. 4.4.6-13.
89xen. Hell. 4.8.10.
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Podanemos' Lakedaimonians now challenged the Korinthians under
their navarch Agathinos for superiority in the Gulf.

In a minor engage-

ment, Podanernos lost his life and his second officer Pollis had to withdraw because of wounds.

Herippidas succeeded Podanemos as navarch for

the rest of the summer and compelled the Korinthians now under Proainos
to abandon Rhion.

90

In Athens the spectre of a Lakedaimonian occupation of Attika
had arisen once again with Praxitas' capture of Lechaion and his breach
of the Korinthian long walls.

In central Greece, the Boiotians were

still faced with hostile forces in Phokis and Orchomenos, and the
Korinthians' temporary naval advantage had evaporated with Herippidas'
successful action near Rhion.

Only the Argives, who had begun the

annexation of Korinth, had reason left to continue the struggle.

With

these things in mind, the Athenians made an overture to Sparta in late
summer or early autumn for a peace.

The Spartans were amenable,despite

their enhanced position, because they still faced the opposition of
Artaxerxes and Strouthas.

Although Andokides pled well before the

Athenian assembly the people rejected the proposa1. 91

90 xen. Hell. 4.8.11. These events at Lechaion and on the Gulf
near Rhion occurred after Antalkidas' failed mission to Sardis.
Although minor, the two victories clearly enhanced the Peloponnesians'
position. The coalition's only gain was the rebuke to the pro-Spartan
Tiribazos whom Artexerxes had replaced with the pro-Athenian Strouthas.
91 our only sources for this second attempt in Sparta are
Andokides' speech, On the Peace with the Spartans (3.17-18 clearly alludes
to the summer of 392), its hypothesis and Plut. Moralia 835a. Xenophon
Qiell.4.8.12-15),Didymos(7.17-20),and Plato (Menexenos 245b)mention only
the Sardis conference.

138
Because the Korinthians were badly divided by factional strife 92
and the Argives would resist any effort to dissolve the nascent sympolity, there could be enthusiasm for a general peace only among the
dissidents who supported Pasimelos and Alkimenes.

Although the

Boiotians, who regarded Orchomenos as a rival and a threat, were willing
to come to terms, as were the Spartans, the opportunity for a general
peace passed with the rejection of Andokides' proposals by the Athenian
demos.

The reasons for their rejection in spite of Andokides' vigorous

advocacy are two.

First, the proposed settlement would offer the

Athenians nothing they did not already have.

Unlike what the Great

King proposed in Sardis, the Spartans would leave the Euxine grain route
secure (and the integrity of the Boiotian league except for Orchomenos),
while insisting only that the coalition be dissolved and that the
Argives withdraw from Korinth.

Radical democrats, however, and others

who resented Sparta's ascendancy, thwarted Andokides' purpose in order to
complete the task begun by Konon and even recover some part of their
former maritime realm.

A strong anti-Spartan coalition funded by

Strouthas was a more attractive prospect than a sterile peace. 93
Although Agesilaos is nowhere attested in our sources from the
autumn of 394 to the spring of 391, one might well ask whether his
influence is discernible in this singular year.94

The conclusion that

92 see Kagan, 447-51, who places this intense infighting in high
relief.
9 3see Beloch, 3.1, 82-83; Meyer, Vol •. 5, 248-49; Ryder, 32-33;
and Hamilton, 258-59.
94Because of the muddled chronology of Xenophon and Diodorus
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he did have a hand in the events of 392 seems inevitable.

That his

collaborator Herippidas 95 finished the navarchy of the deceased
Podanemos and reasserted Peloponnesian control of the straits of
Rhion is the first significant item.
Telutias 96 became navarch for 392/91.

Second, his younger half-brother
In the matter of the first peace

conference in Sardis, it is abundantly clear that Agesilaos and
Antalkidas were

conteu~iuus

rivals and that the king, as much as the

Athenians, found the notion of ceding Greek Asia to Artaxerxes
repugnant and unconscionable. 97

In this case Agesilaos emerges as

the idealist, while Antalkidas is much more the practical man of
affairs.

As for the conference at Sparta in

th~

autumn, it matters

little whether the proposed settlement was the same as that in Sardis 9 8

(and the former's peculiar arrangement of events on land and sea after
Koroneia), a slim possibility exists that the Sardis conference occurred
after the initiative in Sparta. In that case the Isthmian games
mentioned by Xenophon (Hell. 4.5.1) would be those of 392 (see Grote,
Vol. 7, 523-25, who believes that the only peace conference of 392 was
the one in Sardis), and Andokides' speech would have occurred in the
autumn of 393. This reconstruction,which forces considerable
compression of events,seems much less feasible than the more flexible
chronology which takes Xenophon's reference to the Isthmian games as
those of 390. See Ryder, 167-69,and Martin, "Sur une interpretation
nouvelle de la Paix du Roi," Mus. He1v., 6 (1949), 127-39.
95Herippidas had replaced Lysander as chief advisor to
Agesilaos in 395 and campaigned with him extensively: see chs. 3 and 4.
96see Xen. Hell. 4.4.19 and Meyer, Vol. 5, 245, 251.
97rsokrates, Epistle 9.8-12; Plut. Ages. 23.2, Moralia 213b.
98wilcken, "Zur Entstehung und Zweck des K'Onigsfriedens,"
Abhandlung der Preussischen Akademie, Phil.-hist Klasse, no. 15,
1941, 4-11, suggests that ceding the Asian Greeks to Artaxerxes was a
common feature in both proposals despite Andokides' suppression of it.
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or different in some important respects. 99

Agesilaos would not have

found acceptable the lenient and congenial terms offered to the Thebans, 100
even if the Great King's interests were not an issue.

After Knidos and

Koroneia, his influence perhaps waned, 101 but by the spring of 39l,in
the wake of two failed efforts to secure a peace, it is evident that
Agesilaos and his friends surged once again to the fore and, in fact,
dominated Spartan policy for the rest of the war and

Wilcken also believes that the conference in Sparta preceded the one in
Sardis. Both suggestions have been ably refuted by Martin, 128-31;
Ryder, 32; Smith, 278; and Hamilton, 254-55.
99 Andokides 3.15-18:

see also Hamilton, 254, and Ryder, 32-33.

100As is clear from his treatment of the Theban embassy sent to
inquire about a settlement in 390 and after the ratification of the
King's Peace in 386 (Xen. Hell. 4.5.6, 9-10) antipathy to Thebes wa.s
still a major component of his foreign policy.
lOlsmith, 278, n.l,and Hamilton, 239.
102 see Smith, 278,and Hamilton, 239, who believe that the
failure to reach a negotiated settlement made Agesilaos' domination
inevitable. Since a military solution was once again sought, it was
only natural that Sparta should turn to her most successful soldier
to achieve it.

CHAPTER VI
THE SECOND PHASE OF THE KORI~THI&~ WAR TO THE
PEACE OF ANTALKIDAS (KING f s PEACE) After Strouthas replaced Tiribazos in Sardis ( F392 ), the
angered Spartans recalled Thibron from exile and with Tiribazos' money
. to As1a
. M"1nor. l
sent h 1m

Except for Derkylidas in Abydos (who merely

clung to a small Hellespontine area in order to resist Pharnabazos
and Konon in 393/92), this was the first offensive against the Persians
since Agesilaos had pillaged Pharnabazos' Mysian estates in the winter
of 395/94. 2
Over the fall and winter of 392/91 Thibron won back Ephesos to
the Peloponnesians and made it his headquarters.

By springtime he had

brought over Magnesia,Priene and other small poleis in the Maiandros
valley with an army of 8,000 men.

Strouthas, however, had gathered a

huge force of over 35,000 and had pitched his camp near that of the
Greeks.

With his best infantry and horsemen near the Koressos ridge, 3

he suddenly attacked the careless and disdainful Thibron whose men had
scattered for pillage.

Thibron, his athletic flute player, 4 and most

lxen. Hell. 4.8.17-19; Diodorus (14.99.1-3 ) supplies the
numbers.
2 see ch. 5.

3Burchner, RE 11.2, 1392 and 5.2, 2781 with map.
tion of this hill is unknown.

The exact loca-

4xenophon(Hell. 4.8.18)writes that Thibron and Thersandros, his
flute player, were having a discus-throwing contest when the Persian
141
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of the Greek army perished in the sudden Persian assault.

Some Greeks

were taken prisoner, but only a few escaped to safety on the Knidian
Chersonese.
The defeat and death of Thibron seriously weakened the
Lakedaimonian war effort in Asia Minor. 5

That same spring (391), how-

ever, Agesilaos persuaded the ephors to launch an attack on the Argives
who, in addition to their partial annexation of Korinth,
much in the war at little or no expense.

h~d

gained

Since the coalition still

controlled access to central Greece through the Isthmos (the
Peloponnesians had secured the straits of Rhion under Podanemos and
Herippidas in the fall of 392), Agesilaos' campaign in the Argolid and
Korinthia made excellent strategic sense.

He spent most of the spring

and summer laying extensive waste to Argive croplands, though he did
not attempt to besiege Argos itself.

When he discovered that the

Korinthians and Athenians had rebuilt the segment of the wall that

cavalry overwhelmed them. See Meyer, Vol. 5, 253, Theopomps Hellenika
111-112; Beloch 3.1, 87, and Ehrenberg, RE 6A.l, 274-75. Polyainos (6.10.1)
describes how Thibron's athletic flute-player was recruited.
5

The Spartans did not attempt to recover their losses until
the spring of 390, when a delegation of Rhodian exiles arrived in Sparta
to ask for help in staging an uprising in their homeland. Ekdikos, the
navarch for 391/90,set sail with eight ships and put Kiphridas ashore
in Ephesos. Diphridas tried to regain what Thibron had lost in the
Maiandros valley and by a stroke of good fortune near Sardis, he captured
Strouthas' daughter and her husband whose ransom provided him with
enough money to pay his mercenaries for many months. Ekdikos sailed
from Ephesos to Samos and finally to Knidos where he was able to gather
up the survivors of Thibron's debacle.
The Rhodian democrats, despite
the oligarchs' toehold on the island, were still in control and had
twice as many ships as Ekdikos who chose to remain at Knidos. When his
navarchy ended in late summer, Teleutias, no doubt in part because of
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Praxitas had demolished the previous summer, 6 he marched from the
Argolid through Tena to Lechaion and recaptured this stretch of the
walls.

At the same time his half-brother, the navarch Teleutias,

with twelve ships attacked Lechaion by sea and set fire to the
Korinthian shipyards. 7

With the approach of winter, Agesilaos dis-

banded the Peloponnesian levy and returned to Sparta. 8
In the spring of 390 Agesilaos again led out the Peloponnesian
army.

This season, however, the objective was not the Argolid, but

the Perachora peninsula.

The reason for this choice is three-fold.

First, Korinthian exiles had informed the ephors that the city kept
its livestock near the town of Perachora in the western region of the
peninsula.

Second, and more importantly, a successful campaign would

virtually assure the Spartans an overland access to their Phokian and
Orchomenian allies.

It would no longer be necessary to rely solely

Agesilaos, was named navarch for 390/89. He took the twelve ships at
Lechaion, circumnavigated the Peloponnesos, added seven more at Sames
and sailed to Knidos to relieve Ekdikos. In early spring 389, he
captured ten Athenian triremes sailing to aid Euagoras who, after
Konen's death in 391, had revolted again from Artaxerxes. Xenophon
(Hell. 4.8.20-24) notes the irony of both the Athenians' and Teleutias'
iniatives. See also Diod. 14.97.1-4.

6 See ch. 5.
7 This, of course, occurred before the ephors sent
replace Ekdikos at Knidos. Xenophon (Hell. 3.4.19) writes
mother of the navarch and the king~rejoiced that both her
glory on the same day, one by taking the foes' walls, the
ships.

Teleutias to
that Eupolia,
sons achieved
other his

8xen. Hell. 3.4.19, Ages. 2.17; Diad. 14.97.5; Plut. Ages.
21.1-2. For the events of 391, see also Meyer, Vol. 5, 250, 253 and
Beloch, 3.1, 85, 87-88, both with notes.
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on the precarious and circuitous approach across the Gulf of Korinth.
Finally, Agesilaos would be in a position to drive a wedge between
Argos and Korinth, thereby forestalling the momentum of the sympolity
begun by the atrocity of 392. 9

Since in Asia-Diphridas had achieved

merely modest success near Ephesos and Teleutias had secured only
Knidos for the Spartans, a decisive coup in Europe would greatly
strengthen the Peloponnesians' slight strategic advantage after the
collapse of the peace initiatives in 392.
While en route to Perachora, Agesilaos discovered that the
Argives and Korinthians were preparing to celebrate the Isthmian games.
The Argives in fact had taken charge, but fled to Korinth along the
roaci from Kenchreiai 10 as soon as they saw the Peloponnesian column
approaching.

Rather than pursue the fleeing enemy, Agesilaos decided

to remain and offer to Poseidon the unfinished sacrifices that the
Argives had abandoned.
celebrate the games.

He then directed the Korinthian exiles to
Later in the year when the Peloponnesians had

withdrawn, the Argives celebrated the games again and many of the
competitors were proclaimed victors twice. 11

9 see ch. 5 for a description of the massacre at the feast of
Artemis Eukleia.
lOKenchreiai was the Korinthian port on the Saronic Gulf; see
Philippson, RE Vol. 11.2, 167-70.
llxen. Hell. 4.5.1-2.
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When Agesilaos arrived at Perachora, he discovered that the
town was heavily fortified and its defenders commanded by Iphikrates
of Rhamnous. 12

In a classic feint, Agesilaos withdrew his troops as

if to attack Korinth itself.

The citizens in fear of betrayal from

within sent an urgent request for help to the garrison at Perachora. 13
Iphikrates accordingly led his peltasts out to defend Korinth and
passed the Peloponnesians in the night.

Aeesilaos now had unopposed

access to Perachora and the livestock nearby.

He ordered the main body

of the army to proceed along the coastal road by the "Hot Springs,"l 4
but he assigned one mora 15 to advance along the heights of Mt.
Geranion16 to his right.

12For a brief discussiop of Iphikrates' importance in the
history of tactics, see below.
13The memory of Pasimelos and Alkimenes' cooperation with
Praxitas in 392 would still have been quite fresh. See ch. 5.
Perachora was also known as Peraion in antiquity; see Meyer, RE
19.2, 564-66 and The Blue Guide to Greece, 252.
l4Ancient Therma (modern Loutraki); the hot springs gush
forth at 31°C; see Meyer, RE 5A.2, 2376 and The Blue Guide to Greece,
252.
15The ~ which consisted of 600-900 men was the basic unit
of the Spartan army. See Lammert, RE Vol. 16.1, 251-52. The most
important ancient references are Thuc. 5.68.3; Xen. Hell. 2.4.31;
Lak. Pol. 11.4; Diod. 15.32; and Plut. Pelop. 17.
16see Philippson, RE 8.1, 1236-37. The highest point is 1370
meters, while the average elevation along the ridge is 800-1000 m.
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When night fell, a chill set in, accompanied by rain and high
winds.

The mora on the Geranion ridge had no means to kindle camp-

fires, so Agesilaos ordered ten men to carry fire in earthen pots to
the soldiers on the heights with instructions to light as many fires
as possible.

When the now depleted defenders in Perachora saw great

numbers of campfires on the ridge and in the plain, they assumed that a
huge army would soon invest their town and fled in the night to the
temple of Hera on the westernmost tip of the peninsula. 17

Once again

Agesilaos' understanding of human nature and tactical brilliance were
quite in evidence.
By deceiving the Korinthians into summoning Iphikrates and the
Perachorans into fleeing their town by night, Agesilaos was able to
occupy the nearby fortress of Oinoe 18 without shedding a single drop
of blood.

wnen his soldiers had liberally partaken of the captured

stores, the army marched out to the Heraion where the Perachorans with
their wives, children and livestock had taken refuge.

Realizing the

futility of resistance, they surrendered to Agesilaos and placed their
fate in his hands.

He decided to turn over to the Korinthian exiles

those who had participated in the massacre two years earlier during the
Eukleia festival.

All others were to be sold into slavery along with

17 xenophon (~.4.5.3-5) records that a fire broke out that
night in the nearby temple of Poseidon. For this shrine and the two
dedicated to Hera on the Perachora peninsula, see Meyer, RE 19.2, 565.
18This Oinoe should not be confused with the Athenian fortress
on the Boiotian frontier some 55 km. to the northeast. See Meyer, RE
17.2, 2236-37,under Oinoe (7).

147
their animals and possessions.

19

The envoys of several poleis chanced to be present while the
Peloponnesians were disposing of the captives' persons and
possessions.

Among this group were the Boiotians,who were anxious

to treat for peace, since their land now lay exposed to a Spartan
invasion.

Agesilaos, however, refused even to acknowledge their

presence despite an introduction by Pharax, the former navarch and
Theban proxenos at Sparta.

The king contented himself by sitting on

a circular block and gazing exultingly at the great welter of prisoners
and booty.

In addition to his personal grudge against the Thebans,

Agesilaos realized that a mere cessation of hostilities between the
Boiotians and Peloponnesians would not be sufficient.

Harsh chastise-

ment, most probably including dissolution of the Boiotian league, would
be

req~ired

for a peace based on Spartan supremacy in central Greece.

Unfortunately, Agesilaos' complacency in the afterglow of the
bloodless military victory and diplomatic snub to the Thebans did not
last very long.

A messenger from Lechaion arrived with news of the

near annihilation of
northern port. 20

th~

mora assigned to garrison the Korinthians'

The king hastened past Loutraki (Therma) with his

19 Xen. Hell. 4.5.5-6. Agesilaos by freeing Iphrikrates'
men from garrison duty had unwittingly made possible the destruction of
the mora; see below. This was the only unfortunate consequence of
his

ruse.

20

After Agesilaos had outwitted the Korinthians into summoning
Iphikrates from Perachora, the Athenian peltast commander lost little
time in plotting a contre-temps in revenge. Part of the mora in
Lechaion consisted of Amyklaians who customarily returned home for the
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tent companions and a small bodyguard.

Upon arriving in Lechaion, he

learned that the bodies of the fallen had been recovered, so he ordered
his men to ground arms and rest.

The next day they marched back to

the Perachora Heraion where Agesilaos commanded that the remaining
prisoners and property be sold. 21
Agesilaos than summoned the Boiotian legates and asked them
why they had come.

They now mace

~o

mention of peace, but requested

safe conduct to Korinth to join their own troops.

The king laughed,

saying they did not want to see their soldiers, but rather the results
of their allies' good fortune. 22

He offered to escort them personally

Hyakinthia festival even if they were on campaign. The polemarch thus
offered to escort these men to an area about 5 km. south of Sikyon.
When the company reached that point, the polemarch, after sending the
Amyklaians ahead with a small cavalry detachment, began the march back
to Lechaion. Iphikrates, however, had laid an ambush in which his
specially trained peltasts,supported by Kallias' Athenian hoplites, would
attack the unsuspecting 600 Spartans. By a series of brilliant thrusts
and retreats, Iphikrates' peltasts slowly wore down the Spartans' numbers
and will. Even the appearance of the horsemen who had escorted the
Amyklaians was not enough to retrieve the situation. The Spartan
cavalry escaped to Lechaion while the crippled mora occupied a small hill
about 370 m. from the sea and 3 km. from Lechai~ The Peloponnesians
eventually sent boats to rescue their beleaguered comrades, but Kallias'
hoplites killed many of them on the beach and even in the surf as they
struggled frantically to reach the boats; Xen. Hell. 4.5.11-18; Plut.
Ages 22.2; Paus. 3.10.l;and Nepos, Iphicrates 2~
21
22

Xen. Hell. 4.5.7-9; Plut. Ages. 22.1-2.

Beloch, 3.1, 86; and Grote,Vol. 7, 515,write that this was the
most portentious and humiliating defeat inflicted on Spartan hoplites
since Sphakteria in 425 B.C. in that it seriously undermined the Spartan
reputation for invincibility. Grote, ibid., Hamilton, 284-86 (who perceives a rare dramatic power in Xenophon's description of this defeat
and its affect on Agesilaos) and Anderson, Military Theory and Practise,
121-31, also suspect that the figure of 250 dead is low and that Kallias'
hoplites played a larger role than Xenophon admits in enhancing the
proportions of the mora's defeat.
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to see what might follow upon the Athenians' victory.

When he reached

the area near Korinth, he did not dismantle Iphikrates' trophy, but cut
down all remaining fruit trees which, he remarked to the Thebans, produced no sign of resistance from the defenders in the city.

He then

marched back to Lechaion and sent the Theban legates to the Thespian port
of Kreusis. 23

In the wake of the Athenians' victory, Agesilaos departed

with the defeated

~

after assigning a fresh one to Lechaion,

On

~he

homeward march, he led his troops into cities late in the day while
setting out very early in the morning.

He left Arkadian Orchomenos

'before dawn in order to pass by Mantineia in the darkness, because the
Mantineians were accustomed to rejoice at Spartan misfortunes. 24
With the dispersal of the main Peloponnesian army, Iphikrates
was able to recapture the towns in the Megarid which had fallen to
Praxitas two years earlier.

The Spartans' control of the Isthmos and

access by land to Phokis and Boiotian Orchomenos were once again curtailed.

This limited them to conducting harassment of the coalition

by sea from Lechaion.25

23 xen. Hell. 4.5.9-11. Iphikrates' improvement in peltast warfare had far-reaching implications. By 390 B.C. the well-trained and
innovatively equipped peltast had become a formidable component of
strategy. The ancient evidence for Iphikrates' reforms appears in
Diodorus 15.44.2-3; Nepos Iphicrates 1; Polyainos 3.9.17; and Plut.
Mor. 187a.
24 .
Xen. Hell. 4.5.18-19. Xenophon notes that all Spartans
mourned the death of those fallen in battle except the families of the
deceased. These would paradoxically rejoice in the misfortune since
their husbands, sons, and brothers had achieved glory by making the
supreme sacrifice for the state (Hell. 4.5.10).
25xen. Hell. 4.5.19.

Xenophon wrote that after 392

the land
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Agesilaos' Campaign in Akarnania, 389-88 B.C.
In the spring of 389 an Achaian legation arrived in Sparta
to request aid against the Aitolians who with their Athenian and
Boiotian allies were attempting to detach Kalydon, a town on the
northern shore of the Patraic gulf.

Kalydon had originally been

Aitolian but since 417 it had been incorporated into the Achaean
league. 26

In order to hold the town in the last few years, the

Achaians had been compelled to garrison it.

The Aitolians' latest

harassment provoked the Achaians to seek help from Sparta.

The

Achaians, whose function in the Peloponnesian alliance was crucial to
Sparta, 27 made it clear that they would secede unless the requested
aid were provided.

Therefore

Agesilaos and his supporters easily

persuaded the ephors to call out the ban and the king, after assuming
command , 1 e d th e army to Rhl.·on.

28

Be f ore crossJ.ng
·
th e s t raJ."t s, th e

army, which consisted of two Lakedaimonian morai and two from allied

war bogged down and that most subsequent military actions were conducted
by mercenaries (Hell. 4.4.14). Except for Agesilaos' expeditions to
Akarnania to secure the Spartans access to Central Greece through Rhion
and Agesipolis' campaign in the Argolid, the most important struggles of
the war (from 389-87) occurred not around Korinth, but in the Aegean and
near the Hellespont, the Spartans' last toehold in Asia; see Grote, Vol.
7, 517; Meyer, Vol. 5, 252-53; and Hamilton, 287.
26Thuc. 5.82.1-2. See Larsen, "The Early Achaean League,"
Studies Presented to David~· Robinson, Vol. 2, 804.
27As Larsen, 807-08, has shown, since 417 the Achaians were responsible for controlling the straits of Rhion which separated the
Patraic and Korinthian Gulfs and guaranteed access to central and
northern Greece for the Peloponesians when often, as in the Korinthian
War, the Isthmos was in hostile hands.
28Xen. Hell. 4.6.1-3.
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£oleis, was joined by the full levy of Achaians.

When the

Peloponnesian force arrived in the vicinity of Kalydon, the
Akarnanians withdrew to the safety of their walled towns and sequestered their livestock in the more rugged and inaccessible regions
of their land near the Ambrakiote Gulf.
Agesilaos sent heralds to the Akarnanian capital Stratos to
inform the citizens that

u~l~as

they abandoned their alliance with the

Athenians and Boiotians, the Peloponnesian army would lay waste to
their land section by section.

When the Akarnanian assembly rejected

these terms, Agesilaos began making good on his threat. 29
The Peloponnesians cut and burned the Akarnanian croplands
so thoroughly that the army's advance was only about 2.2 km. daily.
This lulled the Akarnanians into a false sense of security which in
turn induced them to bring most of their animals down from the mountains
while continuing the tillage of land unscathed by the invaders.

Aware

that his ruse had succeeded, Agesilaos suddenly advanced almost 30 km.
in a single day on the fifteenth or sixteenth day from his crossing at
Rhion.

He arrived at the southern shores of Lake Ambrakia at the foot

of a ridge to the east where the Akarnanians had gathered their herds.
The swiftness of the march stunned the defenders, allowing the
Peloponnesians to capture nearly all the horses, cattle and sheep along
with many prisoners.

On the next day Agesilaos held a public sale of

29 Xen. Hell. 4.6.3-4.
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the booty. 30
The Akarnanians did not give up.

They dispatched a force of

peltasts whose harassment from the heights was so effective that the
Peloponnesians were forced with some losses to descend into the plain.
During the night the peltasts departed and Agesilaos began his withdrawal the following day.

As the Peloponnesians marched with the

lake on one side and the spurs of the ridge on the other, t.he peltasts
suddenly re-appeared to press their attack.

Agesilaos realized that

he could advance no farther because of the intensity of the Akarnanians'
assault.

Accordingly, he ordered his hoplites and cavalry, after draw-

ing the enemy out, to counterattack before they could retreat to the
safety of the ridge.

When the Lakedaimonians pressed their attack to the

ridge, they encountered the Akarnanian hoplites in battle formation. 31
The Akarnanian hoplites stood their ground against the
Lakedaimonian cavalry, but gave way to the Spartan hoplites.

After

erecting a trophy on the flanks of the ridge, Agesilaos continued his
withdrawal to the southeast.

As the army approached the Lake Trichonis

region, the king again pillaged and burned extensively.

30

At the

Xen. Hell. 4.6.5-6. See Klaffenbach, RE 7A.l, 89-90, for a
map of the region of Trichonis and the western lake called Lysimacheia.
Hirschfeld, RE 1.1, 1151, discusses the topography of Akarnania.
Oberhummer, RE 13.1, 707, describes the area of the modern Lake Ambrakia
and the ridge-on its eastern shores as the site of Agesilaos' sudden
coup in 389. This region was known as Limnaia in antiquity and lies
some 30 km. northwest of the fertile area of the Acheloos plain between
Lakes Lysimacheia and Trichonis. See also The Blue Guide to Greece,
457-58, where Agesilaos' campaign is misdated to 391.
-31xen. Hell. 4.6.7-11.
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insistence of the Achaians, he attempted to reduce some of the walled
"
32
towns, including Stratos, but met with no success.

At the approach

of autumn, Agesilaos wanted to break off the campaign until the following spring.

The Achaians, believing that he had accomplished nothing

since not a single town had surrendered, wanted him to stay to hinder
the Akarnanians' fall planting.

Agesilaos, however, thought this un-

wise, because the more the Akarnanians planted in the fall, the more
they would have to lose the next summer.33
The army approached Rhion through rugged Aitolian mountains
unmolested because the Aitolians hoped that Agesilaos would help them
regain Naupaktos, as he had aided the Achaians in securing Kalydon.
While the Peloponnesians were crossing over to Rhion, Athenian triremes
(which had sailed down the Acheloos river from Oiniadai) harassed them
from the Patraic side of the straits, but could not prevent their safe
passage. 34
In early spring 388, Agesilaos again gathered the Pelopcnnesian
army to fulfill his pledge to the Achaians.

As he had surmised some

months earlier, the Akarnanians sent legates to Sparta with an offer
to conclude a peace.

They joined the Peloponnesian alliance when they

learned of the preparations for another invasion of their land.

32xen. Hell. 4.6.12.
33xen. Hell. 4.6.13.
34xen. Hell. 4.6.14.

They
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reasoned that even in the safety of their walled towns, they would in
effect be under siege

if Spartans were to destroy their crops.

The

Lakedaimonians accepted their terms and peace was thereby concluded. 35
With the successful conduct of this campaign, it became clear
that Agesilaos had gained the upper hand in Lakedaimonian politics
and was gradually becoming the most powerful and influential figure
in the

st~tc.

His rivalry with Antalkidas and the supporters of

Lysander was not fully resolved, but the outlines of his plan for a
Spartan hagemony in European Greece were now clearly emerging.36
In addition, Agesilaos' Akarnanian campaign guaranteed Spartan
access through Rhion to central Greece, the loyalty of the Achaians and
friendly relations with Arkadia and Aitolia.
Agesipolis in Argos:

The Aegean and Hellespontine
Struggle

Although Agesilaos and his younger brother Teleutias had enjoyed a great deal of success in the summer of 391 at Lechaion, the
shocking blow to Spartan prestige inflicted by Iphikrates in 390 had
emboldened the Argives.

Before Agesilaos and Teleutias solidified their

hold on Lechaion, 37 the king in 391 had ravaged Argive croplands, but

35 Xen. Hell. 4.7.1. A synopsis of this campaign also appears
in Plut. Ages. 22.5 and Polyainos 2.1.10.
36see Meyer, Vol. 5, 288-89 and Hamilton, 287.
37 Praxitas, harmost of Sikyon, in collusion in 392 with the
pro-Spartan Korinthians, Pasimelos and Alkimenes from within Korinth had
provided the first chance for the Spartans to break the coalition's
grip on the Isthmos. See ch. 5.
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his absence in 389 after the Athenians' slaughter of the mora offered
the Argives an opportunity to complete their sympolity with Korinth.
In spite

of the embarrassment caused by the loss of the mora to

Iphikrates and Chabrias, the Spartans had seriously weakened the
coalition's control of the Isthmos by the time of Agesilaos' Akarnanian
venture in 389.

In the absence of Sparta's most formidable leader, the

Argives decided to act.

They launched a f11ll-scale attack on Korinth,

occupied the city and surrounding area except Lechaion, removed the
boundary stones, and simply referred to Korinth as "Argos." 38
Thus in 388,after the Akarnanians joined the Peloponnesian
alliance, the time had come once again to chastise the Argives.
they still held Lechaion, the Spartans'
risk.

Since Agesilaos

ha~

g~ins

Although

in the Isthmos were at

been able to avoid a second invasion of

Akarnania, the ephors instead called out the ban against Argos, placing

38Xen. Hell. 4.4.6; Diod. 14.91.2-9.2.1. As noted in ch. 5,
Xenophon's account of the coup in Korinth of 392 (Hell. 4.4.2-5) seems
to compress the two-stage assimilation of the city by the Argives into
a single season. The actual completion of the sympolity is much
more likely to have occurred in 389 when the Argives could seize on
Sparta's preoccupation in Akarnania to garrison Korinth and forestall
any further attempt at internal disruption by pro-Spartan oligarchs.
It was precisely this fear of betrayal from within which led the
panicky democrats to summon Iphikrates from Perachora in 390 when
Agesilaos' army suddenly turned back from the Geranion ridge toward
the city. Thus Hell. 4.4.6 belongs not to 392, but 389. Similarly
Diodorus' discussion, while preserving the proper sequence of events
(14.86.1 and 14.91-92), is hopelessly muddled chronologically, since
he dates the democratic coup and the Argive invasion to 394 and 393 respectively. For an excellent reconstruction of the very difficult
chronology of these years, see Hamilton, 269-70, who bases his argument
on Griffith, "The Union of Corinth and Argos," Historia 1 (1950), 236-56.
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the young king Agesipolis in command.

39

Because of the Argive occupation

of Korinth, the Spartans reasoned that war against Athens and Boiotia
was dangerous when an unmolested hostile polis lay on their borders.
Because the Argives were in the habit of pleading "holy truces" to
avoid invasion (except for Agesilaos' incursion in 391, this technique
had evidently been effective), Agesipolis consulted with Zeus at
Olympia and Apollo at Delphi before invading the Argolid.
gods responded favorably, the young king went ahead.

Since both

He succeeded in

penetrating as far as the city's walls and plundered extensively before
unfavorable omens and sacrifices at the end of the summer induced him
to withdraw. 40
While Agesilaos, Teleutias and Agesipolis were securing the
Spartans' access to central Greece through Rhion and trying to

reg~in

access at the Isthmos, the warring parties were not idle in the Aegean
and the Hellespont.

Because of Konen's success, Pharnabazos' support

in 394/93 and the failure of Antalkidas and Tiribazos to conclude a
Sparto-Persian peace in 392, many people in Athens began to work

39since his father Pausanias chose exile at Tegea in 395/94
after the fiasco at Haliartos, the Spartans appointed a regent to
serve in his place (see ch. 5). Because this was his first field
command in a war which had lasted for seven years by 388, Agesipolis
must have become king (i.e. reached the age of 30) in his own right
either this year or in 389.
40 Xen. Hell. 4.7.2-7. Meyer, Vol. 5, 26~ and Beloch 3.1, 94,
date this incursion to 387 to coincide with Antalkidas' mission to
Sousa and the Peloponnesian offensive by land and sea in the Hellespont. Niese, RE 1.1, 805, is non-committal,suggesting either 388 or
387. Hertzberg, 118, dates the incursion to 390 since he accepts the
the chronology of Diodorus. Grote, Vol. 7, 519-22,and Hamilton, 288,
assume that Xenophon's narrative is continuous and take 388 after the
Akarnanian settlement as more likely.
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In

spite of Antalkidas' ultimate failure to mollify Artaxerxes, such
nee-imperialism can not have received much encouragement when the proSpartan Tiribazos arrested Konon.

Konon's release by Strouthas eased

concern at Athens, but the navarch's death in Kypros some months
later (391) led to the ascendancy of the moderate Thrasyboulos.
After Ekdikos and Telenti.e.s

~ad

42

secured Knidos in the summer

of 390 to help the pro-Spartan uprising in Rhodes, 43 Teleutias captured
ten Athenian triremes sailing to aid Euagoras' revolt against the king.

44

Despite Teleutias' modest success at Knidos in giving the pro-Spartan
oligarchs a Rhodian toehold and Agesilaos' campaigns in Perachora and
Akarnania, some Athenians believed that the Spartans were too weak to
resist Athenian expansion in the Aegean. 45

This group also feared a

41 some early evidence for this assertion appears in Tod, GHI 2,
28-29; and Bengtson, Staatsvertrage 2, 176-177. By 390 this activity
was indisputable; see Bengtson, 182-84.
42 s ee c1 oche,
Etrangere
d ' Athenes de _Q_
" La Pol1t1que
· ·
"
'
4 4 ~"' 33~a.C.,
20; Perlman, "Athenian Democracy and the Revival of Imperialist Expansion at the Beginning of the Fourth Century B.C." _Q',63 (1968), 262; and
Hamilton, 289-91.
43 see ch. 6, footnote 5. The chronology for these years is
muddled, as Beloc~ 3.1, 87-88,and Meyer, Vol. 5, 254, n.l, have shown,
but a good reconstruction is obtainable by considering the Spartan
navarchs. Thus Podanemos and Herippidas 393/92, Teleutias 392/91,
Ekdikos 391/90, and Teleutias 390/89 all served as chiefs of the Spartan
navy.
44 As Meyer, Vol. 5, 258, has shown, this occurred in early 389.
For Athens' treaty with Euagoras, see Bengtson, Staatsvertage 2, 182.
45

The resounding success of Chabrias and Iphikrates against the
in 390 undoubtedly bolstered Athenian confidence.

Spartan~
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revival of Spartan naval strength and wished to dislodge Derkylidas from
Sestos and Abydos. 46

The two most prominent leaders of this faction

were Ergokles and Thrasyboulos who induced the assembly to authorize
construction of forty ships.

Thrasyboulos intended to help the

Rhodian democrats, but before sailing to Rhodes he needed money, allies
and mercenary support.

He, therefore, composed civil strife between

the Odryssian Amadokos and the Thrad.an Seuthes who then allied !:hc-...selves to Athens. 47

In Byzantion, after overthrowing the oligarchy,

he sold the right to collect the five percent shipping tax to the
popular leaders.

The Chalkedonians, opposite Byzantion in Asia, now

also came over to his side.
Mytilenians against Methymna.

He then sailed to Lesbos where he led the
After the Spartan harmost Therimachos

fell in battle, most of the Lesbian poleis came over to Thrasyboulos.
Those that did not he plundered for money to hire mercenaries. 48
Before making a landing in Rhodes, Thrasyboulos sailed around the coast

46These Hellespontine straits, of course, controlled the
Euxine grain route; see Lysias 22. Derkylidas had been harmost there
since July of 394. See ch. 5.
4 7xen. Hell. 4.8.26; Diod. 14.94.2; see Bengtson,
Staatsvertrage 1. 185-87.
48xen. Hell. 4.8.28-30;also Diodorus (14.94.3-4) writes that
a storm sank twenty-three of Thrasyboulos' ships off Ephesos before he
led the uprising on Lesbos. The speeches of Lysias (nos. 19.22, 27, 28,
and 29) and Aristophanes' Ekklesiazousai 814-18, which date to 391-87
B.C.,make it clear that the Athenian treasury was almost depleted, which
made Thrasyboulos' gathering of booty essential. See also Grote, Vol. 7,
529-30; Beloch, 3.1, 90-92; Meyer, Vol. 5, 259-61; Hamilton, 295.
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of Asia Minor to Aspendos on the estuary of the Eurymedon River
northwest of Kypros.

49

He had been hiring mercenaries while increasing

his fleet strength all along, but because of an ill-advised raid by
his men, the Aspendians fell upon his camp one night and killed him
in his tent (spring 388 B.C.).
place him

50

The Athenians sent Agyrrios tore-

when they learned of his death. 51

Because Derkylidas had been ineffective against Athenian resurgence in the Hellespont, the Spartans replaced him with Anaxibios,

52

who arrived at Abydos with three triremes and money to hire 1,000
mercenaries.

The Athenians that same spring (388) countered by sending

Iphikrates with eight ships and 1,200 men. 53

.

After some indecisive

4 9see Ruge, RE 6.1, 1334; today the Kopru-Su. The Eurymedon
estuary, of course, was the site of Kimon's victory over the Persians
in 466 B.C. The ruins of Aspendos lie near modern Serik.
50xen. Hell. 4.8.30; Diod. 14.99.4-5; Nepos, Thrasyb. 4.4 and
Aristophanes' Ploutos 550, the production of which in the spring of
388 fixes the time of Thrasyboulos' death; see Meyer, Vol. 5, 259,
n.l, and 261.
5lxen. Hell. 4.8.31; ironically the Athenians had ordered
Thrasyboulos and his comrades back to Athens to stand trial. As
Lysias' orations 28 and 29 and Demosth. 19.180 show, Ergokles,
Nikophemos and Aristophanes were condemned to death and Pamphilos, who
had failed on Aigina (see below),was fined. The basic reason for these
things was that Thrasyboulos and his demagogues were seriously undermining Athenian relations with Persia and draining the treasury.
52Anaxibios had much experience in the Hellespont as navarch
in 400 B.C.; Xen. Anab. 6.1.16, 7.1.3, 11, 20,36, 7.2.5, 8. See also
Judeich, RE 1.2, 2082.
53rphikrates had left Korinth the previous summer (389) after
the Argive incursion. Xenophon (Hell. 4.8.34) writes that he went home
to Athens because the Argives said they did not need him any more after
he killed some Korinthian Argolizers. Diodorus (14.92.1-2) states that
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skirmishes, Anaxibios gre•v careless and was killed in an ambush near
Kremaste

while returning from Antandros.

Iphikrates' peltasts had

killed 12 Spartan officers and over 250 other Peloponnesians and
Abydenes.

I

With Derkylidas' departure and Anaxibios death, the

Athenians were firmly in control of the grain route and the tide in
the Hellespont seemed to be turning against the Spartans (summer 388).

54

The Struggle on Aigina
Spartan fortunes, however, were not entirely black, as during
the previous summer they had undertaken a campaign of piracy against
the Athenians from Aigina.

The Athenian response

~vas

to send

Pamphilos,who blockaded the island with ten ships and landed a hoplite
force.

After completing his collection of tribute in the islands,

Teleutias hastened. to the Aiginetans'aid.

He drove off the Athenian

ships, but Pamphilos had built a fortress and continued his depredations by land.

At the end of the summer, Hierax replaced Teleutias.

who sailed home.55

the Athenians recalled him because he wished to seize power in Korinth
for himself. Hamilton, 296-97, believes Diodorus' explanation is more
likely since the Athenians would not wish to antagonize their Argive
allies, while conducting operations in the Aegean and Hellespont.

54 Xen. Hell. 4.8.35-39. See also Grote, Vol. 7, 535; Beloch,
3.1, 92; Meyer, Vol. 5, 265-66; and Hamilton, 294 all of whom observe
that while the Athenians were in full control of Hellespontine shipping,
the Spartans were confined to Sestos and Abydos.
55xenophon (Hell.~ 5.1.1-4) writes that, although Teleutias faced no
great danger or loss during his second tenure as navarch and effected
no clever ruse, he had been immensely popular with his men. This
according to Xenophon is the true test of a commander's worth.
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Hierax placed his adjutant (

>

/

ETitOTOAEUS ) Gorgopas in command

of twelve ships at Aigina, while he sailed to Rhodes.

Gorgopas

quickly reduced Pamphilos to a state of siege which moved the
Athenians to outfit a fleet for the rescue of their beleaguered hoplites.

After only four months, the Spartans under Gorgopas were free

again to continue their piracy against Athenian shipping in the Saronic
Gulf (autumn 389).

56

In the spring of 388, the Athenians outfitted thirteen ships
under Eunomos to resist the Spartans' piracy.

That this measure was

necessary 57 despite severe depletion of the city's finances is
abundantly clear from the testimony in Lysias' prosecution of the grain
dealers. 58

In the fall of 388, Antalkidas replaced Hierax as navarch.

He put into Rhodes with the entire fleet, but sent Gorgopas (Hierax's
adjutant) back to Aigina with his original twelve ships.59 .The new
navarch then appointed his own adjutant Nikolochos commander of the

5 6xen. Hell. 5.1. 1-5.

Eteonikos was the previous commander.

57xen. Hell. 5.1.5. The campaigns of Thrasyboulos and Iphikrates
in the Hellespont in 389-88 were simultaneous with those of Pamphilos and
Eunomos in the Saronic Gulf; see above.
58see Lysias 22.8 especially for a price-fixing conspiracy in
a period of scarce supplies in the winter of 388-87: also Meyer, Vol. 5,
262-63 with notes.
59This was likely a reward for Gorgopas' effectiveness against
Pamphilos' Athenians in autumn 389.
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remaining twenty-five ships, ordering him to sail to the relief of the
beleaguered Abvdenes,60
Early in 387, Nikolochos' twenty-five ships reduced Tenedos,
plundered it and put into Abydos.

The Athenians countered this move

by assembling thirty-two ships from the northern Aegean and Hellespont.
They then blockaded Nikolochos at Abydos. 61
In the Saronic Gulf, Gorgopas had managed to capture four of
Eunomos' triremes the previous fall (388) in a daring pursuit and
battle off Cape Zoster by moonlight.

He thereby reduced the Athenian

fleet strength in this area to a mere nine vessels for the winter of
388-87. 62

Gorgopas' success, however, was cut short because of Euagoras'

request for help which moved the Athenians to dispatch Chabrias with
ten ships in the spring of 387.63

Before sailing to Kypros, he put in

at Aigina where he laid an ambush for Gorgopas' men and the Aiginetans.
Gorgopas and 350 others died in the struggle and because the remaining

60 xen. Hell. 5.1.6; this of course means that the entire
Peloponnesian fleet numbered only thirty-seven vessels in the winter of
288-87, a remarkable contrast to the 120 trireme~ afloat ten years
earlier (see chs. 3 and 4). It is also mute, but eloquent testimony to
the Spartans' depleted resources.
6lxen. Hell. 5.1.7.
62xen. Hell. 5.1.8-9.
63xen. Hell. 5.1.10. As noted before, Euagoras had revolted
from the Great King about a year after Konon's death. At the time he
had requested and obtained an alliance with Athens (390 B.C.).
Agesilaos' brother Teleutias,who was navarch in 390/89,captured the
first ten ships sent by the Athenians to help their Kypriote friend
and benefactor. See Xen. Hell. 4.8.24 and Bengtson, Staatsvertrage 2,
182.
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Peloponnesians and Aiginetans refused to serve under Eteonikos 64 without
pay, the Athenians again controlled the Saronic Gulf. 65
By the early summer of 387, with the single exception of
Thrasyboulos' death near Aspendos in 388, Athenian fortunes seemed to
be better than ever on the surface.

Iphikrates' ambush near Kremaste

had caused the death of more than 250 Spartan allies and Anaxibios,
who had replaced Derkylidas as harmost in Abydos (388).

Antalkidas'

adjutant Nikolochos had blundered into a blockade at Abydos in the
spring of 387 and shortly thereafter Chabrias' trick on Aigina had
broken the ephors' two years of piracy in the Saronic Gulf.

Because of

the treaties with Akoris of Egypt in 389 and Euagoras in 390, 66 the
Athenians seemed to be assured of ships and grain in their struggle
against Sparta, even if the treasury was dangerously depleted. 6 7

The

reasons for the failure of Athens and her coalition allies to bring
the Spartans (whose fiscal resources were also near exhaustion) to
their knees must be sought in Sardis and Sousa.

64 Eteonikos commanded the Spartan force on Aigina in 389 when
Pamphilos' troops first landed. He was aided by the arrival of
Teleutias from Rhodes, see Xen. Hell. 5.1.1-2.
65 Xen. Hell. 5.1.11-13.
66For these treaties with rebellious subjects of the Great King,
see Bengtson, Staatsvertrage 1, 182-84.
67That the Spartans were resolved to harass Athenian shipping
in the Saronic Gulf even though their sailors on Aigina refused to
serve under Eteonikos without pay is clear from Xenophon's testimony.
The Hellenika (5.1.13-24) recounts the brilliant nocturnal raid on the
Peiraeus and coastal piracy off Attica which Teleutias undertook in
order to obtain booty and pay for the sullen sailors. Because this
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The Diplomatic Navarchy of Antalkidas and the King's Peace.
While Agesipolis was in the Argolid and Anaxibios was wrangling
with Iphikrates in the Hellespont, a profound change occurred in the
Persian attitude to the Greeks.

Because of the rising tide of

Athenian nee-imperialism marked by attempts to win over former Aegean
allies and undisguised aid to rebellious Persian subjects, the Great
King decided to replace the pro-Athenian Strouthas in Sardis with
Antalkidas' friend Tiribazos.

As noted above, after extending Gorgopas'

command in Aigina and placing his adjutant Nikolochos in charge of the
remaining Peloponnesian ships, Antalkidas travelled to Sousa to curry
favor with Tiribazos and the Great King. 68

Tiribazos, with whom

Antalkidas had become friendly during the failed peace of 392, supported
the navarch's position vigorously.

e

This time Artaxerxes was persuaded

that Persian and Spartan interests had coalesced because of the hostile
behavior of Athens. 69

He, therefore, concluded a peace with the

Spartans and sent Tiribazos to Sardis to replace Strouthas and to help

occurred during Antalkidas' navarchy in spring 387, Agesilaos' influence
most likely lay behind the decision to send Teleutias to continue
Gorgopas' earlier good work.
68 Fall and winter 388-87; see Xen. Hell. 5.1.6.
69Meyer, Vol. 5, 265-66; Beloch 3.1, 89; and Hamilto~ 298,all
note that Athens' aggressively independent foreign policy since 392
had eroded any basis for cooperation with Persia. Beloch in fact
observes that the aid to Euagoras and Akoris had placed Athens in a
virtual state of war with the Great King.
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Antalkidas bring Athens to heel.

70

The Spartans also requested aid from

Dionysios I of Syracuse whom they had helped in 396. 71

With the twenty

Syracusan ships and some twenty-five from Daskyleion, Antalkidas' naval
strength stood at over eighty ships. 72

The Spartan navarch quickly

proved himself the equal in tactical cunning to Agesilaos' brother
Teleutias.

He was able to split the Athenian fleet in the Hellespont

and break the blockade at Abydos where his adjutant Nikolochos had
been trapped with twenty-seven ships. 73

Because of Teleutias'

70At the same time another close friend of Tiribazos named
Ariobarzanes took charge of the Daskyleion satrapy while Pharnabazos
travelled to Sousa to marry Apame, one of Artaxerxes' daughters. In
addition to fulfilling one of his satrap's long desired hopes (see
chs. 3 and 4), the Great King eliminated the last influential Persian
supporter of Athens, thereby isolating Iphikrates and the Athenian
navarch Diotimos near Abydos. See Xen. Hell. 5.1.28 and Plut. Artax. 27.
71 For this aid to the beleaguered tyrant some nine years
earlier, see ch. 4 and Diod. 14.63.4.
72 Xen. Hell. 5.1.28. The Athenians had failed to detach the
Syracusans from Sparta in 393, as Sparto-Syracusan ties going back
to 414 B.C. prevailed (see Bengtson, Staatsvertrage 2, 137-38). For
Athens' approach to Syracuse in 393, see Tod GHI 2, no. 108 and
Lysias 19.9.
73 He isolated Iphikrates' eight ships at Chalkedon and his
Syracusan ally Polyxenos caused Thrasyboulos of Kollytos (not to be
confused with his more famous namesake who had died a year before; see
Schwahn, RE 6A.l, 575,under Thrasyboulos(6))to abandon the western
approach to the Hellespont. Thus Thrasyboulos' eight ships were
captured by an ingenious feint which also lured away enough of the
thirty-two triremes blockading Abydos to permit Nikolochos to break
free. See Xen. Hell. 5.1.25-28.
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operations from Aigina and Antalkidas' recovery of the Hellespont
with Persian help, the Athenians realized that they had no hope of
successfully prosecuting the war.

The Lakedaimonians, if pressed,

could reduce Athens to starvation as Lysander had in the winter of
405/04, since Antalkidas had closed off the Euxine sources.

Similarly,

Teleutias could intercept any Egyptian grain from his base on Aigina.
By early summer,

theref0~e.

the Athenians were prepared to sue for

peace.
None of the other members of the anti-Spartan coalition was
any more eager to keep up hostilities.

The Argives could no longer

plead "sacred truces" to avoid Spartan pillage of the Argolid.
the Korinthians had

bee~

Because

subsumed into Argos, their policy naturally

coincided with that of the Argives with the exception of those who
bitterly resented the Argive occupation of their homeland.

Although

the Thebans had contributed little to the war for some years, they
still faced harassment from Sparta's Phokian allies and the harmost
in Boiotian Orchomenos.

Even the Spartans,who clearly enjoyed the

advantage,were weary of the struggle.

They had maintained garrisons

at Orchomenos and Lechaion, while keeping watch over wavering or disloyal allies at great expense.

Their recent

i~ability

to pay the

soldiers and sailors on Aigina and the fact that they could barely keep
forty ships in service are eloquent testimony to their fiscal exhaustion.74

When Tiribazos invited the belligerents to assemble in Sardis,

74At the outbreak of the war in 395, the fleet strength stood
at 120 ships, ninety in Asia Minor and thirty in Sicily. The financial
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all came to hear the formal announcement of the Sparto-Persian
alliance and the terms on which the Great King would make peace with
the other Greeks. 75
Agesilaos, Antalkidas and the King's Peace
When the envoys of the several poleis had convP.ned at the
satrapal residence in Sardis, Tiribazos read them the text of the
Sparto-Persian treaty and terms for the settlement.
in Asia were to remain tributary to Artaxerxes.

The Greek cities

All other Greek

poleis, large or small, were to be autonomous except Skyros, Lemnos
and Imbros which would remain under Athenian control.

Finally,

Artaxerxes promised together with those faithful to the treaty to bring
the full might of the Persian empire to bear against any polis rejecting it.76

Having heard these rather lugubrious terms, 77 the

and physical depletion of all Greek poleis by early summer 387 is noted
by Grote, Vol. 7, 547-48; Beloch, 3.1, 94-95; Meyer, Vol. 5, 268-69; and
Hamilton,311-312.
75Bengtson, Staatsvertrage 2, 188-92, has compiled a complete
listing of all ancient references to the terms of the peace as laid
down in Sardis by Tiribazos. Xenophon's (Hell. 5.1.31) account is
clearly the best and most detailed.
76

xen. Hell. 5.1.31; Diod. 14.110.3; Plut. Ages. 23.1-5.

77niodorus (14.110.4) records that the Athenians, Thebans and some
other Greeks found the treaty's first clause, which abandoned the
Asian Greeks to the Great King, repulsive.
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coalition's envoys had only to report to their home poleis and reconvene in Sparta during the winter (387/86) for formal ratification.
With the adjournment of the conference in Sardis, one might
well ask why Agesilaos,

an adversary

of Antalkidas and fiercely

opposed in 392 to surrendering the Asian Greeks, 78 would allow
precisely such a thing for the sake of peace with Persia in 387.
The answer must be sought in several areas.

The most important reason

for his change of heart was the growing difficulty of waging a war on
two fronts.

The Peloponnesian alliance simply did not have the resources,

human or fiscal, to defeat the coalition and keep the Asian Greeks
free.

When Agesilaos left Sestos in 394 he promised to return to Asia

Minor as soon as matters were settled in Europe. 79

At Koroneia,

though he controlled the field, he unfortunately failed to detach
Boiotia from the coalition.

Also his brother-in-law's naval disaster

near Knidos prevented the Spartans from containing subsequent
Athenian expansion in the Aegean.

Finally the gradual Argive-Korin-

thian sympolity (392-89), despite his and Teleutias'best efforts near
Lechaion, severely limited Spartan access to central Greece through
the Isthmos.

All of these things combined to make an inglorious and

desultory war of attrition inevitable.

78Plut. Ages. 23, Mor. 213 b.
79see ch. 5.

A second concern surfaced
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with Chabrias'and Iphikrates'annihilation of the~ near Sikyon in
390: not only did Sparta have to contend with hostile Greeks and
Persians, but there were growing indications of recalcitrance within
her own alliance. 80

A third reason for Agesilaos' change of heart,

however reluctant, was the strong resistance to his influence and the
war ag~inst Persia from the supporters of Antalkidas. 81
Agesilaos had been

a~~e

In 392

to prevail because of the Athenian refusal to

cede the Asian Greeks and Artaxerxes' anger at Spartan depredations
at Knidos, Ephesos and Abydos.

In 388 Sparta's sinking fortunes in

Asia Minor and the Athenian naval revival, which now irritated
Artaxerxes more than the Spartans' toeholds at Abydos and Knidos,
forced Agesilaos to concede that Antalkidas was correct.

The Spartans

would either have to surrender the Asian Greeks for peace with the
Persians or yield to the hostile coalition in Europe.

As painful and

distressing as it must have been to him, Agesilaos chose to preserve
Spartan security at home at the cost of reneging on his promise in 394

80Agesilaos was compelled to lead the survivors of the defeated
~ home with caution to avoid exposing them to ridicule, especially
from the Mantineians (Xen. Hell. 4.5.18). Also the Phliasians
refused to allow any Spartans into their city until Iphikrates inflicted a sudden defeat on them near their own walls (Xen. Hell. 4.4.15);
see also Legon, "Phliasian Politics and Policy in the Early Fourth
Century B.C." Historia, 16 (1967), 325-26. During these same years
(391-89) the Spartans resented their allies' cowardice in battle against
Iphikrates' peltasts (Hell. 4.4.17).
81 Didymos 7.19; Plut. Artax. 21; see also Meyer, Vol. 5, 265,
n.2; Smith, "The Opposition to Agesilaos' Foreign Policy, 394-3il B.C.,"
Historia, 2 (1954), 274,believes that Antalkidas and the king cooperated
in 392, but Plutarch's testimony (Ages. 23) and Isokrates' Archidamos (1112)
make this highly unlikely.
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at Sestos. 82
The ratification of the peace in Sparta during the winter was
not without its stormy moments.

The autonomy clause provoked resent-

ment among the Argives and their democratic supporters in Korinth.
Similarly, the Thebans bitterly resented Agesilaos' insistence that
all members of the Boiotian league sign individually.

Theban reluctance

eventually collapsed, however, when Agesilaos threatened to declare
war.

Also the Argives, facing a similar threat, withdrew from Korinth.

The Spartans restored the oligarchs, thereby ending the Korinthian experience with democracy.

The Korinthian democrats fled into exile in

fear for their lives and an oligarchic Korinth rejoined the Peloponnesian
alliance. 83
When these matters were settled early in 386 B.C., the Greek
world after eight years of warfare was again at peace.
Spartan coalition had been dissolved.

The anti-

With the reluctant cooperation

82 see Wilcken, 12,and Hamilton 307, n.27. Meyer, Vol. 5, 265,
n.2,also believes that by 388 Agesilaos reluctantly agreed to lay
aside his differences with Antalkidas to secure the best settlement
possible for Sparta. He obviously knew that the European situation
was much more threatening than the Asian.
83 xen. Hell. 5.1.32-36. Xenophon is completely silent about
Agesilaos' change of heart by 387 and only briefly discusses Antalkidas'
brilliant diplomacy in Sousa. Wilcken, 17-18, and Hamilto~ 316, n.56,
quite plausibly suggest that the reason for his reticence is that the
terms of the Sparta-Persian peace (which made the general settlement
possible) reflected poorly on Agesilaos who had promised to defend the
Asian Greeks' autonomy. That Agesilaos could insist so vehemently on
a literal interpretation of the autonomy clause against the Thebans and
Argives attests to the effectiveness of his rival. Antalkidas' persuasion of the Great King to include a threat of force against any polis
resisting the peac~ thereby making Agesilaos' bellicosity possible.
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of Agesilaos and Antalkidas the Lakedaimonians had achieved three
things:

they brought Korinth back into their own alliance, they

dissolved the Boiotian league and they humiliated once again their
ancient enemies,the Argives.

Because of the navarch's diplomacy and

the king's change of heart, the Spartans had regained full access to
the Isthmos and were poised under Agesilaos to extend their hegemony
throughout European Greece. 84

Artaxerxes' gain from the peace is apparent. The Persians would now
be free to bring their rebellious subjects in Kypros and Egypt to heel
while the Spartan hegemony in Europe would preclude the form~tion of
any hostile coalitions in Greece. See Justin 6.6.1-3; and Died. 14.111.
Olmstead, History of the Persian Empire, 395, suggests that
Xerxes had failed!
84 Ryder, Kaine Eirene, 36, rightly observes that the major
role played by the Persians in the settlement of 387/86 means that
• cannot b e cons1•d ere d a ture Kotvn\ e:tpnvn.
;) /
Th•1s 1s so b ecause tne
1t
peace was not forged on a basis of common interest among the Greeks.
See also Wilcken, 18-19; Hamilton, 316-18; Meyer, Vol. 5, 269; and
Beloch, 3.1, 95-96. On the subject of Agesilaos' change of heart and
European Greek attitudes to their compatriots in Asia, Seager and
Tuplin, "The Freedom of the Greeks of Asia," JHS,lOO (1980), 141-54,
believe that it was during the period of Spartan intervention from
400-387 that the notion of the Asian Greeks as a collective entity
first arose. Wesenberg, "Agesilaos im Artemision," ZPE,41 (1981),
175-180, suggests that the Ephesians tried to scratch Agesilaos' name
off the column base in the restored temple some time after 386 because
the Spartans had abandoned them to Artaxerxes.
0
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CHAPTER VII
AGESILAOS AND SPARTA'S HEGEMONY IN GREECE, 386-382

~·f·

The most significant result of the King's Peace in Europe was
that it redounded greatly to the advantage of the Spartans. 1

In

Asia, the Persians realized a long-term goal of their foreign policy.
The peace dictated by

Artax~rY-es

and Sparta explicitly stated that

the Greeks of the Aegean seaboard were to be possessions of the Great
King.2

The Persians could now direct their energies in the West to

the suppression of revolts in Egypt3 and Kypros. 4

After nearly a

decade and a half, they had finally ridden the northwestern satrapies
of the Spartans' irritating and injurious presence, while simultaneously
freeing a great pool of mercenaries for the campaigns against Akoris
and Euagoras. 5

The other Greeks of Europe and the Aegean gained little

or nothing from the peace which gave Sparta a nearly free hand to
consolidate her power on either side of the Isthmos of Korinth.

In

1 see Hertzberg, 131; Hampl, Die ~iechischen Staatsvertrage des
~Jahrhunderts YQl:Christi Geburt, 83; Meyer, Vol. 5, 288; Beloch, 3.1,
99-100; Grote, Vol. 8, 26-27; Seager, "The King's Peace and the Balance
of Power in Greece, 386-62 B.C.," Athenaeum,52 (1974), 39-40; and
Hamilton, 323-25.
2xen. Hell. 5.1.31; see also Bengtson's complete collection of
references to the peace, Staatsvertrage 2, 188-93.
3 rsok. 4. 140; Demosth. Contra Lept. 76; Nepos Chabrias 2.1;
Justin 6.6.3.
4 rsok. 4.162, Euag. 62; Diod. 15.2.3.
5As Parke, Greek Mercenary Soldiers, Oxford, 1933, 1-57, has
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marked contrast, however, to their earlier purpose, the Spartans under
the leadership of Antalkidas and a reluctant Agesilaos surrendered
the Asian Greeks to the Persians.

6

With the conclusion of the peace in early 386, the dissolution
of the Argive-Korinthian sympolity and the fragmentation of the
Boiotian league, Agesilaos stood poised to enhance Sparta's position
as

,

~pocrTaTns

of the

and the Aegean. 7

~c3~~

and

,

(
nYE~WV

of the Greek world in Europe

To secure his grip in Boiotia, Agesilaos restored the

Plataians to their home town which an earlier generation of Spartans
had destroyed, thus forcing the inhabitants to flee to Athens. 8

He

continued the occupation of Boiotian Orchomenos by a garrison and

shown, there was a dramatic surge in the number and variety of
mercenaries during the Peloponnesian War. After 404 B.C., such figures
as Klearchos of Sparta, Koiratadas of Thebes, Chabrias and Iphikrates
of Athens elevated mercenaries to an importance equal or surpassing
that of the citizen hoplite. With the exception of Agesilaos'
innovative use of cavalry (see ch. 4), the Spartans were the only ones
to make no significant advances in mercenary·warfare. The chief
reasons for the rise of the mercenary were impoverishment attendant
upon warfare, the decline of agricul~ure and overpopulation. See Isok.
4.167, 5.122;and Diod. 14.23.4.
6 rt is ironic that the Asian Greeks, whose dreams of autonomy
were dashed by the settlement of 386, entered into a period of great
material prosperity. The off-shore islands also experienced a resurgence of material well-being which continued to elude the war-torn
Greek mainland. The only possible exception was Sames whose citizens
and economic base had been devastated by bloody factional strife for
over a decade. See Meyer, Vol. 5, 286-87 and Olmstead,396-97. In
support of his Panhellenist ideals Isokrates in the Panegyrikos, On The
Peace, and Letter to Archidamos (Agesilaos' son) takes a gloomy view of
the economic and social ills in Greece after 386 B.C.
7

Grote, Vol. 8, 2; Beloch 3.1, 95; Meyer, Vol. 5, 208-09; and
Ryder, 35-36,all observe that since no~e but the Spartans gained from
the peace, no polis could challenge or even resist whatever purposes
the Spartans intended for years after the settlement.
8

Paus. 9.1.3; Isok. 14.14, 54.

For the destruction of Plataia
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installed a garrison in Thespiai. 9
In the wake of the lugubrious surrender of Asian Greece and
I

the Spartans activities in Europe in early 386, someone reproached
Agesilaos by saying "Alas for Hellas, when Lakonians are Medizing."
The king answered, "Not at all, rather the Medes are Lakonizing."

10

While what he said was true, the king's ready wit could not disguise
the fact that a major shift in Spartan policy had occurred.
Although he had abandoned his earlier Panhellenism when he
realized that he would be unable to fulfill his promise to the Greeks
of Asia, Agesilaos was in fact at the zenith of his power and influence
in Lakedaimon.

He had emerged from the Korinthian War as the-dominant

force in Spartan politics and would quickly assume nearly full control

in 427, see Thuc. 3.68, 5.32; Isok. 4.126, 12.101; and Plut. Lys. 14.
9xen. Hell. 5.4.15-20; Isok. 14.14-15; and Diod. 15.32-37.

Ryder, 4 7, writes that Sparta's flimsy pretex.ts for meddling in the
internal affairs of other poleis on either side of the Isthmos show
that little more than expediency dictated her course of action.
10 Plut. Ages. 23.2, Artax. 22.2, and Mar. 213b. Olmstead, 396416, and Meyer, Vol. 5, 286-87, describe in great detail the gradual,
but relentless encroachment of Greek cultural, numismatic and military
influence throughout the western regions of the Persian realm. Greeks
held positions at the highest administrative levels, a practice begun
over a century before, but greatly accelerated by the King's Peace.
Among the most salient results of this trend in the quarter century
after 386 was the successful resistance to central authority made
possible in many areas by use of Greek mercenaries.
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o f f ore1gn
po 1"1cy. 11

Even during Antalkidas' brilliantly effective

navarchy (388-87), Agesilaos had secured the Aiginetan command for
his brother Teleutias, when the sailors refused to serve under
Eteonikos without pay. 12

Earlier Teleutias had served as navarch on

two separate occasions (392/91 and 390/89), a most unusual development,
since by tradition no man would hold that office more than once. 13

In

addition to his campaigns from 391-388, this indirect evidence hints
strongly at Agesilaos' influence in shaping Spartan public opinion and
policy.

His deference to the ephors, loyalty to his friends and rap-

port with the ordinary citizenl4 made possible his supremacy in the
state at this period and for many years to come.

It

i~

interesting to

note that unlike his elder brother Agis or contemporary Pausanias, the
Spartans never put Agesilaos on trial. 1 5
Before he could expand Spartan influence beyond the Isthmos,
Agesilaos wanted to be certain of allied loyalty in the Peloponnesos.
At the conclusion of the Korinthian War, the Spartans routinely

11

See Grote, Vol. 8, 26, 32; Meyer, Vol. 5, 280-89; Cawkwell,
"Agesilaos and Sparta," 74-77; Smith, "The Opposition to Agesilaos'
Foreign Policy," 275; Parke, "The Development of the Second Spartan
Empire," 373, Rice, "Agesilaos, Agesipolis and Spartan Politics," 166.
12 See ch. 6.
13 Xen. Hell. 2.1.7; Aris. Pol. 127la; see also Meyer, Vol. 5,
254, n.l, and 259, n.2 for chronology.
14 See ch. 2.
15 For Agis' trial in 418 B.C., see Thuc. 5.63 and Gomme et al.,
Vol. 4, 89-90. Pausanias was tried and acquitted in 403 (Paus. 3.5.2),
but fled into exile after an unfavorable verdict in 395 (Xen. Hell.
3.5.25; Paus. 3.5.6; Diod. 14.89.1).
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.

garr~sone

d many a 11'~e d

. .

c~t~es.

16

Once Agesilaos had broken all

lingering resistance to the King's Peace, 17 he directed his attention
to nearby allies whose allegiance had wavered or become suspect.
Mantineia was the first polis to experience the new direction of
Agesilaos' foreign policy.
The Fate of
-------

Mantineia and Phlious

--

A certain restiveness under the Spartan yoke in the earliest
years of the fourth century is well attested.

Fearful of an imminent

Spartan invasion in 395, the Boiotians had sent an embassy to Athens.
The Theban speakers listed a number of grievances against Sparta in
the Athenian assembly.

~ey

observed that many allied poleis, even

those in the Peloponnesos, resented the Spartans' arrogance.

The

Lakedaimonians, they claimed, had failed to allot a fair share of the
spoils of war to free men in 404 B.C. and had placed perioikoi and

16Xen. Hell. 5.1.29.
l7see ch. 6 for details of his dissolution of both the Boiotian
league and the Argive-Korinthian sympolity. There is some ancient evidence that Sparta and Thebes contracted an alliance in 386 B.C.; see
Isok. 14.27; Plut. Pelop. 4.5; and Aristeides 173. Bengtson,
Staatsvertrage 2, 193, writes that the existence of this is doubtful.
Buckler, 11 The Alleged Theban-Spartan Alliance of 386 B.C." Eranos, 78
(1980), 179-85, argues that a formal treaty ratified by oaths is unlikely because of Thebes' prohibition against Sparta's Olynthian
campaign in 383, Sparta's lack of any reference to such a treaty
before the seizure of the Kadmeia, and Leontiades' claim that Thebes
under Ismenias had been hostile to Sparta since 404 B.C. Also
Agesilaos' most consistent trait, his peculiar antipathy to Thebes,
makes such an alliance unlikely. Buckler is either correct, therefore,
in asserting that Isokrates lied about this treaty for his own rhetorical purposes or he may have exaggerated an informal liaison between
Leontiades' pro-Spartan faction and a S)rmpathetic group in Lakedaimon.
If there were such an informal relation, it bore fruit dramatically
with Phoibidas' coup (see below).
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helots in control of free cities.

18

Another sign of discontent surfaced in 391 when the Phliasians
requested a Spartan garrison to protect them from Iphikrates'
mercenaries.

Before Iphikrates' successful attack, however, the towns-

men for some time had refused to admit any Spartans within their walls.
The Spartans complied with the Phliasian request, but despite their
sympathy for the city's oligarchic exiles, they did not insist that
the democratic government take these exiles back.
city without tampering in any way with its laws. 19

Also, they left the
That Agesipolis

used Phlious as a base to launch his incursion against the Argives
indicates that the city was still loyal to the Spartans in 388. 20
Perhaps because of that cooperation Agesilaos decided to post?one the
Phliasians'

ch~stisement

until he had dealt with the Mantineians whose

. 21
1 oya1 ty was muc h more errat1c.

18

Xen. Hell. 3.5.12.

19 xen. Hell. 4.4.15.
20 Legon, "Phliasian Politics and Policy in the Early Fourth
Century B.C.," Historia,l6 (1967), 326-28, contends that in 388 the
city was still democratic. The government allowed the Spartans to
mass their troops at Phlious as a gesture of good will. The Spartans,
preoccupied with the war, had no intention of forcing an oligarchy on
the city at that time.
21

No better illustration of Parke's remark ("The Second Spartan
Empire," 37) that Sparta under Agesilaos was converting the alliance
into an ~pxr) occurs than her treatment of Mantineia and Phlious.
Cawkwell, "Agesilaos and Sparta," 75, notes that these poleis were the
two great anomalies in the Spartan alliance. Because of their walls
and prosperity, they had evolved along somewhat independent lines and
had become democracies.
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Relations between Sparta and Mantineia had long been strained.
Because of a common border and Mantineia's tradition of democracy,
Agesilaos decided to make an example of this polis after all matters
pertaining to the King's Peace were settled.

An excellent pretext for

intervention arose with the expiration of the thirty-years' treaty between the two cities which was concluded in 417 after the Spartans'

.
. .
. . 22
an d Mant1ne1an
army near Mant1ne1a.
de f eat o f a combine d Arg~ve
Agesilaos' inherent piety would not obstruct his designs since the
sacred oaths were no longer in effect.

23

At the treaty's expiration, the Spartans had a list of
grievances against the Mantineians.

They considered the Mantineians

unreliable allies because they had supplied grain to the Argives
during the Korinthian War

while pleading "holy truces" .in order not

to participate in allied campaigns.

Especially galling to Agesilaos

was the fact that he took the remnants of the mora defeated by
Iphikrates in 390 past Mantineia at night to avoid ridicule at the
Spartans' misfortune.

Finally, Agesilaos and many Spartans did not

22 Thuc. 5.81.1. Gomme et al., Vol. 4, 148, note the chronological puzzle in Xen. Hell. 5.2.2, since by his account the treaty
would have expired in 387, not 386/85. Diodorus (15.5.3) would fix the
year as 385 B.C. The agreement seems to be a truce rather than an
alliance, but Mantineia remained attached at least nominally to the
Peloponnesians.
23 For Agesilaos' scrupulous adherence to sworn compacts, see
ch. 4.
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• •
d emocracy. 24
approve o f t h e 't.!
r ant1ne1an

In the spring of 385 the Spartans dispatched a legate to
Hantineia with an ultimatum.

The demands were simple:

the citizens

would either tear down their walls or face an invasion. 25

The

oligarchic faction, which was out of power at this time, was secretly
in sympathy with the Spartan demands.

Moreover, many of the wealthier

Mantineians would not be affected by the demolition of the walls or
the dwellings t·lithin them because their estates were in the countryside.
Some were even enthusiastic about Spartan intervention since it would
give them a chance to regain control of the government. 26
Despite the oligarchic sentiment of some citizens when the
ultimatum was

delive~ed,

the city decided to resist.

Agesilaos excused

himself from the expedition (spring 385) on the grounds that the
Hantineians had rendered many serYices to his father during the
•
27
.
Messen1.an campa1gns.

The younger king, therefore, found himself in

the possibly uncomfortable role of

le~ding

an army against the

24

Xen. Hell. 5.2.2. Diodorus (15.5.2-3) writes that the
Spartans had no intentions of honoring the autonomy clause in the
Peace of Antalkidas when it was inexpedient to do so. He states
that, in many poleis, they would stir up factional strife in order
to impose governments loyal to themselves. Ultinate responsibility
for this policy must be laid at Agesilaos' feet.

25
26

Xen. Hell. 5.2.1-3; Diod. 15.5.2
Xen. Hell. 5.2.3, 6-7.

27 This is a reference to the aftermath of an earthquake in
464 B.C. which prompted an uprising of Messenian helots. See Diod.

11.63-64.
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Mantineian democrats who had been on· excellent terms with his exiled
father Pausanias. 28

This development shows that Agesilaos was

equally adept at political and military tactics.
and letting the

~of

By declining command

the campaign rest on Agesipolis' shoulders,

the elder king likely neutralized any opposition to his own purposes.
Were Agesipolis to reduce the city, the Spartans would have properly
chastised the democrats and installed a government loyal to Sparta.
If he should falter in the field, Agesilaos could simply come to his
rescue.

In either case for the Mantineians, the result would be the

same. 29
When an invasion appeared inevitable, the Mantineians appealed
to Argos and Athens for aid.

Because neither polis had the

strec1gt~

or will to risk a war, the Mantineians were compelled to stand alone.
When even the sight of the

a~lied

army failed to induce them to pull

down their walls, Agesipolis began to ravage their land.

As this too

proved insufficient for his intent, he ordered one half of the army to
dig a trench around the city under the other half's protection.

When

the trench was finished, the Lakedaimonians built a wall of their own.
The Mantineians did not entirely lack sympathizers during the siege,

28Xen. Hell. 5.2.3.
29Rice, "Agesilaus, Agesipolis and Spartan Politics, 386-379
B.C.," 168, argues that Agesilaos cleverly manoeuvered the ambitious
young king into assuming command to suppress internal resistance to
his domination. It is possible, however, that Agesipolis merely sought
to attain renown on the "field of honor" since his only campaign \vas
the incursion against the Argolid in 388. Agesipolis may well have
been in basic accord with Agesilaos' leadership as indeed most Spartans
were at this time.
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for some neighboring peoples would smuggle provisions to the defenders
at night. 30
tain

That this could happen proves the existence of a cer-

discontent with the Spartans even among their closest neighbors.

Agesipolis finally cut off this clandestine supply line by releasing
a pack of dogs whose nocturnal barking would betray the presence of
anyone approaching the walls.
Although the city no longer received external support because
of Agesipolis' dogs, the citizens had laid in a great supply of grain
from the autumn harvest.

As a result there was no prospect for a

quick surrender until the young king hit upon another ruse.
noticed that winter rains had greatly swollen
ran through the city.

31

order to flood the city.

t~

He

Ophis River which

He, therefore, decided to dam

the river in

The rising waters turned the whole town into

a shallow pond and began to dissolve the baked mud bricks of the walls.

As it slowly became apparent that the Spartans would be able to breach
the weakened ramparts, the inhabitants chose to break off their
resistance.

Since they would be forced to tear down their walls anyway,

they decided to do so as allies of the Lakedaimonians rather than their
prisoners of war.

The Spartans accepted the Mantineians' surrender,

but added a stipulation that after the demolition of the walls, the

30Polyainos 2.24.1.
31

Frazer, Pausanias' Description of Greece, Vol. 4, 205, describes what the river's course may have been in antiquity since there
is no trace of the waterway today. He surmises that the citizens may
have diverted the channel to keep the water from flowing through the
town when they rebuilt it in 370. See also Meyer, RE 18.1, 649 under
Ophis (1).
--
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city be broken up into its constituent villages.

In the future the

Mantineians would receive not one, but several Spartan officers in
charge of foreign troops (

/

~Evayol

).

Because the city's Argolizers and leading democrats feared for
their lives after the surrender, the exiled Pausanias made his son
promise to permit these people to depart in safety. 32

As the sixty

or so men set out, the Mantineian oligarchs had more difficulty in
restraining their anger than the Spartans did. 33
With the conclusion of the Mantineian affair in early 384,
a group of exiled Phliasians sympathetic to Sparta saw a chance to be
restored to their homeland.

They had observed, with encouragement,

the Spartans' garrisoning of small Peloponnesian poleis during the
last two years in conformity to Agesilaos' purposes.

The installation

of pro-Spartan oligarchies in these smaller cities had now been followed
by the chastisement of the anti-Spartan demos at Mantineia.

Moreover,

32

Pausanias was living some 18 km. to the south as a suppliant
in the temple of Athena Alea in Tegea. See ch. 5.
33

xen. Hell. 5.4.2-7; Diodorus (15.5,12) writes that the city was
divided into five villages, not four as Xenophon recounts. Jacoby,
Fr. Gr.H., 2A.l, 64, no. 29, preserves this account as an Ephoros
fragment. Pausanias(8.8.5-8)describes Agesipolis' siege and its outcome as does Polybios(4.27.6)who censures the Spartans for abusing
their allies. See Walbank, An Historical Commentary on Polybios,
Vol. 1, 475-76, who writes that Polybios' source perhaps was Ephoros,
but more likely was the anti-Spartan Kallisthenes of Olynthos.
Plutarch, Pelop. 4-5, writes that in a pitched battle Epameinondas saved
a wounded Pelopidas from Mantineia's Arkadian mercenaries. Although
some of Leontiades' pro-Spartan supporters may have witnessed the siege,
it is unlikely that there were any pitched battles or formal treaty
·
between Sparta and Thebes which would induce two such strongly antiSpartan Thebans to be present at Mantineia's demise. See Buckler,

183
the Phliasians' support of the Spartans during the Korinthian War had
scarcely been enthusiastic under the democracy. 34

Thus taking heart

at the Lakedaimonians' heavy-handed treatment of luke-warm allies, the
oligarchic exiles sent a deputation to Sparta in the summer of 384.
They asserted that while the city was in their hands, Phlious had
always admitted Spartans within the walls and had participated in all
allied campaigns.

Under the democracy, they continued, the Phliasians

were unwilling to serve in the allied army and until 391 barred the
Spartans alone of all men from the city.

The ephors considered the

exiles' charges serious enough to send a legation to Phlious.

The

legates maintained that the exiles, who were friends of the Lakedaimonians, had suffered unjust expulsion.

The ephors, therefore, deemed

it right that the city take back the exiles and restore
property.

~hem

to their

Further, if any dispute about the restoration of expropriated

property should arise, the Phliasians were to refer the matter to an
impartial court of inquiry.

Because the democrats feared that the

exiles' friends and relatives would

betr~y

the city, should the Spartans

"The Alleged Theban-Spartan Alliance of 386 B.C.," 184-85, who along
with Grote, Vol. 9, 247, n.3,and Reincke, RE 19.1, 376, rejects this
account as spurious and deriving from Plutarch's Alk. 7.3 and
ultimately Plato's Symposium 220e-22lb.
34As noted inch. 6 (Xen. Hell. 4.4.15), the Phliasians had
refused to admit any Spartans into their city until suffering a defeat
at the hands of Iphikrates' mercenaries in 391. At that time the
Spartans did not insist that they take back their oligarchic exiles.
Parke, "The Second Spartan Empire," 64, argues that the reason for this
was Spartan deference to their allies, but Legan, 328-29, much more
convincingly suggests that it was simply inexpedient to aid the exiles
because of the full-scale war around Korinth and in Asia Minor.
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invade, the government accepted the terms laid down by the league. 35
The Philiasian matter was thus settled temporarily by intimidation
rather than force. 36
Spartan Adventurism Beyond the Isthmos
While Agesilaos' policies were firmly taking effect in the
Peloponnesos, an opportunity for Spartan expansion to the northern
Aegean literal arose early in 382.

A delegation from Akanthos and

Apollonia, 37 two cities in the Chalkidike, and from Amyntas III of
Makedonia arrived in Lakedaimon to seek Spartan aid against the growing power of the Chalkidic league.

The chief spokesman for this combin-

ed legation was Kleigenes of Akanthos whom the Spartans invited to
address the Peloponnesian assembly.

In his speech Kleigenes called

35 Xen. Hell. 5.2.8-10.
36cawkwell, 76. Rice, 172, and Legon, 330-31, correctly
point out that the ephors did not even give the Phliasians a chance
to respond to the exiles' charges. Moreover, the charges were weak
at best since the Phliasians had joined Agesipolis' incursion into
the Argolid in 388. Thus the ephors were not interested in deciding
the matter on its merits, perhaps even believing that the charges
would not stand up. Since Agesilaos for two years had been working
to install pro-Spartan oligarchies, it is safe to conclude that
mere expediency lay at the core of the ephors' decision.
3 7Akanthos (modern Ierissos) lies astride the Strymonic and
Singitic gulfs just north of Xerxes' canal; see Pietschmann, RE 1.1,
1147. Apollonia was situated about 17 km. to the northeast oyOlynthos; see Hirschfeld, RE 2.1, 114.
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the Peloponnesians' attention to the league's forcible absorption of
many Chalkidic cities and several of the major Makedonian towns,
including Pella.

He claimed that the league also had won over the

nearest Thracians and had made friendly overtures to the Athenians38
and Thebans.

Although many Chalkidic poleis resented the Olynthian's

league, only the Akanthians and Apollonians had thus far resisted
absorption.

¥.~~igeues

then pointed out that when the league's legates

demanded support for the campaign against the Makedonians, the
Akanthians, Apollonians and the Makedonian king decided to appeal to
Sparta. 39

Finally, the speaker noted that with access to the vast

tracts of Thracian timberland and the silver deposits of Mt. Pangaion
near Amphipolis the Olynthians' league could become a naval menace in
concert with Athens.

Torone had recently joined the league,as had

Potidaia,which meant that the entire Pallene peninsula would soon fall
into the Olynthians' hands.

Finally, he stated that even the

38 rn fact, they contracted an alliance with the Athenians in
383 B.C. See Tod, GHI, Vol. 2, no. 119 and Bengtson, Staatsvertrage
2, 199-200.
39Amyntas III had contracted an alliance with the Chalkidic
league when an Illyrian invasion of the Hakedonian highlands
occurred in 393 B.C. Amyntas was routed in battle after turning
over great tracts of lower Makedonia to the Chalkidikians for protection and he initially despaired of his throne. With the aid of some
Thessalians, however, he was able to repel the Illyrians and regain
control of upper Makedonia in only three months. He asked that the
Olynthians restore the land he had ceded to them, but they refused.
Relations between Amyntas and the league deteriorated until by 384
the league supported the pretender Argaios. In the early spring of
382, Amyntas decided to join Akanthos and Apollonia in an appeal to
Sparta. For these events, see Diad. 14.92.2-4; Isokrates Archidareos
46; and Aelian y.H. 4.8.3. Meyer, Vol. 5, 296-97 with notes; Tod, no.
111; Bengtson, 178-80; and Grote, Vol. 8, 42-48,all believe that
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Akanthians and Apollonians would not be able to hold out much longer
unless the Spartans acted. 40
Despite earlier inattention to such things, Agesilaos and his
supporters quickly realized the implications of what Kleigenes had
reported.

Here was an entity in the Chalkidike which was subverting

the autonomy of Greek cities by voluntary or forcible absorption.
Sparta as

,

TipocrTaTns of the King's Peace could restore the Akanthians,

Apollonians and other Chalkidic Greeks to their

TI&Tptot TIOAlTEtal,

while simultaneously expanding her own influence in the Northern
Aegean.

No Spartan force had even passed through that part of the

Greek world since Agesilaos' returned from Asia. 41
When Kleigenes had concluded his addr~ss,4 2 the Spartans convened the full allied assembly which quickly and supinely voted to mount
an expedition against the Ch.alkidic league. 43

To insure a prompt

Amyntas III, the father of Philip II, became king in 393 B.C. Beloch,
Vol. 3.1, 101-03 and 3.2, 58-62, believes that Amyntas II was king
when the 50-year pact with the league was concluded in 393. Kaerst,
RE 1.2, 3006, dates Amyntas III's accession to 389 and the 50-year
treaty to 389/88. All scholars agree that Makedonian chronology for
the ten years after Archelaos' death in 399 is greatly muddled.
40xen. Hell. 5.2.12-19; Diod. 15.19.3.
41 That is since the summer of 394; see ch. 5.
42 Rice, "Agesilaos, Agesipolis, etc.," 176; Cawkwell,
"Agesilaos and Sparta," 77; Seager, "The King's Peace, etc.," 41
observe that Kleigenes makes not a single reference to the Peace or
Sparta's role as TipocrT~Tns •
The entire appeal is to the material
and military advantage which the Spartans could gain. Ryder, Koine
Eirene, 47, believes that the Olynthians' threat to Sparta's hegemony
was exaggerated.
43xen. Hell. 5.2.20.
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check against the seizure of any more cities by the Olynthians, the
joint delegation urged the dispatch of an advance force.

The ephors,

therefore, hastily gathered a contingent of 2,000 men composed of
Skiritiai,44 ?eodamodais, perioikoi and helots under Eudamidas to
march north.

Before setting out, Eduamidas asked that his brother,

Phoibidas,be given command of a similar force to follow somewhat
later. 45

Eudamidas was able to garrison some cities on the

Makedonian and Thracian coasts when they requested his aid.

After he

detached Potidaia from the Olynthians' league, he occupied it and
made it the Spartans' headquarters for the rest of the war. 46

Most

important, however, was Eudamidas' request that the ephors send
another 2,000 men under his brother Phoibidas.

That some Spartans

contemplated a venture fully as weighty as the Olynthian campaign is
strongly hinted by the gathering of this second contingent. 47

44 These people who perhaps were perioikoi lived at the
northern frontier of Lakedaimon. It was in their territory that the
Spartans performed the traditional border sacrifices before setting
out on a campaign. See Geyer, RE 13A.l, 536-37. The chief ancient
references to this people are Thuc. 5.67-68; Xen. Hell. 5.2.24, Lak.
Pol. 12.3, 13.6; and Diod. 15.32.1.
45cawkwell, 77, clearly discerns Agesilaos' handiwork in the
Spartan decision to mount the expedition. He points out that the
first three Spartans to take the field were all partisans or relatives
of the elder king.
46xen. Hell. 5.2.23-24.
47 xenophon as a Lakonophile and friend of Agesilaos could never
bring himself to admit openly that the elder king had a direct hand in
the gathering of Phoibidas' troops. Diodorus' epitome of Ephoros, who
had no such compunctions, no longer distinguished the two brothers'
separate commands. Rather Diodorus makes Phoibidas polemarch of the
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The Seizure of the Kadmeia
Phoibidas, supposedly en route to join his brother at Potidaia
in late summer 382, precipitated a remarkable turn of events in central
Greece.48

Acting on secret instructions and with the collusion of a

pro-Spartan polemarch in Thebes, he evolved a plot to seize the
Kadmeia.

Just outside the city walls near the gymnasion Phoibidas

encamped his troops where he received a cordial deputation from
Leontiades.

Ismenias and Androkleidas, the leaders of the rival

faction which controlled the government, however, refused even to
acknowledge the Spartans' presence.

Because of most Thebans' intense

anti-Spartan sentiment, the council had passed a decree forbidding any
Theban from joining the Lakedaimonian expedition to the Chalkidike.
It was, therefore, necessary for Leontiades and Archias' rival faction
to make their traitorous proposal in secret.

Leontiades offered to

lead the Lakedaimonians to the Kadmeia which was the seat of the
Theban government.

He assured Phoibidas that once the akropolis was

in Spartan hands, the city's submission and great glory for the Spartan
officer would quickly follow.

entire allied force which, he writes, eventually grew to over 10,000
men. Hence Eudamidas, the brother who first engaged the Chalkidic
forces and secured a reliable base on the Pallene just 13 km. south
of Olynthos, has been largely forgotten in the afterglow of Phoibidas'
notoriety. Plutarch (Ages. 24.1) explicitly states that suspicion of
Agesilaos' complicity quickly arose after Phoibidas' light rebuke by
the authorities.
48Meyer, Vol. 5, 293, dates Eudamidas' mission to the spring
and Phoibidas' coup to August 382 B.C. Beloch, 3.2, 232, citing
Aristeides(258), ·who states
the Pythian games were in progress, also
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After the clandestine rendezvous Phoibidas withdrew from the
_gymnasion as if to join his brother Eudamidas in Potidaia.

A short

time later while the council was in session away from the Kadmeia because the women were celebrating the Thesmophoria, Leontiades rode
out to the Spartans and led them back to the city.

It was mid-summer

and the streets were deserted when the Spartans arrived.
led his men directly to the akropolis

wh~~e ~e

of the city without a single drop of bloodshed.

Phoibidas

completed his seizure
It remained only for

Leontiades to convene an assembly, alert the citizens of their changed
situation, and introduce them to their new masters. 49
Some 300 Thebans were able to escape to Athens before the
new, meekly pro-Spartan government took over.

Ismenias, however, was

not as fortunate, as Leontiades ordered his arrest and extradition
to Sparta for trial.

Another polemarch was appointed in Ismenias'

stead and Phoibidas' overthrow of the Theban government was complete.50
When news of the coup reached Lakedaimon, many were angered
and shocked at what they perceived as a gross overstepping of authority
and a serious violation of the autonomy clause in the King's Peace.

dates the seizure to Aug. 382. Grote, Vol. 8, 56, n.2; Cawkwell, 79;
and Rice, 180,all concur. Reconstruction of subsequent chronology is
facilitated by fixing the date of Phoibidas' coup.
49

Xen. Hell. 5.2.25-29; Plut. Ages. 23.6-7, Pelop. 5; Diad.
15.20.2; Polybios 4.27.4; Isok. 4.126; Nepos, Pelop. 1.2-3. Plutarch
(Mor.576a) writes that Lysandridas was Ismenias' replacement as
polemarch. ·
50 xen. Hell. 5.2.30.
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Agesilaos, however, quickly came forward to exonerate his friend by
stating that Spartan officers were expected to show initiative and
that the only standard by which Phoibidas should be judged was whether
his actions had served the state. 51

Although the accused was relieved

of command and fined, Agesilaos easily persuaded the Spartans to retain a harmost and garrison at Thebes.

The light censure of Phoibidas

and the decision to sustain the occupation of the Kadmeia were deeply disturbing to many Greeks far beyond the borders of Lakedaimon.

52

Yet another measure of Agesilaos' control of Spartan policy
despite some
Ismenias.

intern~l

opposition was the trial and execution of

His bitter factional rival Leontiades was the chief witness

against him.

He began his indictment by noting that, for over twenty

years, the Thebans had consistently failed to cooperate in Spartan
enterprises.

They refused to join the attack on the Peiraeus in 403

during the revolt against the thirty in Athens.
at the outset of the Asian campaign in 396.

They snubbed Agesilaos

Ismenias and Androkleidas

had gladly taken Timokrates' bribes and launched the attack on Phokis
in 395,which was the casus belli of the Korinthian War.

Finally,

Leontiades noted, Ismenias' government had recently threatened with
punishment any Theban who might march with the Spartans against the
Chalkidic league.

Leontiades ended his plea by observing that under

51

xen. Hell. 5.2.32; Plut. Ages. 23.6-7 and Diod. 15.19.4.
Grote, Vol. 8, 59, thinks the ephors' disavowal of Phoibidas was
hypocritical since he was acting on their instructions to neutralize
Thebes.
52 see note 49 and Diod. 15.20.3.
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his government, Thebes would no longer be an obstacle to the Spartans
and insisted that the Medizing war-monger be made to pay for his crimes
against Hellas. 53
To Agesilaos and his supporters and even to the elder king's
opponents who had suffered in the Korinthian War, Leontiades' charges
carried some weight.

Although some Spartans were uneasy about not re-

maining loyal to the oaths taken in 386, Agesilaos' partisans again
prevailed.

Ismenias was arraigned before a panel of three Spartan

judges and one each from the several allied states.

In spite of a

vigorous defense on his own behalf, he was found guilty of all charges
and subsequently executed.

With the installation of the pro-Spartan

oligarchy, the Thebans were not only

subservi~nt,

but co-operated with

the Lakedaimonians in more ways than were demanded. 54

53 Xen. Hell. 5.2.33-34. Meyer, Vol. 5, 292-93, points out that
while Thebes had taken no hostile steps against Sparta, her refusal to
join the Olynthian expedition was not something which the Spartans
could overlook. Beloch, 3.1, 104, believes that the Spartans
(especially Agesilaos) were looking for a pretext to seize control
of Thebes because of the hostility of Ismenias and Androkleidas'
government. Buckler, "The Alleged Theban-Spartan Alliance of 386
B.C.," 184, believes that Agesilaos' failure to mention any violation
of a separate treaty's terms in justifying Phoibidas strongly suggests
that there was no such treaty. Had there been a separate pact between
Sparta and Thebes, the latter's failure to cooperate against Olynthos
would have been an excellent excuse for punitive action.
54 xen. Hell. 5.2.35-37. Beloch, 3.1, 104-05, succinctly writes
that the outcome of the trial was never in doubt. Grote, Vol. 8, 5961, perceives an iniquity in charging Ismenias with Medism when the
Spartans themselves had cooperated openly with the Persians and
abandoned the Greeks of Asia to Artaxerxes only five years before.
He compares Ismenias' fate to that of Theramenes at the hands of
Kritias in 404 B.C.
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Retrospective
The events of the years from the spring of 386 to the autumn
of 382 reveal with great clarity the adventurism of Sparta under
Agesilaos.

Although Antalkidas was an obvious opponent of the elder

king 55 and the young king, Agesipolis, was a rival of sorts, 56 as one
would expect, because of his prestige among the Spartans, Agesilaos
was the driving force in making and carrying out Spartan policy.
After he abandoned any immediate hope for returning to Asia, he began
to consolidate Sparta's grip on the alliance by forced occupation of
smaller poleis and districts in the Peloponnesos.

57

When this pro-

cess was well underway, he directed the Spartans' energies to larger
entities whose opposition or recalcitiance was more serious.

After

the dissolution of the Argive-Korinthian sympolity and the Boiotian
league, he was able to persuade the ephors, assembly and younger king
58
. fl'1ct a s1m1
. '1 ar f ate on t h.e Mant1ne1ans.
· ·
to 1n

The young king was

the instrument of the elder's policy, since Agesilaos' object was
clearly the subjection and dispersal of Mantineia into its original
villages.

Should Agesipolis falter in the field, which would have

55 See chs. 5 and 6; they put aside their differences for a
time during the latter's navarchy to achieve an acceptable and for
Sparta, advantageous peace.
56niodorus (15.19.4) makes it clear that Agesipo1is was the more
conciliatory of the two kings in his attitude to the allies.
57 see Isok. 4.113-116 and Diad. 15.1.3-4, 5.1-2.
58Rice, "Agesilaos, Agesipolis, etc.," 166-68, suggests that
Agesilaos cleverly begged off conduct of the siege to neutralize any
internal resistance.
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been a serious blow to his prestige, Agesilaos could have assumed
command and credit for the success.

In any case, the young king was

all too eager to succeed against the Mantineians and possibly only
the intervention of his exiled father from Tegea prevented a bloodbath. 59
With Lysander's death at Haliartos in 395 and Pausanias'
exile the following spring, there was no single figure in Sparta
who could compete with Agesilaos' record of military, financial and
diplomatic successes.

Antalkidas' achievements as a negotiator

and navarch quickly dissipated when he reverted to the status of
private citizen (fall of 387).

He and others perhaps
did not share
.....

Agesilaos' enthusiasm for forcing docile, pro-Spartan oligarchies on
the allies or for seeking to humiliate the Thebans, but in his reduced
role, he could scarcely compete with the prestige of a king who held
office for life.

Also those unhappy with Sparta's failure to abide

by the oaths of 386 guaranteeing autonomy could not expect the younger
king to match Agesilaos' influence either.6°

59

xen. Hell. 5.2.6. Rice's suggestion that Agesipolis was the
hapless tool of the elder king's cunning is not nece~sarily borne out
by the evidence. Diodorus' description of him as E1PnVtK~S
and
OlKatos while Agesilaos is termed ~tAontAE~OS and
opacrTtKOS
(15.19.4) is likely nothing more than rhetorical balance or contrast
in Ephoros. Agesipolis showed no lack of martial vigor in 388 against
the Argives (see ch. 6), in 385-84 against Mantineia or in 381-80
against the Olynthians. It seems best to ascribe whatever differences
existed between the two kings to the traditional rivalry of their
respective royal houses.
60Parke, "The Second Spartan Empire," 71,and Rice, 169, see in
the events of the3e years and Agesilaos' domination of Spartan policy
the full emergence of Sparta,
not as ~YE~Gv
of an alliance, but
;a
/
rather as tyrant of an apxn.

'

..

-
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The process begun with the smaller poleis and Mantineia continued to evolve with the ultimatum delivered to Phlious.

Agesilaos

and his supporters were more than willing to crush recalcitrants
simply for the sake of expediency. 61

The joint Makedonian, Akanthian

and Apollonian appeal for aid against the Olynthians' league in 382
suddenly provided Agesilaos with the long sought chance not only to
expand Spartan influence to the northern Aegean, but to indulge his
bitter resentment against Thebes.

The Spartan's response to

Kleigenes and the secret instructions issued to all Spartan officers
in the field were perfectly consistent with Agesilaos' policy since
the King's Peace and clearly reflect his control of the state. 6 2
Phoibidas' seizure of the Kadmeia was the result of policy, not mere
opportunism on the part of an overly ambitious officer.

Agesilaos

and his supporters had hoped to occupy Thebes to eliminate Sparta's
only serious rival in central Greece.

Because of his antipathy to

Thebes, his great popularity in Sparta and his control of all aspects
of policy, Agesilaos himself certainly was responsible for the "secret

61 see Legan, "Phliasian Politics, etc.," 330 and Rice, 169.
62 see Seager, "The King's Peace, etc.," 41-42. Cawkwell,
"Agesilaos and Sparta," 77, believes that a combined reading of the
evidence in Diodorus and Xenophon gives the complete background for
the Spartan intervention in the north. Although Xenophon does not
mention the pact with Amyntas, while Diodorus is silent about
Akanthos and Apollonia, there is nothing in the two authors which is
mutually exclusive or contradictory. Cawkwell also believes that the
King's Peace was applicable to the Chalkidike, but not to Amyntas'
realm in Makedonia. This would justify superficially intervention on
behalf of Akanthos and Apollonia.
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instructions" to reduce the city. 6 3

Xenophon naturally would emphasize

Leontiades' treason and Phoibidas' rashness because implication in the
deed would put his benefactor in a poor light.

Evidence supplied by

Diodorus and Plutarch, however, points to Agesilaos' culpability.
With the fall of Thebes, the Peace of

P~talkidas

had become

moot despite a tenuous pretext for intervention on behalf of Akanthian
and Apollonian autonomy.

In reality Agesilaos and the Spartans were

. d to conso l"d
. apxn
>
/
now po1se
1 ate t h e1r

throughout European Greece.

Agesilaos put into effect a policy of chastising suspect allies,
dismantling coalitions and even single poleis in order to impose
docile, pro-Spartan oligarchies.

With an aggressive, militaristic

statecraft oddly reminiscent of Lysander's dekarchie2, Agesilaos'
leadership completed Sparta's transition from

63 Rice, 180 and Plut. Ages. 24.1.

C

I

nYE~WV

to tyrant.

CHAPTER VIII
THE DESTRUCTION OF THE CHALKIDIC LEAGUE AND THE FALL OF PHLIOUS:
THE LIBERATioN OF THEBES AND AGEsiLAoS'REACTION
The War Against Olynthos
With the Thebans docile and garrisoned, the Spartans could
proceed with their campaign in the north.

Eudamidas, brother of the

notorious Phoibidas, had occupied Potidaia in the spring of 382 to
prepare for the arrival of the full Peloponnesian levy. 1

The entire

Pallene was secure for the allies when the Spartans appointed
Teleutias commander of the full levy. 2
appointment for his

half-b~other,

In addition to securing this

Agesilaos also persuaded the ephors

to send dispatches to all allied poleis with orders to supply
Teleutias with men and equipment according to the allies' joint
resolution.3

Since the

;

O"KUTCJ.ACll

were the official leathern dis-

patches sent by the ephors to Spartan commanders outside Lakedaimon, 4
the success of Agesilaos' policy now becomes clear.

Many Greek towns must

1 The chronology of the Olynthian War is muddled in places, but
Meyer, Vol. 5, 298-99, n.5, places Eudamidas' mission in the spring of
382. Beloch, 3.1, 103, concurs, while Grote, Vol. 8, 54-55, does not
attempt to fix the date.
2Ehrenberg, RE 5.2, 2367-68, dates Teleutias' march to summer
382 and his death to the following summer. For Teleutias' great
success and popularity, see ch. 6.
3xen. Hell. 5.2.37; Diod. 15.21.1-2.
4see Oehler, RE 3A.l, 691-92.
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have received Spartan garrisons whose purpose was to assure adherence to
Lakedaimonian aims.

The closeness of the parallel to Lysander's

dekarchies is unmistakable and not at all surprising.

Although

Agesilaos had not installed groups of ten 5 to rule poleis controlled
by Sparta, nor had he kept up the fleet's strength since the King's
Peace, supinely pro-Spartan oligarchies sprung up wherever the
Lakedaimonians had intervened.

Agesilaos' purpose in obtaining command

for his brother was to continue the policy of dissolving any leagues or
federations and garrisoning individual poleis.

6

5Agesilaos' great success lay in part in his perception that
he must maintain at least formal subservience to the ephors and
gcrousia (Plut. Ages. 2.5, 4.1-6). Unlike his former mentor Lysander,
therefore, he would not impose governments solely on the basis of
loyalty to himself.
6Because of vagueness and ambiquity in the wording of the
King's Peace, the Spartans were able to interpret the autonomy
clause to their own ends. Many smaller poleis beyond the Isthmos
and in the Aegean were freed from domination of the great powers and
the Spartans' reputation as liberators was as high in 386 as it had
been in 404. When Agesilaos' designs began to unfold, however, first
with smaller 29leis, then Mantineia, Phlious and finally Thebes in
382, her reputation, as during the dekarchs' tenure, lost some of its
lustre. See Ryder, Koine Eirene, 39-45; Ehrenberg, The Greek State,
113-19; and Busolt/Swoboda, Griechische Staatskunde, Vol. 2, 1327-30.
Unlike previous epochs, Spartan activity under Agesilaos after 386
was marked by a singular and uncharacteristic aggressiveness. The
king and his supporters were no longer content to be leaders of the
Peloponnesians, but they now aimed for hegemony over all Hellas to
forestall the development of any league or coalition which might
threaten their supremacy or force them into an unwanted war. As Ryder,
37-38, observes, this interpretation of autonomy militated against
Panhellenism based on opposition to Persia. Throughout Hellas, local
patriotism, the desire to protect or increase wealth, and a pervasive
war-weariness combined to foster Agesilaos' drive for hegemony. I
disagree with Ryder that Lysias' Olympiakos of 384 indicates that
Sparta's prestige as liberator was unimpaired; see Ryder, 44. Rather,
because of the reduction of Mantineia and other smaller poleis, the
cession of the Asian Greeks to the Great King and their alliance with
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In order to achieve this purpose more efficiently, Agesilaos
presided over a reorganization of the Spartan alliance.

With the

decision to go to war on behalf of the Makedonians and unaligned
poleis of the Chalkidike against the Olynthian's league in 383, the
Spartans reintroduced compulsory tribute and ordered every allied
state to send soldiers to bring the army to a strength of 10,000 men.
For the

fi~st

time since Lysander's dekarchies (404/03), all poleis

in Greece bound to Sparta by treaty were required to send men or money
for the campaign.

The rate of commutation was three Aiginetan obols

per day for each soldier, or twelve obols for a horseman.

Failure to

supply either men or money would result in a fine of one Aiginetan
stater per day for each foot soldier absent from the levy.

One reason

for imposing this system was to counteract allied reluctance to comply
with the constant demands on their manpower. 7
After setting out, Teleutias was joined by Derdas, a vassal
prince of Amyntas III.

Derdas had long since proved his worth to

Amyntas and now served as the Makedonians' contribution to the allied
effort.
400. 8

His special strength was his horsemen of whom he led some
The Thebans, aware that Agesilaos' brother was in command of

Dionysios, Lysias (Oly. 1,5,7) explicitly rebukes the Spartans for
betraying their heritage as the guarantors of Greek freedom. With the
seizure of the Kadmeia, Sparta had become a threat to the very ideals
she had championed and the other Greeks held dear. See Ryder, 41-42;
Ehrenberg, 117-119; and Busolt/Swoboda, 1331-33.

7Xen. Hell. 5.2.21-22.

See also Busolt/Swoboda, 1328,and
Ehrenberg, 116. With the submission of Phlious and Olynthos,
Agesilaos completed the reorganization of Greece into ten districts
at the outset of his Boiotian campaign in 378; see ch. 9.
8

Elimia is the mountainous region of upper Makedonia; see

199
the full levy, also sent a contingent.

Teleutias proceeded slowly to

avoid antagonizing the allies beyond the Isthmos and to gather the
full complement of his force. 9
Upon occupying

Potidai~which

lay 11 km. south of Olynthos,

the new harmost Teleutias tried to induce the Olynthians to fight a
pitched battle.

At first he avoided cutting trees down or burning

crops, but finally he drew up his troops just under 2 km. from the
walls.

A sudden Olynthian cavalry sortie nearly put the allied force

to flight, but Derdas' men saved the day by forcing the Olynthians to
withdraw.lO

For the remainder of that year, the campaign deteriorated

into a series of raids and pillage by both sides in which Teleutias
partially reversed

hir~self

and began to cut down trees to impede the

enemy's approach. 11
In the spring of 381 the Makedonians, who had departed with
the onset of winter, returned, but the Olynthian cavalry took the
initiativ~.

They penetrated as far as the vicinity of Apollonia, some

17 km. to the north, while Derdas and his men were in town.

The

Makedonians launched a surprise attack, killed eighty Olynthians and
drove the rest back to their city. 12

Because no one would venture out-

Kaerst, RE 5.1, 239; and Oberhummer, RE 5.2, 2367-68. Derdas ultimately aided Amyntas III's succession~y killing Amyntas II in a
quarrel; see Arist. Pol. 13llb.
9Xen. Hell. 5.2.38-39; Diad. 15. 21.2.
lOxen. Hell. 5.2.39-42.
11xen. Hell. 5.2.43; Diod. 15. 21.2.
12xen. Hell. 5.3.1-3.
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side the walls, Teleutias changed his tactics to force the issue.
He knew that the defenders could farm only a very small tract of land
and that their supply of grain was low.

He therefore ordered an

extensive campaign of cutting down fruit trees and burning croplands
as close as possible to Olynthos itself.

His new strategy

provoked

the Olynthians to dispatch a cavalry force against a group of
Peloponnesians across the river which flowed just west of the city.
Teleutias, irritated by their temerity, ordered a counterattack, but
the Olynthians suddenly wheeled about and killed one hundred of his
men, including the Spartan hipparch.

Teleutias then lost his head,

ordering a full-scale assault on the city.

The Olynthian hoplites

poured out of the city to aid their retreating cavalry, however, and
broke through the allied line when Teleutias himself fell in the
fighting.

The rest of his troops, who had advanced hastily and in

disarray, scattered.

The Peloponnesians fled to Potidaia; the

Makedonians and Chalkidikians to Spartolos, Akanthos, Apollonia and
elsewhere.

Some 200 of the finest troops had died in the struggle,

leaving the Olynthians to celebrate a major victory. 1 3 ·In addition
to laying in considerable stocks of grain, they recruited many soldiers
from their allies

in the expectation that the Spartans would soon dis-

patch another army.l4

13 xen. Hell. 5.3.4-6; Diodorus 15.21.2.
14xen. Hell. 5.3.8; Diodorus 15.21.3.
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The consternation in Sparta at the news of Teleutias' defeat
and death was pervasive.

The remnants of Lysander's faction, who

perhaps still hoped to exploit the rich areas of Asia under the pretext of a Panhellenic crusade, could take little consolation at
Agesilaos' personal loss. 15

Some Spartans, such as Antalkidas and

the younger king Agesipolis, who feared a revival of Athenian seapower
and favored a much different interpretation of the autonomy clause
than Agesilaos, 16 could not have been pleased with a d~bacle inflicted
by a polis recently allied to Athens. 17

Because of recruitment

difficulties stemming from allied resistance to Sparta's constant
demands for soldiers, the anger of the previous summer at Phoibidas'
egregious coup, and now the setback in the north, it was necessary ior
Agesilaos and his supporters to take decisive steps.

As in the case

of the Asian campaign, the Spartans placed responsibility for the war
in a king's hands to shore up sagging prestige and resolve the impasse

15 For Sparta to act as rroocrTaTns of an anti-Persian crusade
was not really feasible at this time, despite the sentiments bruited
about at the great Panhellenic festivals. See Lysias' Olympiakos
(1, 5 and 7),delivered in 384 and Isokrates' Panegyrikos(ll7, 121,
125-28)which dates to 380 and bitterly decries the Spartans as
oppressors unsuitable to lead free men against the common despotic
foe. Also, as noted earlier, local patriotism, desire for prosperity,
and a pervasive war-weariness combined to preclude such a "crusade,"
see footnote 6.
16 For Antalkidas' opposition to Agesilaos, see Plut. Ages.
26.3-4, Mor. 227d and ch. 9. For the differences between the two
kings, see Diod. 15.19.4 and ch. 7.
17

see Bengtson, Staatsvertrage 1· 199. That Antalkidas and
Agesipolis were not unduly wary of the Athenians can be appreciated by
the fact that as early as 384, the city had contracted an alliance
with Chios; see Staatsvertrage 1, 196-98.
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created by the Olynthians' unlocked

for victory. 18

Not Agesilaos,

but Agesipolis took command and was accompanied by a council of thirty
advisors, as the elder king had been in 396.
In order to bolster the army's strength under Agesipolis, sons
of foreigners raised at Sparta,
volunteered to march.

~6ewves ,19 and many perioikoi

The young king also received the support of

Amyntas and Derdas whose enthusiasm was even greater than it had been
for Teleutias. 20

Agesipolis had proved effective, if not brilliant

against the Argives in 388 21 and had carried out Agesilaos' policy at
Mantineia in 384. 22

Because the younger king was a potential leader

for a faction opposed to the elder king, Agesilaos perhaps found it
expedient to allow conduct of the war to pass into his
hands. 23

colle~gue's

He could now firm up his base at home, while still achieving

18 xen. Hell. 5.3.8; Diod. 15.22.2; see Cartledge, Sparta and
Lakonia, 289. Smith, "The Opposition to Agesilaos' Foreign Policy,"
Historia,2 (1954), 48, believes that Teleutias' defeat in a war undertaken by Agesilaos' supporters may have caused the elder king to fear
for his supremacy. This is perhaps an exaggeration, but that many
Spartans and Peloponnesians were unhappy with Agesilaos is undeniable;
see below.
19 These were bastards of helot men and Spartan women.
20

Xen. Hell. 5.3.9.

2lsee ch. 6.
22 see ch. 7.

__

23Parke, "The Development of the Second Spartan Empire," JHS , 50
(1930),7~observes that Agesilaos' grand criterion for the entire period
from 386-379 B.C. was expediency. This is the mark, of course, of any
successful leader. Also dispatching Agesipolis to Potidaia could
certainly be seen as expedient to Spartan interests as Agesilaos perceived them.
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the dissolution of the Chalkidic league. 24
Upon arriving at the Pallene, Agesipolis and his advisors
were no more successful than Teleutias in drawing the Olynthians out
from their walls during the rest of 381.

The coming of spring found

. d army. 25
t h e d e f en ders no more eager to engage t h e a 11 ~e
for the Olynthians' reluctance are two:

The reasons

they had laid in a large

supply of grain after defeating Teleutias and were in awe of the
Spartans' military might and the size of the army.
Agesipolis repeated the tactics of Teleutias by ravaging
the countryside around the city.

He also occupied the middle of the

three Chalkidic "fingers," but as the season wore on, he fell ill with
a high fever.

Despite efforts to break the fever in the

~old

springs

24cartledge, 289, thinks that the disagreement between the
two kings was principled. He notes that Agesipolis was the instrument
of Agesilaos' policy at Mantineia and Olynthos. Although there was
internal opposition to Agesilaos, Cartledge points out that until the
end of his reign the elder king's supporters either won over or
silenced adversaries. Rice, "Agesilaos, Agesipolis and Spartan
Politics, 386-379_ B.C.," Historia,23 (1974),177, n.2, believes that
Agesipolis had won the trust of many Spartans and allies especially
by sparing, at his father's behest, the Mantineian exiles. By winning
the war in the Chalkidike, Agesi.polis could install a faction loyal to
himself in Olynthos and strengthen the internal opposition to
Agesilaos, perhaps even wresting control from him. This is an interesting view, but it rests primarily on speculation. It is more
likely that most Spartans were agreed, though perhaps for differing
reasons, that the Chalkidic league should be dissolved. In addition to
Rice, 177-78, Cawkwell, "Agesilaos and Sparta," CQ,26 (1976\77-78
and Parke, 73, see Agesipolis' appointment as manipulation by the elder
king. Still on the matter of the Olynthians, the two kings were likely
in substantial agreement; but there were some Spartans who did not completely agree with Agesilaos' purposes and methods.
25 xen. Hell. 5.3.18; Diod. 15.22.2.
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near the temple of Dionysos at Aphytis, 26 Agesipolis never recovered
and died by mid-summer 380.

The Spartans, having encased his body

in honey, as was customary for a dead king, sent it home to his relatives for buria1. 27

Agesipolis' exiled father Pausanias has left a

tribute to his son in a Delphic inscription to commemorate his
fourteen-year reign which began with the father's self-imposed exile
in 394 after the battle of Haliartos.28
The Spartans assigned Polybiades to Potidaia to conclude the
war (fall 380). 29

This officer was the son of the ephor Naukleides

who had accompanied King Pausanias to Athens in 403. 30

Since

26Aphytis lies about 15 km. so~theast of Potidaia; see
Hirschfeld, RE 1.2, 2801 and Princeton Encyclopedia of Classical
Sites, 70.
27xen. Hell. 5.3.19; Diad. 15.23.2; Paus. 3.5.9. Meyer, Vol.
5, 298-99, n.5, closely connects Agesipolis' campaign with
Agesilaos' siege of Phlious to fix the chronology. Diodorus, who
places his death in 380, is to be preferred to Xenophon whose version
is vague and imprecise because of his emphasis on Agesilaos at
Phlious.
28 For the inscription, see Tad, GHI, val. 2, no. 120.
29 xen. Hell. 5.3.20; Diad. 15.23.3.
30Aristeides 14.7; Athenaios 550d; Schaefer, RE 21.2, 1440.
Rice, 178, and Cawkwell, 78, observe that Agesilaos'-supporters may
not have been able to send one of their own to replace Agesipolis
because of weakened influence. A more likely reason would be that
Agesilaos was conducting the siege of Phlious. In any case, the
younger king's supporters perhaps effected the appointment.
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Polybiades' strategy was to reduce Olynthos to starvation, he invested the city by land and sea.

In late spring or early summer

379, his campaign succeeded with the Olynthians' capitulation.

They

yielded to the harmost's tactical sense, his numerical superiority
and famine by sending an embassy to Sparta to sue for peace. 31

In

exchange for lenient terms and the dissolution of the Chalkidic league,
the Olynthians agreed to become full allies of Sparta. 32

Following

the Olynthians' example, other Chalkidic poleis also enrolled under
the Spartan banner.33
Agesilaos and the Fall of Phlious, 381-379

~.f.

The struggle against the ChaJ..kjdic league had begun as a project nurtured

and controlled by Agesilaos.

Some historians have in-

ferred a decline in Agesilaos' influence because of resentment at the
king's methods and his brother's considerable setback near Olynthos in
381.3 4

\ihether this is so or not, an opportunity arose for Agesilaos

31 nemosthenes (19.264) almost makes it seem that Sparta, not
Olynthos, sued for peace. Ryder, Koine Eirene, 45-47, discusses
Sparta's uncharacteristic aggressiveness after 386 under Agesilaos
and the differences between the two kings, See n. 6 above.
32 Xen. Hell. 5.3.26.
33niod. 15.23.4.
34Rice, 178; Smith, 280; Parke, 72: Cawkwell, 78, suggests
that Agesilaos' supporters perhaps obtained this command for him to
shore up his sagging prestige. Another explanation is that
Agesipolis was absent so a new "crisis" would come under Agesilaos'
purvue, especially since Phlious was a Peloponnesian polis.
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to take the field himself with the arrival of a legation from Phlious.
Shortly after Agesipolis' departure in the summer of 381, a group of
pro-Spartan oligarchs arrived in Lakedaimon.

After Agesilaos had pro-

cured their restoration in 384, the ephors decreed that any disputes
arising over confiscated property should be submitted to arbitration. 35
On this occasion the oligarchs brought some Phliasian citizens to
corroborate their claim that contrary to the settlement of 384, they
were not receiving justice because the democrats controlled the boards
of inquiry set up to restore disputed property. 36

After hearing their

plea, the ephors were persuaded to call out the ban because word
arrived from Phlious that the democrats had fined the oligarchs for an
unauthorized visit to Lakedaimon.

Here was precisely the pretext

Agesilaos needed to stamp out the last major pocket of independence
in the Peloponnesos.

With Agesipolis in the Chalkidike he had a free

hand to take charge of the levy in what was essentially a local

35 xen. Hell. 5.2.8-10; as noted inch. 7, Phlious was a small,
but prosperous community just east of the Asopos River about seven km.
northwest of Nemea; see Meyer, RE 20.1, 272-73 and the Princeton
Encyclopedia, 707-08. In 384 the oligarchs had persuaded the Spartans
to deliver an ultimatum to Phlious' democratic government without
examining the merits of the exiles' allegations. See also Legan,
"Phliasian Politics and Policy in the Early Fourth Century B.C.,"
Historia,l6 (1967),325, 327, and 321.
36The Spartans bore a grudge against the Phliasians since 394
for pleading "holy truces" to excuse themselves from participating in
the battle of Nemea. Also they refused to admit Spartans into Phlious
until Iphikrates' peltasts routed them in 391; Xen. Hell. 4.2.16,
4.4.15. Legan, 330, n.2, believes that the democrats retained control
in 391 because the Spartans were bogged down in a war on two fronts.
See also ch. 7.
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operation. 37
As soon as sacrifices proved favorable, the king set forth
to besiege the small city.

He was met by several delegations offering

him money to turn back, but he spurned them all.

His response to

their entreaties was that he was not marching to do injustice, but
rather to rectify it.

The only way for the Phliasians to avoid war

would be to consent to the occupation of their akropolis by a Spartan
garrison.

The democratic government would obviously reject this con-

dition because it would set the stage for an oligarchic assumption of
power.3 8

That Agesilaos would make such a demand the sole condition

for peace shows that he intended to abolish the democracy. 39
With the inevitable rejecti-on of his demands by the Phliasian
government, Agesilaos led his troops to the outskirts of the polis
and began to construct a wall of encirclement.

In a sentence of

37 xen. Hell. 5.3.10-13. Xenophon notes in classic understatement that nv 0~ COT~ ~yncrtA~ &xeo]i€v~ TctUTCt.
He also observes
that the Phliasian democrats erred in believing that the Spartans
would not attack because Agesipolis was absent. By 381, however, it
is likely that any activity on the near side of the Isthmos was
considered "local," so it would not be necessary for the other king to
remain in Lakedaimon proper. In addition the Phliasian oligarchs had
a long-standing relationship with Agesilaos' family. An elder
oligarch had been Archidamos' ~{vos
while Prokles, a younger man,
was ~EVOS to Agesilaos.
38xen. Hell. 4.4.15.
39Rice, 178, suggests that
the Phliasian democracy to offset a
Agesipolis' partisans at Olynthos.
evidence to support this assertion,

Agesilaos was determined to crush
more lenient settlement by
There is, however, no real
even if it is true.
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remarkable candor Xenophon comes as close to censuring Agesilaos
as he can bring himself by writing that many Lakedaimonians said that
for the sake of a few, they were becoming hateful to a city of over

5,ooo. 40
Because the defenders would hold their assemblies in full view
of the besiegers, a measure was needed to counter the effectiveness
of their resistance.

Agesilaos therefore urged the exiles to make

common mess with any sympathizers from the city who might flee the
walls.

The exiles were to supply arms and training to these defectors

without regard to expense.

41

iJhen over 1,000 Phliasians eventually

joined the allied force, even those opposed to Agesilaos' designs were
compelled to admit that he was a man of great political and tactical
sagacity. 42

Moreover, the Phliasian defectors were seen as useful

comrades in arms and the number of defenders had now fallen to 4,000.
As the siege wore on, by the next summer (380) matters had
begun to stagnate when news reached the army at Phlious of Agesipolis'
death on the Pallene.

Because of the kings' somewhat differing aims

40 Xen. Hell. 5.3.16. Hertzberg, Das Leben des Agesilaos II,
157, 329, believes that such overtly political advocacy by Agesilaos
undercut any hope for a Panhellenic crusade against Persia, but see
footnote 6 above.

41 Xen, Hell. 5.3.16.
42 Xen. Hell. 5.3.17. Legon, 333, n. 61, observes that the
one thousand who eventually defected, compared with the original
5,000 heads in the assembly, gives a rough ratio of oligarchs to
democrats.
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and personalities, some expected Agesilaos to rejoice at the demise
of a rival, but the elder king showed a sincere regret as he and
Agesipolis had been personal friends. 43
By the spring of 379, Agesilaos realized that the Phliasians
were holding out longer than he had expected because the city had
laid in a sizeable supply of grain and had voted to cut daily rations
in half.4 4

Another reason for the city's staunch defense was the

leadership of Delphian and a group of 300 die-hard supporters.4 5

This

group would sally forth at night from time to time to harass the men
who were building the siege wall.

Throughout most of the siege, they

had also kept up the spirits of the other defenders in the face of
the enemy and defections by friends of the oligarchs.46

At last,

however, the shortage of food grew critical which forced the
courageous Delphian to request safe conduct to Lakedaimon.

He told

43 xen. Hell. 5.3.19-20; Diad. 15.19.3-4. Isokrates (4.126)
bitterly denounces the Spartans for their simultaneous campaigns
in 380 at Phlious and Olynthos.
44Hell. 5.3.21. Legan, 333-34, suggests that the defenders'
last chance for successful resistance collapsed with Agesipolis'
death. Because the Phliasians may have hoped for an equitable settlement had the younger king lived, Agesilaos perhaps sensed that their
last reason for holding out died with Agesipolis. Nonetheless they did
hold out until the following spring, nearly a year longer.
4 5see Kirchner, RE 4.2, 2517. Delphian is unknown except for
Xenophon's description of him in his account of the siege of Phlious.
46 Hell. 5.3.22.

··---
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Agesilaos that his supporters wished to leave the city's fate in the
hands of the Spartan authorities.

Unfortunately Agesilaos saw through

Delphian's ruse and resented the slight to his own authority.

He

therefore sent word to the Spartans that he be allowed to decide the
defenders' fate,after which he granted Delphian safe conduct. 47
The Phliasian leader must have suspected Agesilaos' deceit
for he and a "marked desperado" who was a master thief escaped in
the night.

This escape occurred after Agesilaos had ordered tighter

security to prevent such things.

When the legates returned to Phlious

with news that Agesilaos would determine the settlement, the city
surrendered.

Rather than risk opprobrium, Agesilaos decreed that a

committee of 100 citizens, fifty exiles and fifty who had stayed in
the city, decide who would live and who would die.

Thus he assured

a pro-Spartan oligarchy would take power since this committee would
also draw up the laws by which the city would be governed. 48

In

effect the Phliasians would impose the oligarchy on themselves under
the watchful eyes of the harmost and garrison which Agesilaos had
funded for six months.

Thus ended the experiment in democracy in the

second of the two anomalous cities in the Peloponnesos which had

47 xen. Hell. 5.3.23-24.
48

Xen. Hell. 5.3.25. Legan, 334, believes that all 100 members
of the committee were oligarchs. Ryder, 52, believes that 50 were
democrats.
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built walls and evolved away from aristocracy.

49

After a twenty-

months' siege, Agesilaos disbanded the Peloponnesian levy and led his
own men back to Sparta. 50
Sparta and Greece in the Autumn of 379
Virtually all ancient sources agree that with the conclusion
of the campaigns against Olynthos and Phlious, Sparta stood alone and
unchallenged, the most powerful by far of all the Greek states.

~qy

dissent or independent course within the Isthmos or beyond it had been
neutralized or crushed.

Her alliance with the Persian dynasty was

intact, she enjoyed cordial relations with Makedonia and in the far
West, Dionysios I of Syracuse was still firmly committed and on friendly
terms.Sl

Under Agesilaos' leadership the Spartans had chosen to inter-

pret the autonomy clause of the King's Peace in a manner expedient to

49 cawkwell, "Agesilaos and Sparta," ~ 26 (1976), 75, believes
that the fate of Mantineia and Phlious was sealed because they stood
in violation of the basic thrust of Peloponnesian life. Democracies
in large, populated centers protected by walls were anathema to a
landed aristocracy which relied on "traditional values" for internal
stability and cooperation with the Spartan alliance (not fortified
towns) for security from external threats.
50

Brief allusions to the Spartan suppression of Phlious also
appear in Xenophon's Ages. 2.21; Isok. 4.126 and Diod. 15.19.3.
Isokrates'use of the present tense to describe in 380 the simultaneous
operations at Olynthos and Phlious is quite apt.
War.

51 These alliances date, of course, to the end of the Korinthian
See Bengtson, Staatsvertr~ge 2, 188-95.
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their own purposes.

Within the Peloponnesos recalcitrant or un-

enthusiastic states suffered chastisement.

The form of this chastise-

ment was usually the imposition of a harmost and garrison, the intraduction of a

/

/

~aTptos ~OAtTEta

Peloponnesian alliance.

and absorption into the

The only exception was Argos, but the dissolu-

tion of the Argive-Korinthian sympolity in 386 had left the Argives
helpless and isolated.
Beyond the Isthmos the Spartans used the threat of Persian
help to dissolve by force hostile coalitions threatful to themselves
as

/

~poaTaTat

of Hellas.

The first victims of this narrow and rigid

interpretation were the Boiotians who were compelled in 386 to dissolve
their league.

Similarly the Olynthians' league was dismantled in the

wake of friendly overtures to the Athenians and Thebans.

In every in-

stance, the individual states made separate treaties with Sparta, not
the Peloponnesian alliance.5 2
As noted earlier, except for lack of a strong naval presence and

garrisons

in Asia,

Agesilaos~

leadership came to resemble Lysander's

and even more that of his older half-brother Agis. 53

He displayed a

strong and consistent antipathy to the Thebans which culminated in the
secret orders to occupy the Kadmeia. For Agesilaos mere dissolution of

52

See Ryder, 54and note 6 above.

53Agis had chastised and then absorbed Elis into the Peloponnesian alliance while Herippidas had occupied Herakliea of Trachis
before Agesilaos' accession; see ch. 2. A sharp point of difference
between Agesilaos and Lysander was that Agesilaos did not attempt to
install narrowly constituted cliques loyal only to himself as had
Lysander after 404.
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the Boiotian league was not enough; the Thebans must be brought to
heel for their final affront in refusing under Ismenias and
Androkleidas to participate in the Olynthian war.

This action is

perfectly consistent with the king's grudge against Thebes ever since
the spoilt sacrifices at Aulis. 54

With the occupation of the Kadmeia,

the reduction of Phlious and the dismemberment of the Chalkidic league,
Agesilaos' politics and policy had come to full and triumphant fruition.
The best ancient assessments of the Spartans' overweening
presence in the Greek world of 379 B.C. are three.

Xenophon writes

that the Thebans and other Boiotians were completely in the
Spartans' control, that the Korinthians' loyalty was unswerving, that
the Argives had been humbled and the Athenians isolated while pll
recalcitrants in the alliance had been punished.
view of the Spartan apxn

He concludes his re-

with the following remark: navTanacrtv ~on
55

""' Kal' ,acr~aAWS
...... n()apxn';)~'
, ~ KaTacrKEUacr
/e at •••
KaAWS
EuOKE1 aUTOlS

54 See ch. 3.
55Hell. 5.3.27. Xenophon uses the irony of the EOOKEl to
introduce his version of the liberation of the Kadmeia. The
Olynthian-Athenian treaty of 383 was dissolved when the Spartans absorbed the Chalkidic poleis into their
See Bengtson, Staatsvertrage
2, 199, 201. This completed the Athenians' ~Pn~@cr8at
by Sparta.

&pxn.
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Isokrates also describes the nature and extent of the Spartan
hegemony, but does so in largely disparaging tones.

His purpose,

especially in the Panegyrikos and the Peace, is to decry the Spartans'
(and other Greeks') unsuitability to confront their despotic foes to
the east.

His writings also contain an occasional reference to the

Spartans' subdued naval presence in the Aegean in the years after the
King's Peace. 56
Diodorus' evaluation of the Spartan hegemony is even more
blunt than Xenophon's.

His description of the extent of Spartan in-

fluence accords well with that of Xenophon, but he adds that the
basis of their power was the other Greeks' fear of their military,
might. 57

In his description of events in 377/76, Diociorus mentions

that the Spartans controlled the Cycladic islands of Skiathos and
Peparethos. 58

In addition Agesilaos had extended the net of Spartan

influence, if not control, to Thessaly and Makedonia with the conclusion

56 Isok. 4.117, 121, 125-28, 132, 175. Lysias' Olympiakos of
384 had similar sentiments. See note 6 and Grote, Vol. 9, 34, n.l;
Busolt/Swoboda, 204; and Ryder, 4~ for date.
57 niod. 15.23.3-5. Part of the Spartans' strength in this
~
Ephoran version lay in ~OAUavepw~ta
but as noted earlier the
Spartiate population during these years had actually declined. What
Diodorus must mean, therefore, is that the Spartans relied on their
perioikoi and helots. See Cartledge, 307, and ch. 2.
58 niod. 15.28.2, 30.5. Other allusions to a Spartan naval
presence in the Aegean occur in Plut. Pelop. 15.1; Demosthenes' de falsa
legatione 4.25; Xen. Hel~. 5.4.56 and Lak. Pol. 14.2,4. See also Parke,
41, 73; and Cawkwell, 79, who remarks that Agesilaos never fully
grasped the potential of sea power even when he was supreme commander
by both land and sea in 395 (ch. 4).
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of the Olynthian campaign.

59

Throughout the period from 386-379 B.C. there was some
grumbling about Agesilaos' aims and methods.

In general Agesipolis

and his supporters tended to be more tolerant of democratic leanings
in Spartan allies and were not eager to to interfere directly in the
allies' internal affairs. 60

Also there were those who perhaps still

yearned to exploit the rich areas of Asia or, more altruistically, to
free the Asian Greeks from Persian suzerainty.

This last group,

perhaps the remnants of Lysander's supporters, must have long since
given up hope of recovering the pre-eminence enjoyed by Sparta in
Greek Asia from 404-394.

The

accorr~odation

reached with the Great

King in 387 effectively precluded any such ventures for the foreseeable future.
Because Lysander had been dead for sixteen years in the
autumn of 379, and Agesipolis had died a year earlier, we must conelude that the great majority of the Lakedaimonians supported the
hegemony forged by the elder king. 61

In point of fact, not only the

59 see the speech of the Thessalian Polydamas (Xen. Hell. 6.1.2)
delivered in 374, but with retrospective allusions. Thessaly and
Makedonia were not formally bound to Sparta, but to some extent they
had accepted Spartan leadership and guidance.
60 see Cawkwell, 75-77; Rice, "Agesilaos, Agesipolis and
Spartan Politics, 386-379 B.C.," Historia,23 (1974), 165; Smith, 27980 and Hamilton, 326-27,for the notion of three distinct factions competing for power in Sparta after 404 B.C.
61 cawkwell, 78, speculates that Agesilaos perhaps acquiesced
to Agesipolis' conduct of the Olynthian war because he and his
supporters may not have been in full control after Teleutias' defeat
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King's Peace, which ceded Greek Asia to the Persians, but political
realities precluded any sort of Lysian or Isokratean Panhellenism
based on a crusade against the Great King. 62
Sparta's hegemony in the fall of 379 seemed assured and
Agesilaos' policies triumphant.

Although her position was secure,

it was not unassailable as events would soon make clear.

The

emergence of new coalitions and political alignments in Greece which
led to the overthrow of the Spartan hegemony began with the liberation of Thebes. 63
The Liberation of Thebes, Dec. 379 B.C.
Apart from the implications for the Spartans, the coup at
Thebes in early winter 379/78 B.C. was one of the swiftest and most
remarkable turn of events in recent Greek history.

No author, ancient

or modern, has failed to compare it either with Phoibidas' exploit

and death in 381. More to the point, however, is his remark, 77,
that Agesilaos' ¢1A£Ta1p1a worked, where his opponents'toleration
of democracies had failed. Smith, 278, notes that in 381 Agesilaos
was unpopular with the allies, while Agesipolis was not, but correctly
asserts that control of Spartan policy was still firmly in the elder
king's hands.
~

62

Hertzberg, 157, 329, tries to show that Agesilaos' policies
prevented such a crusade despite a sort of wistful longing for it in
some quarters of Greece. In fact Agesilaos was far teo practical a
man of affairs to be deluded about its impossibility. Cawkwell, 71,
writes that there is no evidence that Agesilaos ever gave up his
Panhellenism, but he simply faced the fact that in the 380's and 370's
an anti-Persian crusade was unrealistic. See also note 6 above.
63cartledge, 289-90, has remarked, "already, then, before 379,
there were indications that the feet of the Spartan colossus might be
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in 382 or Thrasyboulos' restoration of the Athenian democracy in 403.
Even the Lakonophile Xenophon felt compelled to write that justice
was on the side of the Thebans. 64
While Xenophon's is the only surviving account more or less
contemporary with the events, his narrative is flawed in places and
requires supplementation and correction by the much later versions of
Diodorus and Plutarch. 65
Because of vexation with Spartan behavior since 386, Athens
provided fertile ground for a Theban counter-insurgency.

As noted in

chapter seven, 66 the Athenians favorably received some 300 exiles,

of ceratliic composition. Within a decade, the feet had crumbled and
the giant had been toppled from his pedestal. 11
64

,
Hell. 5. 4 .1.

sch~fer, Die Berichte Xenophons, Plutarchs und Diodors
uber die Bestzung und Befreiung Thebens, 382-379 y_. Chr., Munich,
1930, 19-22, 68-71, 73, 77, and Judeich, "Athen und Theben vom
Konigsfrieden bis zum Schlacht bei Leuktra, 11 Rh.M., 76 (1927)., 172-80,
discuss the difficulties in trying to reconst~ what happened from
the divergent accounts preserved by our three principal sources.
Sch~fer purports to see a Theban tradition stemming from the lost
histories of Kallisthenes in Plutarch's Pelopidas and Daimonion of
Sokrates. He also thinks Diodorus' version represents a balance of
Theban and Athenian perspectives attributable to Ephoros. Xenophon,
Sch~fer believes, writes in a moralistic vein, attempting to reconcile
Athenian and Spartan viewpoints with a distinctly anti-Theban bias.
This bias results in his omission of any mention of Epameinondas or
Pelopidas. The weakness in Plutarch is that he neglects to note the
Athenian role in the coup. Because of the tenuous nature of the evidence, some of the details of this analysis have been challenged. See
Pearson, The Lost Histories of Alexander, 32; and Jacoby, Fr.Gr.~.
2B.2, 420-32.
65

66 xen. Hell. 5.2.31; Diad. 15.20.2.
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whose leader was Androkleidas, colleague of the executed Ismenias,
after the fall of the Kadmeia.

Although Kallistratos of Aphidna's

timorous pro-Spartan faction controlled the Athenian government, democratic and anti-Spartan elements abounded.

For this reason, the

refugees could expect to find aid and comfort,especially in view of
Theban hospitality to 1brasyboulos' group in 404/03.

67

Atnenian hospitality and Androklcidas' murder proved the
catalysts necessary for a conspiracy.

Leontiades' faction in Thebes

ordered the murder of the exile leader and others, but the assassins
failed except for Androkleidas.

With the deaths of Ismenias and

Androkleidas the anti-Spartan group, which favored a strong Boiotian
league, was leaderless.

Although many of the exiles were frightened

and demoralized by the assassination, Pelopidas succeeded in keeping
their spirits up.

As the months turned to years, Pelopidas gradually

emerged as the most prominent of the exiled patriots.

Under his

prodding the exiles slowly realized that they could not remain in
Athens indefinitely.

Both honor and expediency

demand~d

a bold stroke

to expel the traitorous tyrants and Spartan garrison from their city.
An opportunity arose when Phyllidas, a friend of the exile }felon,

visited Athens and \vas won over. 68

Another Theban, Charon, whose

name was grimly appropriate, shared Phyllidas'

rev~lsion

for the

67

Rice, "Xenophon, Diodorus and the Year 379/78 B.C.,"
Yale Classical Studies, 24 (1975), 97-98, n.9, trenchantly discusses the significance of factional politics in both Athenian
and Spartan affairs and their interrelation to one another. See
also Judeich, 175-80.
68

xenophon (Hell. 5.4.2)implies that Phyllidas was secretary
to the polemarchs at the time of his visit. Plutarch (Moral. 595a-b,
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polemarchs and offered his house as a base within the city.
After a day was set for the coup, the conspirators secretly
left Athens to enter Thebes at nightfall.

Pherenikos was left in

charge of the bulk of the exiles at the frontier between Attika and
Boiotia.

With this group there was also a contingent of Athenian

volunteers commanded by two strategoi. 69

The sequence of events for

the next two or three days is quite confused and in places the
testimony is contradictory.

Numerous discrepancies of detail occur

in Plutarch and Xenophon's versions and there are even some differences
.
70
between the two narratives of Plutarch.
The time was December and the occasion was a festival of
Aphrodite which coincided with the winter solstice. 71

The con-

spirators set out on foot, entered Thebes at dusk and assembled at
Charon's house. 72

\Vhile their fellows and the Athenian volunteers

Pelop. 7.1-3) writes that he contrived to become their secretary later.
69 Xen. Hell. 5.4.3, 9; Plutarch __(Pelop. 8.1), as noted above, makes
no mention of this Athenian aid.
70 Grote, Vol. 8, 77-83,follows Plutarch for detail, noting where
he differs from Xenophon. Beloch 3.2, 234-35, as Delacey and Einarson
in the Loeb edition, 362-64, observes that the differences between
Xencphon and Plutarch are irreconcilable. Schafer, 51-63, examines
the matter in great detail as an exercise in Quellenforschung, but
cannot establish with any certainty the merits of one version over
another. See also Meyer, Vol. 5, 365, n.l.

71Dummler, RE 1. 2, 23 71 and Heyer, Vol. 5, 365.
72

According to Xenophon (Hell. 5.4.3), there were seven conspirators led by Melon. He assigns a lapse of two days from their
massing at the frontier to the tyrannicide. Plutarch (Pelop. 8.1-
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waited at the border, 73 the conspirators made their final preparations
for the deed.

On the night of the festival Phyllidas arranged a

dinner at the polemarcheion to celebrate the end of the tyrants' year
in office.

As Phyllidas had promised, a group of hetairai and komasts

arrived after the meal.

These of course were the disguised con-

spirators who, suddenly doffing their outer garments, stabbed
Archias and Philippos to death. 74

A second group led by Pelopidas

went to Leontiades' house, pretending to have a message from the
polemarchs.

Leontiades grew suspicious at the sight of the group,

however, and reached for his sword.

Despite a courageous effort, he

was overwhelmed by the more numerous conspirators and killed.

A third

polemarch, Hypates, tried to flee across the rooftops near his house,
but he too eventually perished at the hands of the liberators.75

9.1) writes that there were twelve conspirators and that they entered
Thebes disguised as hunters during an evening snowstorm with only one
day between departure and deed. Xenophon's chronology is probably--better.
73since Plutarch specifies the Thriasian plain as the point of
departure, the most likely sites would be the border fortresses of
Eleutherai and Oinoe on the spurs of Mt. Kithairon. See Weisner, RE
20.1, 1011-13; Princeton Encyclopedia, 70; and The Blue Guide to Gr;ece,
209 with map.
74xen. Hell. 5.4.6-7 ascribes leadership of the second group
to Phyllidas. He cites no figures, but Plutarch (Moral. 596a-b, Pelop.
9.1) states that the number of conspirators in the city eventually grew
to forty-eight.
75This detail is preserved only in Plutarch (Moral. 596 and
Pelop. 11.6).
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Pelopidas and Melon then proclaimed the tyrants' death and
the liberation of the city while calling the citizens to assembly.
They also sent for the rest of the exiles and the Athenian
volunteers at the border after releasing all political prisoners incarcerated by the tyrants.

Some Theban Lakonophiles with the Spartan

garrison managed to barricade

th~mselves

on the Kadmeia during the

. t h e c1ty.
.
76
uproar 1n
At daybreak the newly armed citizens and freed prisoners launched an assault on the Kadmeia.

Two of the three Spartan commanders had

sent an urgent request for help to Thespiai and Plataia during the
night, but within a few days they agreed to surrender to the new government in exchange for safe conduct. 77

As the Spartan garrison filed out

of the city with the Theban Lakonophiles,

o~ly

the Athenians' inter-

vention cut short a massacre of those who had supported the tyrants.
The survivors were then allowed to depart in peace with the
Lakedaimonians. 78
With the recapture of their city, the death or expulsion of the
Lakonophiles and the departure of the Spartan garrison the Theban

76Xen. Hell. 5.3.8-10; Plut. Moral. 596, Pelop. 12.3-4.
number of those who fled to the Kadmeia was 1500.
77 Xen. Hell. 5.4.10-12. A third officer chanced to be in
Haliartos at the time of the coup, Plut. Pelop. 13, Moral. 597a.
78xen. Hell. 5.4.12.

The
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patriots had ushered in a new era in the struggle for supremacy in
Greece.79

Agesilaos' designs for hegemony were now in jeopardy.

A rupture had appeared in his network of control beyond the Isthmos.
The simple expedient of manipulating opponents at home while imposing
docile oligarchies in other poleis was shown to be not without serious
risk. 80

Only a few months before the Theban coup, virtually all trace

of dissent in European Greece had been silenced or crushed.
stood at the zenith of her political and military ascendancy.

Sparta
Agesi-

laos, the architect of this pre-eminent position, appeared vindicated
in fu11. 81

It is ironic, therefore, that the first fissure in the

king's hegemony should occur with the success of his bitterest foes,
the exiles of Thebes.

79Diod0rus (15.23.1-3) gives a terse notice of the tyrannicide. In his version the tyrants were killed at home in their sleep.
At dawn the citizens assembled and launched an attack against the 1500
Spartans and Lakonophiles who had fled during the night to the Kadmeia.
Nepos (Pelop. 2.1-4.1) also. summarizes the coup briefly. A final curt
and rather garbled notice of the tyrannicide appears in Polyainos
2.4.3, but for the historian's purposes, i t is virtually worthless.
8°Even Agesilaos' friend and admirer Xenophon (Hell. 5.4.1)
adverts directly to the implications of the Thebans' success which he
links closely to the eventual collapse of the Spartan hegemony. He
cannot bring himself to credit the role played by Epameinondas and
Pelopidas, however, which leads Schafer, 60-61, to speculate that
Xenophon has set forth the official Spartan version of the coup.
81 nespite appearances, Beloch 3.1, 146-47; Parke, 74; Cawkwell,
80; and Cartledge,290,all note that Sparta's position was not as secure
as it may have seemed in the autumn of 379.

CHAPTER IX
SPARTA'S RESPONSE TO THE THEB~~S, SPHODRIAS' RAID
AND AGESILAOS 1 CM-rPAIGNS IN BOIOTIA, 378-377 ~.£_.
By January of 378, the Theban Lakonophiles and the Spartan
garrison in the Kadmeia had surrendered.

With the

departur~

of these

people. Pelopidas, Melon and Epameinondas set about the business of
forming a government in the city and ·reconstituting the Boiotian
The ne':.v government 1 s first diplomatic initiative had been

league.

to dispatch a conciliatory legation to Sparta while the garrison
was: still blockaded.

The Spartans, however, rebuffed this overture. 1

t-lith the rejection of the Theban embassy, Agesilaos easily
persuaded the ephors to call out the ban.

He decided this time (un-

like at Hantineia in 385 and Olynthos in 381) not to manipulate the
young king but rather to decline the honor of command himself, citing
his more than forty years of military service. 2

The real reason for

1

Isokrates ( Plat. 29). shows that the Thebans made this gesture
in the hopes of avoiding a war. So soon after the coup, despite the
aid of Athenian volunteers, they could not be sure of Athens' official
support. Rice, "Xenophon, Diodorus, Etc.," 104, observes that Isokrates
has deliberately distorted the purpose of this legation to put the
Thebans in a bad light, but with Xenophon's testimony (Hell. 5.4.10-12)
and that of Deinarchos (Contra Demosth. 38-39), Isokratesr-remarks
confirm the unofficial participation of some Athenians in the coup.
See also Sc~afer, 3.2, 324. Meyer, Vol. 5, 367-68, believes that the
Theban embassy mentioned by Isokrates occurred after Kleombrotos'
incursion.
2xen. Hell. 5.4.14; Plut. Ages. 24.2-3; Died. 15.27.3.
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his decision was concern that after his advocacy of the Philiasian
oligarchs, he would again be seen as a friend of tyrants were he to
take the field against the Thebans. 3

Moreover,there is evidence of

great internal stress at Sparta immediately after the events at
Thebes. 4

Bearing these things in mind and the fact that he was re-

nowned for his animosity against Thebes, Agesilaos stepped aside.

3plut. Ages. 24.3. Agesilaos had seen to it that the ephors
made the same demand of the Theban legates as they had of the
Phliasians: restoration of the exiles. This naturally was the one
condition Pelopides, Epameinondas and Melon could not agree to which
made war inevitable.
4After assuming command of the allied force, the young king
Kleombrotos had two of the three officers in charge of the garrison
at Thebes executed for failing to await reinforcements. One of these
officers may have been Herippidas, a long time collaborator of both
Lysander and Agesilaos. Plutarch (Moral. 597a) is our only source
for the names of these officers, but his text is corrupt. Hertzberg,
Das Leben des Agesilaos, 159,accepts the reading Herippidas as do
Delacey and Einarson who provide a full discussion of the problem,
Loeb Moralia, Vol. 7, 441, 509. Athenaios (Deipnosophistai 609b) in
a discussion of beautiful women reports that Agesilaos contrived the
execution of Xeinopeitheia and her daughter Chryse during a period of
factional strife. Xeinopeitheia, reputedly the most beautiful woman
in the Peloponnesos, was the wife of Lysandridas, one of the three
officers in charge of the Kadmeia. Because he was away in Haliartos
at the time of the garrison's surrender, he was spared the death
penalty. Nevertheless the fine assessed against him was so ruinous
that he chose exile rather than reduction in status to D~o~e(wv
At the time of the death of Xeinopeitheia and Chryse, Agesilaos was
described as
KaTacrTacrl~aas. See Meyer, Vol. 5, 367, n.l; Jacoby,
Fr.Gr.R.,2B.l, 587 (fragment 240 Theopompos). Also at this time
Agesilaos had the contents of Alkmene 1 s tomb at Haliartos transferred
to Sparta upon oracular instigation. All that remained was a bracelet,
a stone, two urns and a large bronze tablet inscribed with what seemed
to be Egyptian hieroglyphics. Agesilaos ordered that copies of the
inscription be sent to Nektanebis who became Pharoah in 380 B.C. He
requested an interpretation, but no word is preserved of any response;
see Plut. Moral. 577e. See also Pieper, RE 16.2, 2234 and Beloch,
3.2, 123-24.
The removal of Alkmene'S body and the substitution
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The internal wrangling at Sparta in the early weeks of 379
made it clear that Agesilaos' strong anti-Theban policy had failed.5
It was nonetheless incumbent upon the Spartans to make some sort of
response to the Thebans' rejection of their demand to take back the
exiles.

Kleombrotos, the younger brother of Agesipolis, who had be-

come king upon the latter's death in 380, therefore obtained his
first field command.

6

Kleombrotos led the allied army into Boiotia through the pass
defended by the Athenian fortress of Eleutherai which was located
some 17 km. south of Thebes.7 He carefully avoided a clash with
Chabrias' Athenian peltasts, but turning west, he routed a group of
Theban irregulars composed of the freed political prisoners.

After

passing through Plataia and Thespiai, he eventually reached Kynos-

of a stone for it are mentioned by Plutarch (Romulus 28.7), Pausanias
(9.16.7) and Pherekydes (Jacoby, Fr.Gr.~. Vol. 1.1, 83, no. 84).
Jacoby observes (Vol. 1.2, 307) that this anecdote appears in the
earliest part of Pherekydes' work which deals with the Greece of myth
and legend.
282~

5 see Smith, "The Opposition to Agesilaos' Foreign Policy,"
and Rice, "Xenophon, Diodorus, e.tc., " 105.

6xen. Hell. 5.4.13-14; Plut. Ages. 24.2-3; Diod. 15.27.3.
Hertzberg, 159; and Rice, 104-0S,have seen Agesilaos' decision not
to take command as another instance of his strategy of allowing those
opposed to him to bear the onus of carrying out his designs. In this
view KleombrGtos' command would ease the vexation against Agesilaos,
deprive his rivals of a strong leader and permit him to keep a close
watch on matters at home. Finally, just as in 385 at Mantineia, if
the youthful king were to falter, Agesilaos could come to his rescue.
Should he succeed, he would merely advance the elder king's policy.
See especially Rice, 105.
7 see Milchhofer, RE 5.2, 2345; The Blue Guide to Greece, 1978,
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kephalai before returning to Boiotia for sixteen days. 8

Because his

was not a full levy, Kleombrotos merely reinforced Spartan outposts
in Boiotia, such as Plataia and Thespiai, rather than attempting to
force a pitched battle with the Thebans. 9

Although most strategic

passes to the south were garrisoned by Athenians and the winter preeluded adequate provisions for a longer campaign, his men were some'"hat puzzled \Vhen Kleombrotos ordered two-thirds of the force back to
the Isthmos. 10

Before leaving Boiotia the young king had made

Sphodrias harmost at Thespiai, leaving him a sum of money for recruiting mercenaries and one-third of the allied troops. 11
In order to avoid entrapment between hostile Boiotian or even
Athenian forces, Kleombrotos withdrew along the coastal road of
Kreusis.

After losing some animals and equipment during a violent

storm near Aigosthena in the Hegarid, Kleombrotos disbanded the army
and went home. 12

363; and The Princeton Encyclopedia of Classical Sites, 368-69.
8 Xen. Hell. 5.4.14-15. This transpired after the trial and
execution of the officers who had surrendered the Kadmeia. The site
of the trial was Megarai Plut. Pelop. 13; Diad. 15.27.3.

9

See Meyer, Vol. 5, 367-68.

10 xen. Hell. 5.4.16.
11xen. Hell. 5.4.15.
12 xen. Hell. 5.4.17-18. Hammond, "The Main Road from Boiotia
to the Peloponnese through the northern Megarid," ABSA,49 (1954), 10322, discusses the extremely rugged and at times hazardous topography
of this coastal area.
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During the incursion, \vhich his troops believed \vas
lnconclusive, Kleombrotos accomplished the follo,..ring.

First he

executed two of the three officers who were present at the surrender
of the Kadmeia and fined a third '''ho \vent into exile . 13

Also

in passing through the Isthmos, his show of strength tempered the

reaction of some Korinthians who were ready to revolt from the
.
14
a 1] 1.ance.

Fin~lly

his m3rch dramatically cooled the anti-

Spartan ardor of certain Athenians and induced the assembly to
co;:1demn to death the t'vo generals who had aided the Theban uprising
unofficially.
exile.

One was in fact execcted, while the other fled into

At the same tine other pro-Theban citizens faced trial on

lesser charges. 15
Attika
~hile

Kleombrotos' army was penetrating central Greece as

far as Kynoskephalai, Agesilaos sent a legation to Athens '.vhose mission

13 see Pltlt. Pelop. 13, ~!oral. 597a; Diod. 15.27.3.

14xen. Hell. 5.4.19.
15

Plut. Pe!E.E_. 14.1. Rice, "Xenophon, Diodorus, etc.,"
97, n.l, believes that Kallistratos of Aphidna's mildly pro-Spartan
party instigated these trials to conciliate Agesilaos, whose legates
arrived in Athens at this time to urge neutrality. See Hertzberg,
162-63, and Rice, 111.
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''as to discourage any aid to the The ban insurgents.

Kallias, the

Spartans' proxenos at Athens, received the three legates Etymokles,
Aristolochos and Okyllos at his home. 16

As noted above, the arrival

of these legates and Kleombrotos' s,.,rift mid,.,rinter march induced the
assembly to condemn the two adventurous strategoi to death. 17

Thus

the Spartans' initiatives in the wake of Pelopidas and Melon's coup
were at least partially effective.

Although they had net

~2gdined

control of the Kadmeia, they had shmm the rest of the Greek

~.,rorld,

especially the Athenians, that they were prepared to maintain the
order imposed with the King's Peace by force if need be. 18

Despite

the elder king's diplomacy and Kleombrotos' show of strength beyond
the Isthmos, a series of events set in motion by the harmost at
Thespiai would make war once again inevitable in Gr£ece.
Shortly after Kleombrotos' return to Sparta and the trial of
the strategoi at Athens, Sphodrias set out from Thespiai at sunset

16

Xen. Hell. 5.4.22.

1 7Hertzberg,l63, has observed that Agesilaos was responsible
for this mission because Etymokles, the chief legate, was one of his
partisans; see Xen. Hell. 5.4.32. It is possible that the Thebans'
conciliatory, though failed, legation to Sparta dates to the aftermath
of Kleombrotos' incursion; see note 1 above.
18 Agesilaos' interpretation of the autonomy clause worked with
special severity against the Thebans and the Boiotian league (see
ch. 7) in part because of his hostility to the Thebans, but also because he perceived the threat posed to Spartan supremacy in central
Greece by a united Boiotia. There is evidence that shortly after the
tyrannicide at Thebes, Pelopidas and the other leaders had swiftly
taken steps to revive the Boiotian league; see Plut. Pelop. 13.1, Moral.
597a; Polybios 6.43, 44.9; and Paus. 9.1.5. Plutarch notes
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in order to capture the Peiraeus.

By daybreak he had led his troops

. . .
. 1n
' t h e Th r1as1an
. .
. 19
o f El eus1s
p 1a1n.
some ::>~0 1r<m. to t h e VJ.cJ.nJ.ty
Unfortunately for his intentions, he was still 20 km. short of the
harbor.

In anger and frustration he pillaged a few houses and seized

some cattle before retreating to Thespiai.

~~en

a general alarm

was sounded in Attika, the hoplites and other citizens naturally
rushed to repel what they thought was a major invasion.

As the truth

became apparent, the Athenians dispatched legates to Sparta with a
demand for an explanation and justice.

The Spartans, however, had

anticipated this reaction, having laid capital charges against
Sphodrias.

Realizing the enormity of his error, the harmost chose to

disregard the ephors' summons in fear for his life. 20
That Sphodrias' raid was even undertaken points up the
difference in purpose between Agesilaos' partisans and those of

that the citizens' assembly elect~d Melon, Pelopidas and two others
Boiotarchs, not polemarchs, for 378. At first the Thebans were
largely alone except for their alliance with the Athenians (see
below), but by 376 they had restored most of the Boiotian league with
the expulsion of the last Spartan garrisons. See Busolt/Swoboda,
1423-24 and Meyer, Vol. 5, 380-81.
1 9This is the figure cited by Beloch 3.1, 147
obtained by consulting topographical maps such as that
Guide to Greece, 1978 ed. Cary, CAR 6, 66-67, gives the
miles, a rather large figure, and he believes that the
started at Plataia. See also n. 25.

which can be
of the Blue
distance as 45
march may have

20 Xen. Hell. 5.4.20-24; Plut. Ages. 24.3-6; Pelop. 14.1-3;
and Kallisthenes fr. 9 in Jacoby, Fr.Gr.~., Vol. 2B.l, 643; Jacoby,
Vol. 2B.2, 418, does not allude to the possibility that Sphodrias
acted on Kleombrotos' orders.
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Kleombrotos.

Xenophon and Plutarch 21 explain the raid as the result

of Sphodrias' foolish vanity and a bribe offered by an agent of Melon,
Pelopidas and Gorgidas.

According to this version the Theban agent

convinced Sphodrias that not only was such a feat possible, 22 but
>vere the harmost to bring it off, his renown >vould eclipse even that
of Phoibj das >vho had seized the Kadmeia in 382.

Thus fired by ambition

and idle hopes, Sphorlr;a~ made his ill-fated attempt. 2 3
As soon as the danger had passed, the Athenians arrested the
three legates sent by Agesilaos to assure the Athenians' neutrality
and urge the prosecution of the two strategoi.24

Etymokles was able

to persuade his captors, however, that the legates were innocent of
any complicity in Sphodrias' attack.

With assurances that the culprit

would be punished, the legates were set free. 25

21 Hell. 5.4.20-21; Ages. 24.3, Pelop. 14.1, where Plutarch
clearly paraphrases his sourc~ Xenophon. See Meyer, Vol. 5, 369, n.l.
22 The agent noted that the Athenians would be caught completely
una>vare and that the "long walls" running from the Peiraeus to the city
as yet had no gates (Hell. 5.4.20). See also Meyer, Vol. 5, 369.
23nespite its superficial plausibility, virtually no one has
accepted at face value the explanation for the raid advanced by Xenophon
and Plutarch. See Meyer, Vol. 5, 369; Beloch, 3.1, 147, n.l; Grote,
Vol. 7, 86; and Rice, 114.
24xen. Hell. 5.4.22.
25xen. Hell. 5.4.23. There is some doubt as to both the
feasibility of Sphodrias' attempt and its date. Disregarding the
distances, terrain, or difficulty of night marches, Rice, 116, n.52
believes that it was feasible. A careful consideration of topography,
however, taken with the ancient estimates of Sphodrias' character
(see note 20), shows that except by horseback, it \vould be arduous
to get from Thespiai (or Plataia) to the Peiraeus overnight. See
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Because the explanation set forth by Xenophon and Plutarch
for Sphodrias' raid is plainly inadequate, it is necessary to consider
the much different reason advanced in the Ephoran tradition of
Diodorus.26

Although his chronology is clearly erroneous and his

placing of Athens' first official aid to Thebes is out of sequence, his
explanation for Sphodrias' raid is surely correct. 27
simply that
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Because Sphodrias had a good deal of money to recruit
mercenaries, it is likely that bribery would be ineffective.

Also,

\vith a third of Kleombrotos' levy28 under hig,.. command, one can surmise
that more than just the garrisoning of Thespiai \vas intended.

In any

case a major figure in Sparta was certainly behind Sphodrias' rash
decision to invade Attika.

Because Agesilaos' diplomacy in Athens

Beloch, 3.1, 147,and Meyer, Vol. 5, 369. While neglecting to mention
that people returning to Athens at sunrise from the Eleusinian mysteries (Plut. Ages. 24.7-8) gave the alarm, Rice, 117, n.54, is surely
correct in dating the raid to early or mid-~1arch. The mysteries, a
cult whose original purpose was to insure good crops, were celebrated
just before the vernal equinox. See Stengel RE 5.2, 2332, \vho dates
the Eleusinia to the period comprising 28 Hekatombion to 12
Boedromion.
26

Diod. 15.29.5-7.

27 Grote, Vol. 7, 86; Meyer, Vol. 5, 369, n.9; and Fiehn, RE 3A.2,
1749-50, are cautious in accepting Diodorus' explanation. Beloch,~.1,
147, n.l, believes that Kleombrotos' complicity is sehr moglich, while
Rice, 114, insists that it is the only possible reason, based on his
hypothetical reconstruction of factional wrangling in Sparta. In addition to misdating these events to 377, Diodorus also erroneously places
Demophon's expedition to aid the Thebans before Sphodrias' acquittal.
28

There is no evidence about the number of Kleombrotos' troops;
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had been effective since the primary focus of his concern was the Theban coup, i t is highly unlikely that the decision

~;.;ras

his.

If \var \vere

necessary to subdue the Boiotians, it cannot have been his purpose to
provoke the Athenians or drive them into the Boiotian camp.

Since

Plutarch explicitly writes that Sphodrias belonged to the group in
Sparta opposed to Agesilaos, the combined literary evidence about the
harmost's situation points ultimately to Kleombrotos' responsibility
for his subordinate's move. 29
As we have seen, the news of Sphodrias' fiasco induced the
ephors to lay a capital charge against him even before the Athenians
.

arr~ve

d to protest. 30

Also Agesilaos would have taken a dim view of

however, as Eudamidas took 2,000 soldiers to Potidaia in 382 before
Teleutias arrived with the full levy of 10,000, Kelombrotos likely
had 2,000 or perhaps 3,000 for his midwinter incursion. Thus
Sphodrias with as many as 1000 soldiers in Thespiai had far more
than needed to garrison effectively the town and money to recruit more!
See ch. 7, n.44.
29 Plut. Ages. 24.4. Despite Lysander I s death nearly seventeen
years earlier, Rice,ll4~15, believes that Sphodrias was a Lysandrian,
that Kleombrotos ordered the attack to bolster his prestige after
failing to retake the Kadmeia and because the young king believed the
raid was feasible. Meyer, Vol. 5, 369, writes that Sphodrias (who
disliked Agesilaos) was a member of Kleombrotos' group. Both
Kleombrotos and Sphodrias likely underestimated the difficulty of the
project, but decided to make the attempt because some Spartans
genuinely feared a revived Athens in alliance with Thebes. This
interpretation accords very well with the evidence, while obviating
the need to posit a tripartite ideological struggle in Sparta. One
need only remark that some Spartans understood better than Agesilaos
the importance of seapower; see below.
30

Xen. Hell. 5.4.24.
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of Sphodrias' efforts, knowing that a full-scale invasion of Boiotia
would be necessary to crush nascent resistance to Sparta's influence
beyond the Isthmos.

Because he eventually moved to acquit

Sphodrias, 31 even though admitting his guilt; a reason must be
sought for his change of heart.
it

~vas

Xenophon and Plutarch 32 write that

because of Archidamos' advocacy.

and Sphodrias' son

~vere

J ewers.

Archidamos, Agesilaos' son,

In this version, Archidamos per-

suaded his father to have mercy on the culprit.

Since Sphodrias

had formerly been a good soldier, Agesilaos finally acquiesced,
noting that the state could not afford to waste the life of a man of
proven worth.
His son's pleas perhaps moved the elder king, but a more
likely explanation for his volte-face was news brought back from
Athens by Etymokles:

Kallistratos' mildly pro-Spartan faction would

be unable to contain the surge of anti-Spartan fervor unleashed by
Sphodrias' egregious assault. 33
As noted earlier, the swift retribution against the officers
in charge of the Kadmeia showed that Agesilaos was not at all loathe

31 xen. Hell. 5.4.34; Plut. Ages. 26.1, Pelop. 15.1; Diod.
15.29.6.
32Hell. 5.4.25-32; Plut. Ages. 25.1-5.
33xenophon (Hell.5.4.23)writes that Etymokles, Aristolochos and
Okyllos were released after giving assurances that they knew nothing
of Sphodrias' attack and that he would be tried for his life. Since
Etymokles was Agesilaos' personal friend, it is quite likely that
he returned quickly to Sparta with ner,rs of the Athenians' mood a decidedly ugly one regarding the Spartans.
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to countenance death or exile, even if he did not press for them
personally.

Moreover, he was not above procuring the execution even

of offending women. 34

In order to compose internal dissension in

the face of a combined Athenian and Theban threat, Agesilaos, having
decided that Athens was lost, voted to acquit the guilty Sphodrias.
Since Sphodrias was a partisan of Kleombrotos, as a conciliatory
gesture, unlike Phoibidas, he was not even fined. 35
~nen

the report of Sphodrias' acquittal reached Athens, what

Agesilaos anticipated was not long in coming.

The sudden surge

of anti-Spartan rancor moved the assembly to declare the Spartans
36
in violation o f the King I s Peace.

For several years the Athenians

had been conducting quiet diplomacy in the Aegean.

inus it is unlikely

34 see note 4 above for a discussion of Agesilaos' role in the
decision to execute the two officers present when the Kadmeia
garrison surrendered and to exile a third who chanced to be in
Haliartos. Also Agesilaos had the wife and daughter of the exiled
officer killed during a period of factional strife immediately after
the Spartan garrison surrendered (Jacoby, Fr.Gr.~ .• Vol. 2B.l, 587
under Theopompos ).
35

xen. Hell. 5.4.34; Plut. Ages. 26.1, Pelop. 15.1. Diodorus
that the two kings cooperated to obtain his unjust
acquittal. Hertzberg, 163-66, observes that ultimately both kings
and their partisans desired Sphodrias' acquittal for the sake of
unity in the face of impending war. Meyer, Vol. 5, 378, surmised
that Agesilaos thought Sphodrias' acquittal would not measurably
affect Sparta's relations with Athens. Smith, 281, is probably
closer to the mark when he suggests that Agesilaos did realize how
the Athenians would react, but underestimated the vigor and sericusness of their response.

~5.29.6)writes

36 Diod. 15.29.5.
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that the turn of events in lakedaimon caused the Athenians to offer
alliance to any polis disenchanted with the Spartans, but it seems to
have accelerated an existing trend. 3 7

The most weighty results of

Sphodrias' acquittal were the Athenians' treaty with Thebes and the
.
. secon d mar1t1me
. .
1 eague. 38
creat1on
o f t h e1r

The return of Etymokles' legation to Sparta with news that
popular support for the pro-Spartan Kallistratos was crumbling
likely induced Agesilaos to seek reconciliation with those opposed to
his aims in Sparta. 39

It was necessary for him to settle internal

wrangling as his long military and political experience surely told
him that war was corning.

Because he did not fully appreciate the

role of seapower in statecraft, he probably decided that Athens was
lost.

His long-standing antipathy to the Thebans surged to the fore.

as an opportunity arose for him to take the field against them (and

37 For evidence of Athenian diplomatic initiatives before 378,
see Tad, GHI, Vol. 2, 56-72 and Bengtson, Staatsvertrage 2, 206-14.
38Besides the more detailed accounts of Xenophon (Hell. 5.4.34),
Plutarch (Ages. 26.1, Pelop. 15.1) and Diodorus' chronologically misplaced narrative (15.26), Aristeides(258)and Polybios(9.23.7)also recall
the Sphodrias affair and its consequences. Epigraphical evidence for
the defensive pact between Athens and Thebes appears in Tad, GHI, Vol.
2, no. 123 and Bengtson, Staatsvertrage 2, 203-06.
39 Rice, 97, n.9 and 123-24, in his complicated reconstruction
of factional politics in Athens and Sparta in this period believes
that Kallistratos was unable to check the Athenians' fury at the
official sanctioning of Sphodrias' attack implicit in his acquittal.
As a result his pro-Spartan clique was voted out of power and the
Athenians prepared to go to war against the Peloponnesian alliance.
See also Meyer, Vol. 5, 369.
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their new Athenian allies) in Boiotia for the first time since the
summer of 394.

The collapse of the faction loyal to him in Athens

tvas perhaps regret table, but the chief order of business \vas to
prevent a revival of the Boiotian league and to chastise the antiSpartan group.
The recently concluded defensive pact with Athens guaranteed
tl1at the Thebans would not stand alone.

Diodorus' misplaced passage

shows that the Athenians' preliminary expedition to Boiotia consisted
of 5.000 n,en. 40

In addition, the pro-Boiotian party in Athens came
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There was a resurgence

of Athenian influence in the Aegean when the Athenians undertook
exte:;sive operations against Sparca by sea. 43

By the summer of 378

40

Diod. 15.26. Schafer., 74-75; Rice, 124; Seager, "The King's
Peace and the Balance of Pmver in Greece, 386-362 B. C.," Athenaeum,
52 (1974), 47; Grote, Vol. 8, 96-97; Beloch, 3.1, 150; and Neyer,
Vol. 5, 366, n.2, all note the impossibility of Demophon's march
occurring before the Sphodrias affair.
41

Xen. Hell. 5.4.34.

l;2

Diodorus (15.29.7) puts the strength of the full mobilization
at 20,000 troops, 500 horsemen and 200 ships. Polybios (2.62.6),
however, cites a more realistic figure of 10,000 troops and 100 ships.
Kirchner~ RE 5.1, 152, no. 6, observes that Demophon and Chabrias~ by
attacking the Peloponnesians from Thebes in the summer of 377, forced
Agesilaos to retreat (Schol. Aristeid. Panath. 173.11).
4~

~Isok.

Plat. 9.
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many Greeks Hho tvere ouL of sympathy \·lith the Spartans fell away from
the Peloponnesian alliance to join the Athenians. 44

If Agcsilaos believed that the Athenian reaction to Sphodrias'
acquittal would be of l1ttle consequence, he would appear to have miscalculated.

Nonetheless Kleombrotos' indecisive incucsion, Sphodrlas'

misadventure, and Demophon's preliminary expedition in the early
spring combined to revive confidence in the elder king.

Faced with

the hostile alliance of Athens and Thebes the Spartans turned to
f cr h.1s proven a b 1'1'1ty 1n
. t h.e t=.
.1e ld . 45

1

'
•
~~esl~aos

He

responded with

enthusiasm to the call, waiving his prior cl2iw of age, but insisted
on bringing to completion the

r~organization

military structure begun in 382.

46

of the alliance's

Greece had been divided into ten

administrative rlistricts as the full allied levy under Agesilaos showed.
The army Has coc;:posed of ten contingents \vhich included the Lake.daimonians, Arkndians, Eleians, Achaians, Korinthians, :t-1egarians, Sikyonians,
~-

Phiiasians, Phokians, Lokrians, Olynthians and l'hracians.

44

Plut.

.

~elop.

47

The rate

15.1.

'+ 5 xenophon

(Hell. 5. 4. 35) Hrites that the Spartans thought
Agesilaos would conduct the war cj>pOVll-l~TE:pov
o¢ (al TOU KAt:opSpOT01J.
Diodorus (15.30). notes the Spartans' choice was based on Agesilaos'
courage, intelligence and energy. He also tvrites that the Spartans
took a much more lenient and conciliatory stance to many Greek cities
because of wide-spread defection to Athens' new maritime league and
the renascent Boiotian confederacy.

46
47

see c h . 8 , note 7 •
niod. 15.31.2.

av
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of cornmutation for poleis not
/

~1AOl

~.;ishing

to contribute soldiers was

t~vo

equalled one hoplite,while one horseman was the equivalent of

four hoplites.

The daily pay was set at three Aiginetan obols per

.
48
h op 1 1te.
lfhen the army marched against Phlious many allied soldiers
grumbled about the Spartans' incessant demands on their manpower
evidently to indulge Agesilaos' support of exiled tyrants. 40

This

time Agesilaos retorted to their complaints with the following device.
He ordered every tradesman to rise upon hearing the name of his craft
called out by a herald.

In time nearly the entire allied army was

on its feet except the Spartans.

The reason was that Spartans were

forbidden by a Lykourgan rhetra from learning any trade but war. 50
Thus despite the allies' muttering, Agesilaos maintained that Sparta
provided more real soldiers than any allied polis or all of them
together. 51
h~en

the full levy assembled for the march north under

Agesilaos, there were over 18,000 soldiers and 1,500 horsemen.

Before

securing the area of Mt. Kithairon, Agesilaos had ordered the warring

48 Xen. Hell. 5.2.21, 6.2.16. Hertzberg, 166, believes that
Agesilaos had a hand in this. Since the project had begun with the
war against Olynthos, Agesilaos was in fact the architect of the reorganization. Grote, Vol. 8, 102-05, discusses at length the
similarities to Athens' fifth-century maritime
~PXn
See also
Busolt/Swoboda, 712-13.
49see ch. 8, note. 40.
50P1ut. Lyk. 24.2.
51 P1ut. ~·
1 1 .7.
A
26 . 3- 5 , M
.
• ora 1 . ?08
_ e; Po 1 ya1nos
,_,
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poleis Kleitor and Arkadian Orchomenos to cease hostilities at once
or f ace

.

occupat~on.

5?
-

He then ordered the mercenaries serving these

tmms to occupy the Kithairon passes.

~fuen

this had been done, he

. . to b eg~n
. h.~s summer
1 e d t h e army sa f e 1y to Th esp~a~

.

operat~ons.

53

That Agesilaos failed to anticipate the vigor of the Athenian
response to Sphodrias' acquittal soon became evident.

As soon as the

allied army set up camp near Thespiai, 5000 soldiers and 200 horsemen
under Chabrias arrived to aid the Boiotians who

~.;ere

commanded by the

Boiotarch Gorgidas. 54
In revie'tving Agesilaos' two incursions into Boiotia, an attempt
to reconcile
~.;ith

t~vo

rather divergent traditions is needed.

The authors

the most extended accounts differ significantly in emphasis and

detail.

As in the case of the disparity between the Oxyrhynchos

historian's description of the Asian campaign in 395 and that of
Xenophon 55 and the somewhat incongruent reports of Xenophon and
Plutarch on the liberation of Thebes, 56 some analysis will be
necessary for an accurate reconstruction of the campaign.

As in the

52 see Geisau, RE 11.1, 611-13,and the Princeton EncYclopedia,
458 for Kleitor. For Arkadian Orchomenos see Muller-Graupa, RE 18.1,
88-90,and the Princeton Encyclopedia, 653-54.
-53 Xen. Hell. 5.4.36-38.
54Diod. 15.32.5; Polyainos 2.1.2.

55 see chs. 1 and 4.
56 see ch. 8.
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earlier instances information from other authors can supplement or
confirm material from the major sources.

In the diagram which follows,

events of the first incursion of 378 are distinct from those of the
second in 377.

It is necessary to bear in mind throughout the follow-

ing discussion that Diodorus has erroneously ascribed both incursions
to 377.

His confused chronology need not reflect, however, on the

accuracy of the operational detail that he presents.

57

The Campaign of 378
Xenophon,

Hellenik~

5.4.36-46:

Diodorus 15.32.1-33.3:

First Phase:

First Phase:

1) Pacification of Kleitor and
Orchomenos from Tegea.

1) missing

2) Occupation of Mt. Kithairon

2) missing

3) Arrival at Thespiai.

3) 18,000 soldiers and 1500
horsemen arrive at Thespiai.
army rests for a few days.

The

4) missing

4) 5,000 soldiers and 200 horsemen under Chabrias arrive from
Athens.

5) Agesilaos lays waste to the
land outside the ditch and stockade next to the city

5) Theban and Athenian forces occupy a fortified hill 3~ km. from
city. Agesilaos' peltasts try to
draw out defenders, but are pushed
back.

57 See Heyer, Vol. 5, 365, n .1, and Be loch, 3. 2, 234.
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6) Theban cavalry suddently charges
allied cavalry and peltasts. Hoplites and main allied cavalry
wheel about and rout the Thebans.
Some losses on each side.

6) Well disciplined display on
hill by Chabrias' peltasts induces Agesilaos to abandon efforts to force a pitched battle.

7) In a sally at da~vn, Agesilaos
attacks an unguarded segment of
stockade, burning some of the
enclosed land up to the city's
walls.

7) Agesilaos orders allies to
plunder all areas outside city and
hill, thus gathering a great deal
of booty.

8) missing

8) Advisors chide Agesilaos f~r
not attempting to force a major
battle despite his superior numbers. The king retorts by claiming victory, since the enemy did
not defend his fields and crops.

9) Agesilaos returns to Thespiai
and replaces Sphodrias as harmost
with Phoibidas.

9) Agesilaos returns to Thespiai
and makes Phoibidas harmost.

10) Agesilaos disbands army at
Megara and returns to Lakedaimon.

10) Agesilaos disbands army at
Megara and returns to Lakedaimon.

11) missing

11) Chabrias has statues of himself erected in Athens to celebrate
his success against Agesilaos.

Second Phase

Second Phase

12) Phoibidas harasses the
Boiotians from Thespiai.

12) missing

13) Thebans retaliate by marching out in full strength.

13) Thebans attack Thespiai, but
fail to dislodge the Spartans.

14) Phoibidas' peltasts hem in
and thrust back the Theban
phalanx.

14) missing

15) Thebans regroup in a ravine
and make a sudden assault against
allied peltasts. After Phoibidas
dies,the rest of the allied
troops retreat within the walls
of the city.

15) Phoibidas rashly counterattacks and loses 500 allied lives,
including his own.
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16) Anti-Spartan exiles find refuge at Thebes. Thebans, rekindling their courage, make
raids against other poleis
occupied by Spartans.

16) missing

17) Lakedaimonians suffer losses
at Tanagra, where Panthoidas is
killed, and at Plataia. New
polemarch with mora arrives to
take charge at Thespiai.

17) missing

Plutarch (Pelop. 14.1-5) mentions the Spartan difficulties at
Plataia and Tanagra, and records the death of Panthoidas. For the
campaign of the following spring, the chart appears as follows:
Xenophon, Hellenika 5.4.47-55, 58.

Diodorus 15.34.1-2:

1) Agesilaos orders Thespian harmost to occupy Kithairon.

1) missing

2) Agesilaos proceeds to Plataia,
feigns a march to Thespiai, but
turns to Erythrai instead.

2) and 3) Agesilaos is prevented
from ravaging the land by Theban
and Athenian troops in fortified
locales.

3) missing
4) Peloponnesians pass the stockade at Skolos and ravage fields
east of Thebes as far as the allied
city of Tanagra.

4) missing

5) Deceived Athenians and
Boiotians at Thespiai wheel about
to the east and occupy a hill to
await the allied army.

5) missing

6) Agesilaos, however, marches
against the unguarded city of
Thebes.

6) Sporadic Athenian and Boiotian
efforts to harass the Lakedaimonian
invaders occur.

7) Athenians and Boiotians
rush to the city's defense and
skirmish with allies.

7) Sortie of Athenians and Boiotians in full strength from the
city results in a struggle from
which Agesilaos suddenly withdraws.58

58see note 42 for Demophon's participation in this sortie.
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8) Agesilaos occupies the hill
abandoned by the Athenians and
Boiotians. Next morning he sets
out for Thespiai.

8) missing

9) Harassed by Chabrias' peltasts,
the king orders the Olynthian
cavalry to attack. The peltasts
are driven off and suffer some
losses.

9) missing

10) At Thespiai, Agesilaos cornposes factional strife, ~vithdraws
the army to ~1egara and disbands it.

10) missing

11) Agesilaos suffers severely
swollen leg (phlebitis?) at Megara.
Efforts to reduce the swelling by
opening a vein almost cause his
death. He is carried back to
Sparta and remains bed-ridden for
the rest of 377 and into the
following year.

11) missing

12) After departure of allied
army, some Boiotians captured en
route to buy grain at Pagasai
escape prison in Oreus and lead
an anti-Spartan uprising. A
permanent grain supply is thereby assured for the Thebans.

12) missing

A glance at the diagram reveals a distinctly different tone
and emphasis in

~vhat

each author presents.

The gaps in Diodorus'

version of the second march result from overcompression and the misapprehension that both marches occurred in 377.

Xenophon, of course,

interpreting events from a Lakedaimonian perspective, is at pains not
to criticize his friend, benefactor and hero Agesilaos. 59

It is not

59 cawkwell, 63-64, and Rice, 95-96, have thus accurately characterized Xenophon's relation to Agesilaos.
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surprising that he should try to minimize the Boiotian and Athenian
success in resisting Agesilaos' numerically superior forces.
Similarly he highlights his old friend's tactical accomplishments,
60
.
.
wh 1.l e suppress1ng
t h ose o f h.1s a dversar1es.

Although Diodorus'

epitome of Ephoros is sometimes careless or superficial, it has the
virtue

of not being obviously biased in favor of Agesilaos and

the Spartans.

Not being under such a constraint, Diodorus more

accurately and impartially describes the Lakedaimonians' failure
to regain control of central Greece.

Even Xenophon could not ob-

scure the fact that the Spartans' only success was to restrict
temporarily the Boiotians' food supply.

The revolt of Oreus,

however, in the northern tip of Euboia ( F 377

) reversed even this

61
.
ac h 1evement.
Regarding the campaign of 378, Xenophon is silent about
Chabrias' 5,000 peltasts and 1,500 horsemen.

Their presence is attest-

ed nonetheless not only by Diodorus, but Polyainos 62 and Nepos.

63

60 see also the remarks on Xenophon's historiography in ch. 1.
This case is not the same as that involving the battle of Sardis. In
the earlier instance, Xenophon appears to have had only partial and
somewhat faulty information from which to reconstruct his account.
In the case of the Boiotian campaigns of 378/77, however, he is clearly
trying to construe as favorably as possible an essentially inconclusive
effort.

61 Xen. Hell. 5.4.56
62 Polyain. 2.1.2.
63 chabrias 1.1-3.
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Xenophon may be exaggerating the size of the area included by the
ditch and stockade which the Thebans built to protect their grain
and livestock.

A sudden allied sortie could have damaged such

supplies and caused a loss of some animals, but Diodorus is probably
right to emphasize Agesilaos' wide-ranging pillage and large yield
of booty.64

The slightly outnumbered Thebans and Athenians relied

on the walls and fortified salients in the field for defense. 65

It

should be noted that Agesilaos' tactics, as described by Diodorus,
are entirely consistent with his hugely successful Asian campaign.
Also Diodorus is likely correct to mention the criticism leveled
against the king by his advisors for not bringing about a decisive
confrontation.66

Some of the blame rests with the defenders who

naturally were unwilling to risk a pitched battle while their defenses were sound.

Although he does not mention the stockade,

Diodorus' account more reliably conveys the desultory and indecisive
nature of the incursion.
After recounting Agesilaos' withdrawal, Xenophon attempts to
portray Phoibidas in more favorable tints than he perhaps deserves.

64xen. Hell. 5.4.38; Diod. 15.32.6.
65oespite Demophon's 5,000 soldiers, Chabrias' 5,000, 1,500
horsemen and perhaps 3,000 to 5,000 Boiotians, the Peloponnesian levy
at 18,000 infantry and 1,500 horsemen enjoyed a numerical advantage.
66 Diod. 15.33.1.
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Diodorus states only that a Theban assault on Thespiai failed, but
that Phoibidas' ill-considered counterattack caused his own death
and that of 500 allied soldiers. 67

Xenophon admits that the Thebans

took heart at Phoibidas' death and Plutarch supplies the reason.
Under Pelopidas' leadership, a Boiotian force also killed Panthoidas, 68
harmost of Tanagra and forced the Lakedamonians to
Plataia.

~vithdra~,r

from

These reverses ornmpted the Spartans to fortify Thespiai

with a polemarch and mora. 6 9
In the spring of 377 Agesilaos once again tried to subjugate
the Boiotians.

Xenophon writes that the king ordered the polemarch

at Thespiai to prepare a market for the army in order to deceive the
Athenians and Boiotians.

As soon as word reached him that the market

was ready, Agesilaos led

the troops directly east from Kithairon in-

stead of

march~ng

north to Plataia and Thespiai.

His destination was

Erythrai, 70 and en route he passed by the stockade at Skolos which the
Thebans had deserted. 71

The purpose of this feint was to draw the

defenders to the west of Thebes, while the allies pillaged to the east

67

Diod. 15.33.5-6.

68 This was the officer sent to relieve Klearchos at Byzantion in
402. He then defeated Klearchos in battle when the latter resisted being replaced. See Diad. 14.12 and Schaefer, RE Vol. 18.2, 776-77.
69xen. Hell. 5.4.46; Plut. Pelop. 15.4-5.
70

see Philippson, RE 3A.l, 575, and Princeton Encyclopedia, 993.

71 Geyer, RE 3A.l, 567,and Polyain. 2.1.11.
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as far as Tanagra. 72

Xenophon offers as proof of the ruse's success

the undefended stockade at Skolos.

According to Diodorus' more cursory

version, the defenders had fortified many more locales in the countryside during the winter.

Agesilaos, realizing this, decided to turn

his attention to another part of Boiotia which he had not plundered
during the first incursion.

Also he would naturally have wanted to see

whether he might retrieve the situation in Tanagra after Panthoidas'
death.

Diodorus implies nonetheless that necessity as much as cunning

dictated Agesilaos' course.7 3
The Thebans formed up at the base of a hill called the
to confront the allies. 74

\

ypaos

Agesilaos again supposedly de-

ceived the Boiotians by marching on a nearly undefended Thebes.

ln

this interpretation the Boiotians abandoned their hill in a panic to
prevent the fall of the city.

In the ensuing skirmish.both sides

suffered some losses, but the allies were able to continue their march
westward. 75

Chabrias' mercenaries harassed the allied rear until

Agesilaos ordered the Olynthian cavalry to repel them.

Apart from the

account of the tyrannicide, this is Xenophon's only reference to
Athenian support of the Boiotian cause.76
Diodorus, however, preserves a different tradition in which the

72 Xen. Hell. 5.4.47-49.
73niod. 15.34 .1.
74rn Polyainos ( 2. 1. 12) and Front inus ( 1. 4. 3), this feature is
called the "Seat of Rhea."
75xen. Hell. 5.4.50-54.
76xen. Hell. 5.4.55.
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Boiotians, having forced Agesilaos to

withdra~.;r

to the

a trophy after a successful sortie from the city.

~vest,

erected

In this version

the Boiotians and Athenians had prevented the Peloponnesians from
pillaging west of Thebes, but once again had striven to avoid a
pitched battle.

\fuat could have changed the defenders' tactics \.;rould

have been an assault on the city.

Agesilaos perhaps reached such a

decision because of the fortified hills to the west of the city.

Also

frustration at being limited to pillage and awareness of his advisors'
criticism in 378 likely caused him to order a direct attack on Thebes
as the best way to force a confrontation.
\-lith these things in mind after his inconclusive campaign near
Tanagra, the king made his move.

..._

He may have believed that the city

itself was undermanned because of the defenders' efforts to fortify
the terrain to the west. 77

The sudden eruption of a sizeable force

from within the walls revealed to the king his error in judgment.
avert a rout he quickly trumpeted a retreat.

To

Because they controlled

the field, the Thebans erected a trophy in the retreating Peloponnesians'
wake.78
After this description of matters on land, Diodorus turns his
attention to naval affairs.

Xenophon, however, notes that Agesilaos

ended the civil strife in Thespiai, thus preventing a slaughter of
t he

.

ant~-

spartan

f

.

act~on.

79

Perhaps word of this strife induced the

77 This is what Xenophon reports (Hell. 5.4.51).
78Diod. 15.34.1-2.
79 Hell. 5. 4. 55.
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king to cut short his efforts to recover Tanagra, since civil
violence in a tmro occupied by a Spartan mora did not augur
allied cause.

~vell

for

Also since the winter the Thebans had provided refuge

for anti-Spartan groups from all Boiotia. 80

Though his assault on

Thebes had failed, the king isolated the Thespian insurgents, thereby
protecting his line of retreat.
Despite Xenophon's best efforts, the central futility of the
two incursions and the Thebans' victory in the one major encounter
emerge clearly from the sum of the evidence.

The last mat'ter dis-

cussed before Agesilaos' illness and brush with death was the disbanding of the army at Megara. 81
After the soldiers had gone home, Agesilaos left the temple
of Aphrodite in Hegara one day and was mounting the steps to the
archeion when he was stricken with severe cramps in his good leg.
Inflammation and swelling soon set in, so a Syracusan physician
opened a vein.

The surgeon, however, was unable to stanch the flmv

of blood and Agesilaos fainted.
almost died.

Before the bleeding stopped, the king

His aides had to carry him back to Lakedaimon where he

80 xen. Hell. 5.4.46.
8lxen. Hell. 5.4.55. Although Xenophon's Hellenika and
Diodorus are our chief sources for the two Boiotian incursions,
allusions to these operations also appear in Xenophon's Agesilaos
2.22, Plutarch's Agesilaos 26.2-3, and a series of anecdotes preserved
in Polyainos' Strategemata. Items 2.1.2, 18 and 21 seem to refer to
378, but 2.1.9, 20 and 25 could describe events in either year. In
general they tend to confirm the desultory and ineffectual nature of
the Spartan efforts. Grote, Vol. 8, 121, n.l,and Cartledge, Sparta
and Lakonia, 290-91, both discuss these anecdotes briefly.
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remained bedridden for months and

~vas

unable to resume command of

. d operatlons
.
. t h e sprlng.
.
82
ln
a 11 le
It is perhaps ironic that physical disability should occur
just as the cornerstone of Agesilaos' hegemony was crumbling.

The

rivalry between the king and the navarch who gave his name to the
defunct peace flared up again.

Antalkidas chided Agesilaos after his

return from Boiotia for violating a clause in the
of Lykourgos.

~rear

rhetra

This clause forbade campaigning too often against the

same foe lest that foe learn the art of successful warfare. 83
Because he had failed to retrieve matters in Boiotia, Agesilaos
cannot have missed the aptness of Antalkidas' remark.

Although the

most important factor in their success was the alli2nce with Athens,
the Boiotians proved themselves a match for the Spartans because
Agesilaos underestimated the vigor of the Athenians' response.

The

reason for this response was that the Athenians considered the Peace
of Antalkidas no longer binding after Sphodrias' acquittal. 84
Even before Agesilaos' protracted illness, the underpinnings
of his hegemony had been loosened.

Unrest in poleis garrisoned by

82 Xen. Hell. 5.4.58; Plut. Ages. 27.1-2.
83 Plut. Ages. 26.2-3; Moral. 189f. 213f and 217e. In some of
these citations Agesilaos is represented as wounded ( TIAny{vTa Dnd
"'
.>
,
GnSatwv
EV ~ax~
), but this is a confusion of the events of 377
with the battle of Koroneia in 394. This injunction appears in
Plutarch's Lyk. 13.5, Moral. 227c; and Po1yainos 1.16.2.
84 see Aristeides 173.5-15 and 258.10.
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Sparta, defection to Athens' new maritime league of cities allied to
Sparta, and the revival of the Boiotian league all signalled a profound shift in Greek political realities.

As in the Chalkidike with

Teleutias' death and the liberation of Thebes, Agesilaos' purpose
suffered a setback.

Major responsibility for directing the affairs

of state fell to Kleombrotos.

Agesilaos' illness was perhaps pro-

vidential; he suffers a six years' absence from our sources, not
reappearing until the peace conference just before the battle of
Leuktra (summer 371). 85

It is possible that Kleombrotos and his

partisans might have increased their prominence in affairs of state
even if Agesilaos had remained healthy.

His lack of naval sense

and ingrained hostility to Thebes weakened his perception of the
threat posed by a revived Athenian league.

If so it is again ironic

that the 10,000 Athenians on land precluded his success in Boiotia.
Agesilaos likely realized too late the reason for his failure to
retrieve the situation in central Greece.
It is fitting, therefore, that political ascendancy in
Lakedaimon should pass to a group that did recognize the seriousness
of Athens' maritime threat.

When Agesilaos re-emerged into full

light of history, his homeland stood on the brink of its greatest
single disaster, the defeat at Leuktra.

The Spartans never recovered

from this setback and were reduced to the role of minor local contender
in Greek affairs.

From 371 to his death in 360 Agesilaos' role in the

8 5see Hertzberg, 173-74 and Smith, 282-84 with notes.
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state had changed dramatically from the days when the Spartan
hegemony stood at zenith - the hegemony of which he had been both
architect and koryphaios.
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